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2To my mother andfather
3ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I examine a view called ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’, which 
holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put 
crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a 
structure. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal 
assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable scientific 
realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its rivals.
The first chapter presents an overview of the scientific realism debate, concentrating 
on the epistemological dimension. The second chapter tracks the development of 
structural realism, differentiates between several versions, and outlines the 
objections that have been raised against it. The third chapter provides answers to a 
large subset of these objections, namely those launched by Stathis Psillos, who 
spearheads the critique of epistemic structural realism. The fourth chapter offers an 
attempted solution to M.H.A. Newman’s objection that the epistemic structural 
realist view, if true, trivialises scientific knowledge. The fifth  chapter presents a 
historical case study of the caloric theory of heat. I utilise the study to answer the 
pessimistic meta-induction argument. The sixth chapter addresses the argument from 
the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that epistemic structural 
realism can potentially restrict the impact of the argument by imposing structural 
constraints on the set of all possible theories compatible with the evidence. The 
seventh and final chapter outlines briefly some promising avenues for future 
research.
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THE SCIENTIFIC REALISM DEBATE
1. Introduction
A question in the philosophy of science that has engrossed the minds of many 
eminent thinkers is the epistemological one of what kind of knowledge, if any, 
science reveals of the physical world. Answers to this question are typically 
classified as either realist or anti-realist.1 Structural Realism, as part of its name 
suggests, is a position on the realist side of the divide. In very simple terms, its 
advocates hold that our epistemic access to the world, so far as its non-observable 
part is concerned, is restricted to its structural features. The position can be traced 
back at least to the beginning of the twentieth century and has recently been 
attracting renewed interest.
My main aim in this dissertation is to evaluate the structural realist answer to the 
aforementioned question. It seems only prudent then to devote the first chapter to an 
examination of the scientific realism debate. In what follows, I will delineate the 
boundaries of the debate, articulate the various positions and identify the 
protagonists. I will also sketch the main arguments and the corresponding objections 
and counter-objections. Finally, I will set out the main obstacles for realism. In doing 
so, I hope to set the stage for structural realism, explain its role in this debate as well 
as reveal more about the conditions of its inception and its reincarnation about a 
decade and a half ago.
2. The Origins and Boundaries of the Debate3
Arguably, the scientific realism debate did not really come into its own, i.e. was not 
independent from general debates about realism, until the twentieth century. The first 
quarter of the century was marked by a somewhat unsophisticated general realism,
1 Unless otherwise noted, the terms ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’ will denote the more specific 
viewpoints o f  scientific realism and scientific anti-realism respectively.
2 This widely held impression is confirmed by the recent increase in the number o f publications 
dealing with structural realism. Note also that in the latest conference o f the American Philosophy o f  
Science Association (PSA 2002), structural realism was central to three out o f five papers in the 
realism section.
3 Detailed overviews o f the debate can be found in Boyd (1984: 41-82; 2002) and Psillos (2000b).
9most memorably the critical realism of Roy Wood Sellars, formed in reaction to the 
rampant idealism of the nineteenth century. The logical positivists came to dominate 
the second quarter of the century. In view of the quantum and relativistic revolutions 
in physics, they found much support for their instrumentalist version of anti-realism. 
It was not until the 1960s, after a multifaceted attack on logical positivism, that 
realism was revived under the guidance of such figures as Karl Popper, Grover 
Maxwell, and J.J.C. Smart. At around the same time, the historically motivated work 
of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend inspired new converts to, and new versions 
of, anti-realism. Realist voices were not kept at bay, however, with Hilary Putnam 
and Richard Boyd, among others, keeping the debate alive in the seventies. In the 
early eighties, the independent but equally powerful critiques by Bas van Fraassen 
and Larry Laudan shaped old problems into new challenges for the scientific realist. 
The debate as it is carried out today owes much to these developments, especially 
those that emerged after 1960.
The twentieth century gave birth and rebirth to a plethora of realisms and anti­
realisms. The current debate is so wonderfully varied that I would be unable to justly 
review in one chapter, or indeed pursue in the rest of the dissertation. For this reason 
I will concentrate on one particular comer of the debate, something that will make 
my task more manageable. Three threads common to the central realist and anti­
realist positions in this comer of the current debate are the following:
(CD1) There exists a mind-independent world.
(CD2) Scientific claims/sentences/statements have tmth-values.
(CD3) Their tmth or falsity is determinable by recourse to the mind-independent 
world.
These threads help circumscribe the debate. The first thread, CD1, endorses 
ontological realism thereby excluding positions such as traditional forms of idealism, 
phenomenalism, and solipsism that deny this view. Idealism holds that the world 
consists only of minds and/or mental states. Phenomenalism, at least in one form, 
can be understood in a similar way: namely as the position that the world consists 
only of experiences/perceptions/phenomena. Solipsism offers a more extreme
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description, claiming that the only thing in existence is one’s own mind and mental 
states.
The second thread, CD2, endorses ‘semantic realism’. This excludes positions such 
as traditional instrumentalism, the verificationist-based instrumentalism of logical 
positivists and fictionalism. In more detail: Traditional varieties of instrumentalism 
view scientific theories as means for the organisation and prediction of the 
observable aspects of the world and deny that they can have truth-values. Similarly, 
the verificationist-based instrumentalism of the logical positivists holds that only 
observational, as opposed to theoretical, statements are meaningful and have truth- 
values. The later logical positivists, who rejected the verificationist principle, argued 
that theoretical statements are partially interpreted and can have truth-values, all in 
virtue of their correspondence with observational statements.4 Fictionalism can be 
thought of as a version of instrumentalism, since it holds that theories do not have a 
truth-value but are instead valued for their reliability or usefulness. It supposedly 
departs from instrumentalism in that it takes scientific theories and their ontological 
posits to be reliable fictions. How the conception of a theory or posit as a fiction 
differs from that as a mere tool is not all that clear.
The third and final thread, CD 3, endorses the correspondence theory of truth. It 
understands the notion of truth as one of correspondence between the mind- 
independent world and language. This excludes positions such as social 
constructivism and conventionalism. Social constructivists typically argue that 
scientific knowledge is the product of theorising, not of discovering facts about the 
world. Conventionalists consider the claims of science as mere agreements, whose 
truth is guaranteed by stipulation. While some conventionalists restrict the 
application of their view to domains like logic, arithmetic, and geometry, others 
apply it across the board covering, among other things, scientific claims.
I do not presume that the excluded positions are without merit, but rather choose to 
concentrate on a very specific, and more manageable, problem: Assuming CD1,
4 Psillos (2000b) calls the instrumentalist positions that deny truth-values altogether ‘eliminativist 
instrumentalism’, and the positions that allow for truth-values but claim that the truth and meaning of 
theoretical statements is parasitic on those o f observational statements ‘reductive empiricism’.
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CD2, and CD3, can science lead us to knowledge about the mind-independent 
world? Participants in the scientific realism debate have, by and large, sought to 
answer this type of question, shying away from, or at least sidelining, ontological, 
semantical, methodological, and ethical questions.5 This dissertation will be almost 
exclusively concerned with epistemological questions.
The following two theses will help us in the formulation of realism and anti-realism:
(OT) The observable thesis: We can have knowledge of the observable aspects of 
the world.
(UT) The unobservable thesis: We can have knowledge of the unobservable 
aspects of the world.
I have left the meaning of the terms ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ undefined for 
now, since there is disagreement over this issue. In what follows, we take a closer 
look at each of the two opposing camps.
3. Scientific Realism
First Approximation
As a first approximation, we can represent scientific realism as the conjunction of OT 
and UT. More precisely, scientific realism states that we can have, and actually do 
have some, knowledge of the observable and unobservable aspects of the world. But 
what exactly do we mean by observable and unobservable? The current consensus 
amongst realists follows Maxwell’s landmark essay (1962), where he argues that 
there is a continuum from the observable to the unobservable so that no sharp 
distinction between them can be drawn. Maxwell also argues that what is 
unobservable is contingent upon factors such as the physiology of the human eye, and 
that for this reason we cannot demarcate the observable from the unobservable. Some 
of Maxwell’s arguments rely on the theory-ladenness of observation, an idea that has 
been advocated by Pierre Duhem ([1914] 1991), Paul Feyerabend (1962), T.S. Kuhn 
([1962] 1996) and N.R. Hanson (1958) among others. Though the exact meaning of
5 For a more detailed treatment o f these other dimensions o f the debate see Niiniluoto (1999: ch.l).
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this notion is contested, most agree that since observation statements are formulated 
in theory-specific contexts, they are to a certain degree imbued with theoretical 
prejudices. We shall shortly see that the theory-ladenness of observation is a double- 
edged sword, employed by both realists and anti-realists in their attempts to defeat 
one another.
Second Approximation
Another requirement of scientific realism, already pointed out under CD2, is that 
scientific claims have truth-values. Our rough understanding of the concept of 
knowledge holds that to know something is to have a justified true belief about it. 
Gettier (1963) famously presented an allegedly devastating counterexample to this 
analysis of the concept of knowledge. In the current context, one need not get into 
the details of how best, if  at all, to characterise the concept. All that need concern us 
here is the fact that having a true belief about something is a necessary condition for 
knowing it. To have knowledge of some aspect of the world involves the true belief 
that the world is in a certain state. Thus, we can express the scientific realist view 
that we have knowledge of (the observable and unobservable aspects of) the world 
by saying that scientific claims about the world are true. As a second approximation 
then we can represent scientific realism as the position which holds that the scientific 
claims about the observable and unobservable aspects of the world are true.6
Third Approximation
Most, if not all, scientific realists accept that the claims made by our current theories 
are not typically true but rather approximately true. In part, the realisation stems 
from the simple recognition that even our best theories are invariably, though to 
different degrees, off the mark when it comes to the production of predictions. The 
recent interest in this field was initiated by Popper (1963), who used the terms 
‘truthlikeness’ and ‘verisimilitude’ to express the idea that one theory could stand 
closer to the truth than another.7 In Popper’s account theories are taken to be sets of 
sentences closed under deduction. According to him, the truth content of a theory A
6 For some realists this holds only o f scientific claims from the most successful sciences, i.e. physics 
and chemistry. Others are more liberal.
7 Niiniluoto (1999: 65) traces the etymological origin o f these terms to the Latin term ‘verisimilitudo’, 
which means likeness or similarity to truth and was introduced by the ancient sceptics Cameades and 
Cicero.
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is the intersection between A and T, i.e. AnT, where T  is the set of all true sentences. 
On the basis of this notion, he defines increased truthlikeness thus: a theory B is 
more truthlike than a theory A if and only if one of the following two conditions is 
met:8
(Cl) A nT cB n T  and B nF cA nF  
(C2) A nT cB n T  and B nF cA nF
Popper’s definition of truthlikeness was short-lived, for David Miller (1974) and 
Pavel Tichy (1974) independently proved that under this definition a false theory 
could not be more truthlike than any theory whatsoever. This is an unwanted result 
because one of the demands for a theory of truthlikeness is to be able to compare 
theories that are strictly speaking false yet approximate the truth to greater or lesser 
extents. Since the refutation of Popper’s definition, a number of different accounts of 
the notions of truthlikeness, verisimilitude and approximate truth have appeared.9 
The most prevalent of these takes similarity or likeness as measuring distances from 
the truth (see, for example, Hiplinen (1976), Niiniluoto (1987), and Oddie (1986)). 
One of the most serious problems with this approach is that comparative judgments 
of truthlikeness are not translation-invariant. While in one language a theory A may 
be more truthlike than a theory B, this relation can be reversed in another language. 
Various solutions to this problem have been proposed (see, for example, Tichy 
(1978), Oddie (1986)) but none seems to command a consensus.
Many realists have abandoned the task of trying to give formal treatments to these 
notions and have instead focused on more informal accounts (see, for example, 
Aronson, Harre and Way (1994), Newton-Smith (1981), Smith (1998) and Psillos 
(1999)). Whether any such informal account delivers the goods is a contentious 
issue. At any rate, it is sufficient for the current purposes to note, as a third 
approximation, that scientific realism can be represented as the position that the
8 Obviously, F  is the set o f all false sentences.
9 Note that some authors (see, for instance, Niiniluoto (1999)) assign different meanings and functions 
to the concepts o f approximate truth and truthlikeness.
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scientific claims about the observable and unobservable aspects of the world are at 
least approximately true.10
General Formulation
Before we present a general formulation, we must consider one more element, 
namely the aim that scientific realism ascribes to science. According to the first part 
of van Fraassen’s definition of scientific realism “Science aims to give us, in its 
theories, a literally true story o f what the world is like” (1980: 8) [original 
emphasis]. Most realists are happy with this characterisation. Given the traits we 
have attributed to scientific realism so far, it seems hardly necessary to state that at 
least one of the main aims of science is to give us true/ approximately true claims 
about the world. It is nonetheless worth making this feature explicit in our general 
formulation of scientific realism:
(SCR) Scientific Realism: Science aims to produce, and has succeeded in producing, 
true/approximately true claims about both the observable and the unobservable 
aspects of the world.
This formulation captures the spirit of scientific realism. To present a more complete 
picture, however, we need to look at the main claims that often accompany scientific 
realism. In ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’, Laudan provides a list of the 
central claims advocated by scientific realists, correctly acknowledging that “there is 
probably no realist who subscribes to all of them [though] most of them have been 
defended by some self-avowed realist or other” (1981: 20). Here is a no-frills version 
of that list:
(RC1) Scientific theories in mature sciences are typically approximately true. 
(RC2) More recent theories are closer to the truth than earlier ones.
(RC3) All the terms, i.e. observational and theoretical, of theories in mature 
science genuinely refer.
(RC4) Successive theories in mature science ‘preserve’ the theoretical relations
10 It might be objected that this statement needs to be restricted to mature scientific claims. Indeed, 
most, if not all, scientific realists adopt this restriction. This point is correct and is taken on board in 
the next few paragraphs. For more on the concept o f mature scientific claims, I ask the reader to look 
at the last few paragraphs o f section six of this chapter.
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and referents of earlier theories.
(RC5) New theories (do and should) explain the success of their predecessors.
(RC6) Claims (RC1)-(RC5) constitute the best, if  not the only, explanation for 
the success of science, and this success provides empirical confirmation 
for realism. (1981: 20-21).
Laudan calls the conjunction of all these claims ‘convergent epistemological 
realism’, the idea being that successive scientific theories steadily converge to an 
ultimate and final theory that faithfully reflects reality.
Having presented a general formulation of scientific realism plus a list of central 
accompanying claims, it would now be useful to say a few things about the main 
varieties of realism. Given the numerous, and usually subtle, disagreements over the 
claims on the above list, it would prove cumbersome to use the list as a point of 
departure.11 However, we can make a rough and ready distinction between total 
realism and partial realism}2 Contra total realism, partial realism imposes a 
distinction between those kinds of theoretical components that can represent some 
aspect of the world and those that cannot.13 By ‘kinds’ I here mean the general 
classificatory schemes employed to systematise science, i.e. entities, laws, etc. Under 
the banner of total realism we can place philosophers such as Richard Boyd, Philip 
Kitcher, Jarrett Leplin, W.H. Newton-Smith, Ilkka Niiniluoto, and Stathis Psillos.14 
Under the banner of partial realism we can cite Nancy Cartwright, Ronald Giere, Ian 
Hacking, Rom Harre, Eman McMullin, John Worrall, and Elie Zahar.15
11 Leplin (1984: 1-7) attempts to go down this path with a similar list but the result, though somewhat 
informative, is rather convoluted.
12 Similar distinctions have been put forward by others. Ilkka Niiniluoto, for example, distinguishes 
between critical realism and critical half-realism (1999: 12). Arthur Fine (1998) identifies piecemeal 
realism in a manner similar to Niiniluoto’s critical half-realism.
13 Some total realists, like Philip Kitcher and Stathis Psillos, draw their own distinctions between 
those theoretical components that we should believe in and those that we should not. Their distinction 
does not make them partial realists in the sense explained above, for it does not discriminate between 
kinds o f theoretical components. For example, they do not advocate belief only in laws but not 
entities, or vice-versa, like partial realists do.
14 For further reference see Boyd (1990), Kitcher (1993), Leplin (1984), Newton-Smith (1989), 
Niiniluoto (1999), and Psillos (1999).
15 See, for example, Cartwright (1983), Giere (1988), Hacking (1982), Harr6 (1988), McMullin 
(1984), Worrall (1989), and Zahar (2001).
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We can cut deeper into partial realism by asking the question, ‘ What is it that the 
partial realist claims we have knowledge of?’ Ian Hacking and Nancy Cartwright, for 
example, are realists about entities, claiming agnosticism about theories. According 
to Hacking’s influential account, hypothetical entities become real “[w]hen we use 
them to investigate something else” (1982: 1165). His prime example concerns 
PEGGY II, a polarising electron gun, built according to our knowledge of the causal 
properties of electrons. When the gun was successfully used to discover the first 
known example of parity-violation in a weak neutral current interaction, Hacking 
maintains, we gained further evidence to believe in the reality of electrons.
Similarly, Cartwright (1980) has argued for a realist attitude towards the causes of 
phenomena, which, at least in this case, involves realism about the entities that 
feature in causal accounts. It is the fundamental laws of physics, according to her, 
that we should be wary about since “to the extent that they are true, [they] don’t 
explain much” (867). In Cartwright’s view, the fundamental laws of physics work 
well, and are considered approximately true, in controlled laboratory experiments. 
But they do not, and according to her cannot, be taken to be true of or explain what 
goes on in the world outside the laboratory. Outside, the laws need to be augmented 
by additional assumptions and auxiliaries to be able to model anything; and even 
then they under-perform in their predictive and explanatory power when compared 
to what they can achieve in a laboratory. Worse still, they are often completely 
inapplicable. Having painted this bleak picture, Cartwight argues against 
fundamental physical laws and in favour of the reality of entities that feature in more 
localised causal interactions. Her best-known counter-example to the explanatory 
power of fundamental laws of physics is the intractable dynamics of a thousand 
dollar-bill floating around in St. Stephen’s Square in Vienna.16
The other major type of partial realism is structural realism. John Worrall and Elie 
Zahar, for instance, are realists about structures, i.e. typically laws of nature 
represented by mathematical equations, claiming that theoretical posits and non- 
structural parts of theories alike are suspicious. Since the next chapter is devoted to 
an explanation and elaboration of structural realism, I will restrict my comments here
16 See her (1998: 28). Cartwright correctly credits Otto Neurath with the example.
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to the prima facie incompatibility between entity realism and structural realism. If 
entity realists remain agnostic with regard to theories/fundamental laws, which 
presumably includes structures, and structural realists remain agnostic with regard to 
theoretical posits, then obviously the two positions can hardly disagree more. 
Niiniluoto (1999: 139) goes as far as to call them ‘diametrically opposite’. I think 
that his ruling may be a bit premature. Despite their professed aversion towards 
theory, entity realists make allowances for some, low-level, theory. Hacking, for 
example, appeals to ‘low-level causal properties’, which, no matter how much 
glazing he puts on them, are simply theoretical properties. Similarly, as we shall see 
in the next chapter, structural realism does not reject knowledge of entities but rather 
restricts such knowledge to their structural features.17
4. Arguments in Support of Realism
Over the years many arguments have been proposed in favour of realism. Of these, 
few have carried as much weight as the No Miracle and Inference to the Best 
Explanation arguments. The following is a brief exposition of the principal claims 
involved in these arguments as well as objections raised against them.
The argument that came to be known as the ‘no miracle argument’ (NMA) was 
independently proposed by J.J.C. Smart (1963) and Hilary Putnam (1975). 
According to the NMA, scientific realism is the only view that does not make the 
success of science a miracle. Given the empirical success of scientific theories, it 
would be a coincidence of almost cosmic proportions or a miracle if they were not at 
least approximately true. The tacit assumption underlying the NMA is that most of 
us are unwilling to accept that the success of science is a miracle. We thus opt for the 
purportedly only alternative, scientific realism.
It could be objected that the NMA poses an unfair dilemma: either uphold scientific 
realism or consider the success of science a miracle. The second disjunct is 
generally accepted as not really an option. Indeed, van Fraassen (1980: 39-40) 
concedes that we might need to account for the success of science, but denies that the
17 Chakravartty (1998) goes as far as to say that the two views, when properly construed, entail each 
other. Though I do not find this claim convincing, I agree with the general idea that entity and 
structural realism can be harmonised with one another without much difficulty. For more on this see 
my review (2003a) o f Niiniluoto’s book.
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only or best account is scientific realism. To support his point he makes an analogy 
between the practice of science and the theory of evolution. Scientific theories also 
struggle for survival with only the ‘fittest’, i.e. most successful, surviving. These, 
van Fraassen says, need not be true or approximately true but they need to be 
empirically successful.18
In order to strengthen arguments like the NMA, realists oftentimes emphasise the 
importance of novel predictions.19 It is argued, for example, that scientific realism 
best accounts for the novel success of science. A prediction is novel, according to the 
most basic notion of novelty, if the phenomenon predicted was not known to have 
existed prior to the theory’s prediction of it. This is often called temporal novelty. 
More sophisticated notions have been proposed over the years. Elie Zahar (1973), for 
example, has proposed the notion of heuristic novelty, also called design novelty, to 
convey the idea even if a phenomenon P  is known prior to the inception of a theory 
X, its prediction by X  will be novel provided that P  was not used in the construction 
of X. More generally, so long as a body of evidence was not used in a theory’s 
construction it counts as heuristic-novel.20 Newton’s gravitational theory is a case in 
point. Although the precession of the equinoxes was known to Newton, his theory 
was not constructed using this phenomenon. According to the notion of heuristic 
novelty, the subsequent prediction of the phenomenon using Newton’s theory counts 
as novel.
Many philosophers believe that the concept of inference to the best explanation 
(IBE) is due to C.S. Peirce, who introduced it under the name of ‘abduction’. What 
certainly is uncontestable is that a century later Gilbert Harman (1965) branded this 
type of reasoning ‘inference to the best explanation’.21 The idea behind IBE is simple 
and intuitive, its use abundant in scientific practice. If a theory X explains some
18 To understand this argument properly one needs to know more about van Fraassen’s take on the 
epistemological status o f scientific theories. This task will be taken up in the coming sections. In the 
meantime it is important to note that van Fraassen’s evolution analogy is criticised in, among other 
places, Brown (1994: 6-7).
19 There is a thriving literature on this topic. Some notable articles include Worrall (1985), Mayo 
(1991), and Achinstein (1994).
20 John Worrall offers a notion o f use-novelty that is a development o f  Zahar’s notion (see the 
former’s (1985) and especially his (2002)).
21 In Peirce’s work, abduction is more general than inference to the best explanation; it is inference to 
some explanation.
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evidence better than any of its rivals, then it is reasonable to choose X over the 
others. IBE is thus essentially comparative in nature, with explanatory merits as the 
adjudicating force.22 This much seems trivial. More contentiously, many realist 
supporters of IBE have argued that we should not merely choose X over its rivals but 
that we should believe in the truth or approximate truth of X.
It is not hard to see how this largely methodological concern has been hijacked for 
the epistemological concerns of the scientific realism debate. Boyd and Putnam, in 
particular, are credited with developing an IBE-based explanationist defence of 
realism that has come to dominate the realists’ arsenal.23 Their argument is that the 
empirical success of science, not just a body of evidence, requires explaining. The 
best, indeed the only, explanation for this success, according to them, is realism.24 
They thus see the NMA as an instance of IBE. That is, it is inferred that the success 
of science is not due to a miracle but rather to the truth/approximate truth of the 
theories employed. In fact, Boyd, Putnam, and more recently Psillos, treat scientific 
realism as a scientific hypothesis, whose support comes from the view that it is the 
only viable explanation of the methodological success of science.
The most thorough study of IBE thus far has been that of Peter Lipton (1991). He 
compares IBE to various traditional inferential devices, such as the ‘instantial model 
of inductive confirmation’ and the hypothetico-deductive model, arguing that IBE 
overcomes some of their shortfalls. Not only is IBE better than the competition, 
according to Lipton, but it also “gives a natural description of familiar aspects of our 
inferential procedures” and “has a number of distinctively philosophical 
applications” (66,70). IBE is not a monolithic concept. Lipton identifies a range of 
IBEs, of which he singles out inference to the loveliest potential explanation (see 
ch.4). This is contrasted to inference to the likeliest potential explanation, the
22 Having said that, I don’t think that proponents o f this view would be alarmed if  someone pointed 
out the fact that a lot o f theories have no extant rivals. In reply, they would probably say that if  it is a 
theory o f a mature science and it explains the data, it should still be considered as true or at least 
approximately true. For them, being the sole contestant just means that it is the only one that explains 
the data, and in that respect the best available theory.
23 Not all scientific realists in fact accept the explanationist defence (see Newton-Smith (1989)).
24 Psillos (1999: 71) argues that realism is the best rather than the only explanation o f science.
25 Boyd calls this the ‘abductive strategy’ which he contrasts with a similar approach that he calls 
‘local explanationism’. For more see his (2002: 7-9). Notice that the so-called abductive strategy is 
similar to Laudan’s claim RC6.
20
loveliest explanation offering the most understanding while the likeliest being best 
supported by the evidence. Lipton prefers inference to the loveliest potential 
explanation because he thinks that explanatory loveliness can be a guide to likeliness 
and that our inference making becomes less interesting the more we restrict the role 
of explanatory virtues.
Both IBE and the explanationist defence of realism have been criticised on numerous 
grounds. The most common objection is that using IBE to choose one theory over 
existing rivals guarantees neither the theory’s truth nor its approximate tmth. After 
all, the pool may contain only false theories. This objection has, in turn, been used to 
argue that the explanationist defence of realism is question-begging (see, for 
example, van Fraassen (1985)). Given that non-realists do not accept IBE in science, 
the argument goes, there is no basis to accept the (meta-level) explanationist defence 
of realism. Van Fraassen, in particular, offers an alternative account according to 
which “we are always willing to believe that the theory which best explains the 
evidence, is empirically adequate” (1980: 20). He thus uses IBE, originally brought 
into the debate to support the realist, to make an anti-realist inference, namely that an 
explanatory better theory is empirically adequate.
5. Scientific Anti-Realism
All anti-realists, not surprisingly, share a distrust of, or scepticism towards, realist 
claims. Just like realism, anti-realism can be found in various forms and guises. With 
regard to scientific knowledge, the general anti-realist intuition is that we cannot 
know whether any of the claims made by scientific theories about the mind- 
independent world are true or approximately true. As a consequence, anti-realists 
consider the realist claims RC1-RC6 unwarranted. In particular, they denounce the 
realists’ principal claims that theories are increasingly approximating the tmth and 
that the theoretical terms in currently successful theories refer, i.e. the entities 
alleged to exist by these theories really do exist.
As previously indicated, given the assumptions that I set out in the beginning of this 
chapter, i.e. CD1, CD2 and CD3, only one anti-realist position qualifies as an 
alternative to realism. I am referring to constmctive empiricism, the position that is
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widely thought of as the main anti-realist competitor in this debate. In what follows I 
take a look at the main tenets of constructive empiricism.
Constructive Empiricism
The view identified as ‘constructive empiricism’ is the brainchild of Bas van 
Fraassen. It shares some features of the older instrumentalism, but it diverges from it 
in at least one important respect. As van Fraassen is at pains to point out, 
constructive empiricism insists on a literal construal of the language of science. In 
short, theoretical statements are understood as having truth-values. The catch, 
however, is that we cannot find out what truth-values theoretical statements have. 
We can only assign truth-values to observational statements. That, according to him, 
is enough to present science as a rational process.
In line with logical positivists, but against realists, van Fraassen supports a 
distinction between observables and unobservables. To be precise, he lambasts the 
use of expressions such as ‘observational vs theoretical dichotomy’ and ‘theoretical 
entity’, saying that these are examples of category errors. Entities are observable or 
unobservable, while terms and concepts are theoretical. This clarification, argues van 
Fraassen, leads to two important questions: 1) Is language divisible into theoretical 
and non-theoretical parts? 2) Are objects and events divisible into observable and 
unobservable ones? He answers the first negatively by appeal to the idea that our 
language is thoroughly theory-laden. He answers the second affirmatively in saying 
that though the term ‘observable’ is a vague predicate, just like most predicates in 
natural language, “it is usable provided it has clear cases and clear counter-cases” 
(1980: 16). He goes on to say that seeing with the naked, i.e. unaided, eye is a clear 
case of observation whereas ‘seeing’ particles in a cloud chamber is a clear counter­
case.
Constructive empiricism is offered as an epistemologically frugal view that can 
nonetheless make sense of science. More precisely, constructive empiricism is the 
view that “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and 
acceptance o f a theory involves a belief only that it is empirically adequate” (12) 
[original emphasis]. One evident difference between van Fraassen’s position and 
realism is the replacement of the criterion of truth with that of empirical adequacy.
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What exactly is empirical adequacy and why should we prefer it to truth? The 
answer to the first part of the question is that a theory is empirically adequate when 
everything it asserts about the observable world is true. Echoing Duhem’s phrase 
‘saving the phenomena’, van Fraassen argues that a theory is empirically adequate if 
it saves the phenomena. The answer to the second part of the question is that the 
criterion of empirical adequacy is less demanding (and presumably more warranted) 
than the criterion of truth, for it requires theories to make true assertions only about 
the observable aspects of the world. In other words, Van Fraassen rejects UT.
Discussions of the merits and drawbacks of constructive empiricism can be found in 
abundance.26 Many of the objections raised against it are directed at the notion of 
empirical adequacy. John Worrall (1984) and Alan Musgrave (1985), for example, 
have independently argued that if a theory is to be empirically adequate in van 
Fraassen’s sense, then it must save all the phenomena, not just those actually 
observed so far. But since we can never have access to all the phenomena, we will 
never be warranted in accepting a theory as empirically adequate. Many other 
objections are directed at the observable-unobservable distinction. It has been 
argued, for example, that the selective scepticism that van Fraassen advocates cannot 
really be upheld since it is presumably based on an arbitrarily drawn distinction (see 
Paul Churchland (1982) and Gary Gutting (1983)).
6. Arguments in Support of Anti-Realism
Two arguments that have a venerable history supporting anti-realism are: 1) the 
underdetermination of theory by evidence and 2) the damning historical record of 
science.
Underdetermination o f Theory by Evidence
Though currently found in various formulations, the main idea behind the 
underdetermination of theories by evidence (UTE) is, roughly speaking, that for any 
given body of evidence there are infinitely many competing theories that can 
‘accommodate’ it, so that the evidence cannot uniquely determine a scientific theory.
26 Churchland and Hooker (1985) contains a collection o f essays on constructive empiricism including 
a reply from van Fraassen.
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That the inference from the evidence to the theory is not deductively valid is an age- 
old idea. One prominent advocate is David Hume. Hume famously argued that no 
matter how many occurrences of an event we observe, we cannot derive a universal
97statement from them. This has come to be known as the problem of induction. A 
similar idea that has been around since (at least) the late nineteenth century concerns 
the fitting of curves. It is a matter of fact that infinitely many curves pass through 
any finite number of points. The analogy with UTE should be obvious, i.e. infinitely 
many theories can accommodate the same (inevitably finite) body of evidence.
A related, though distinct, idea was put forth by Pierre Duhem ([1914] 1991). He 
argues that confirmation is a holistic affair. More precisely, he argues that a 
hypothesis can never be tested in isolation, since it cannot produce testable 
predictions without auxiliary assumptions. Put differently, a counterinstance falsifies 
the whole conjunction (i.e. hypothesis plus auxiliaries), leaving us uncertain about 
which of the conjuncts are to blame. Duhem’s thesis was subsequently revived, 
though arguably in a different guise, by W.V. Quine (1951). He has proposed the 
stronger argument that any hypothesis in our web of beliefs can always be saved by
adjusting the web to accommodate evidence that was previously thought of as
* 28 negative.
UTE supports anti-realist accounts in that it holds that no matter how much evidence 
we amass we will always have infinitely many theories to choose from, i.e. we will 
never be able to uphold any one theory as the true one. We can formulate a 
constructive empiricist version of UTE:
(UTE-CE): For any given body of observational evidence there are infinitely many 
empirically equivalent theories that diverge on their theoretical claims.
Though it is not uniquely associated with constructive empiricism, the concept of 
empirical equivalence features centrally in it. We say that two or more theories are
27 Nelson Goodman (1965) presents concrete examples o f how induction can fail to pick the right 
theory. See Colin Howson (2001) for one o f many alleged solutions o f the problem.
28 Donald Gillies (1993) argues that Duhem’s thesis differs from Quine’s thesis. Carl Hoefer and 
Alexander Rosenberg (1994) point out the differences between underdetermination and what has 
come to be known as the ‘Duhem-Quine thesis’.
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empirically equivalent when they entail the same observational consequences.29 To 
remind the reader, constructive empiricism urges belief in a theory’s empirical 
adequacy, i.e. roughly speaking belief that only the observational consequences of 
the theory are true. UTE-CE supports constructive empiricism for it holds that no 
observational evidence will ever allow us to find out which theoretical claims are 
true or approximately true. Consequently, UTE-CE upholds the belief that only the 
observational consequences of the theory can be shown to be true.
Given the gravity of these allegations, it is not surprising that the many UTE variants 
have come under heavy fire (see, for example, Clark Glymour (1980)). In a landmark 
article, Laudan and Leplin (1991) have objected, among other things, that the notion 
of empirical equivalence is not well defined. Even if we ignore this, they argue, we 
can still choose between empirically equivalent theories because: (1) a theory is not 
necessarily supported by the empirical consequences it entails and (2) a theory can 
be supported by evidence that it does not itself entail. The second point can be 
interpreted in one of two ways: (2a) a theory can be supported by empirical evidence 
over and above the evidence it entails and (2b) a theory can be supported by extra- 
empirical evidence, namely by considerations of economy, simplicity, unity, 
explanatory worth, etc. Whether such considerations are epistemically relevant is the 
object of debate. Moreover, what counts as evidence for a theory can have a 
tremendous impact on the efficaciousness of the above claims and, by extension, on 
UTE and the debate as a whole. In all, the realists hope to show that there are 
justifiable methods through which we can choose between empirically equivalent 
theories.
The Damning Historical Record o f Science
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincare made a 
compelling case that the history of science is punctuated by the overthrow of hitherto 
successful theories.30 The logical positivists, who inherited much from both Duhem 
and Poincare, largely ignored historical considerations. The result was a pervasive, 
though tacit, assumption that scientific knowledge was at once both cumulative and 
progressive.
29 For a somewhat different notion o f empirical equivalence see Quine (1975).
30 See the next chapter for details.
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It was not until the 1960s that this assumption was genuinely brought into question. 
Thomas Kuhn ([1962] 1996), Paul Feyerabend (1962; 1965), and many others 
reinstated the point made earlier by Duhem and Poincare and reinforced it with 
historical case studies. Kuhn, in particular, argued that defining moments such as the 
Copemican, Newtonian and Einsteinian revolutions, bring about a shift in paradigm 
that replaces old concepts and theories by radically new ones.31 The meanings of 
theoretical concepts belonging to competing paradigms are so radically different, 
Kuhn argues, that it is impossible to compare either the paradigms or the concepts, 
let alone support the view that there is some continuity between them.32 This has 
come to be known as the ‘incommensurability thesis’.
Indeed, Kuhn avoids the notions of truth and approximate truth altogether, opting 
instead for an account of progress that views science as a problem-solving 
endeavour. Given incommensurability, the argument goes, there is no common 
ground from which to judge the goals of the competing theories and, therefore, 
scientific theories cannot be said to be increasingly approaching the truth. The notion 
of incommensurability is often intertwined with that of the theory-ladenness of 
observation. Since observation is theory-laden, the anti-realist argues, it cannot serve 
as independent ground upon which rival theories can be judged. In sum, Kuhn claims 
that theory change involves radical shifts in which essential theoretical components 
including central theoretical terms are thrown away and thus that scientific 
knowledge is neither cumulative nor progressive towards the truth.
Even though arguments based on the historical record of science were originally 
launched against logical positivist instrumentalism, an anti-realist position, they have 
since become the staple of anti-realists in their attempts to bring down realism. At 
stake are the realist claims on the above list. RC4, for example, is in direct conflict 
with the historical arguments, for the latter undermine the claim that successive 
theories in mature sciences preserve at least some of the theoretical relations and 
referents of earlier theories -  notably the central ones.
31 Put simply, a paradigm consists o f one or more theories, auxiliary hypotheses, heuristic models, 
ontological assumptions and methodological principles.
32 The implicit assumption here is a descriptive theory o f reference according to which a theoretical 
term t refers to an entity a if  and only if a satisfies the theoretical (i.e. descriptive) claims made by the 
scientific theory employing t.
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The realist reaction to these early historical arguments has followed one of two 
strategies. On one strategy the realists have launched an offensive against the notions 
of scientific revolution, paradigm, and incommensurability, claiming that they suffer 
from vagueness (see, for example, Dudley Shapere (1964) and Lakatos (1970)). 
Lakatos’ ‘methodology of scientific research programmes’, in particular, replaced 
the concept of paradigm with that of scientific research programme, characterising 
the latter in ways that would support a more rationalist outlook towards theory 
change in the history of science.33 On the other strategy realists have contested the 
anti-realist points on historical grounds (see, for example, Richard Purtill (1967)).
A more sophisticated version of the historical argument has been put forward by 
Laudan (1977; 1981). Laudan criticises the use of connections between reference, 
approximate truth, and success in support of the explanationist defence of realism as 
tenuous. More precisely, he argues that the predictive and explanatory success of a 
theory guarantees neither its approximate truth nor that its central theoretical terms 
genuinely refer. The available historical evidence, according to him, clearly shows a 
repeated overthrow of scientific theories as false and their referents as not genuinely 
referential, despite explanatory and predictive success. Laudan cites the following 
long list of theories as evidence for his claim: the crystalline spheres of ancient and 
medieval astronomy, the humoral theory of medicine, the effluvial theory of static 
electricity, the ‘catastrophist geology’, the phlogiston theory of combustion, the 
caloric theory of heat, the vital forces theories of physiology, the electromagnetic 
ether, the optical ether, the theory of circular inertia, and the theories of spontaneous 
generation (1981: 33). This argument, thus, challenges the realist claims RC3 and 
RC4.34
Implicit in Laudan’s argument is the so-called ‘pessimistic induction’ (PI). Laudan 
argues that, given the historical evidence, the inference from explanatory and
33 Lakatos presented his work as a synthesis o f  some o f Kuhn’s and Popper’s ideas.
34 Laudan does not stop there. Like many others, he accuses the realists o f  failing to provide a 
semantical and epistemological characterisation o f the notion o f approximate truth, holding that this 
makes RC1 and RC2 ‘so much mumbo jumbo’ (1981: 32). He also questions RC5 saying that a 
theory might be better supported than its rivals yet not be able to explain why its rivals were 
successful (47). Given his distrust o f all these claims, i.e. RC1-RC5, he thinks that RC6, which relies 
upon them, cannot be upheld.
3 Though Laudan’s (1981) argument is now widely known as the ‘pessimistic induction’ argument, it 
has been pointed out (see Timothy D. Lyons (2002)), that this argument is only present in his (1977).
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predictive success to approximate truth and successful reference is unwarranted. 
Thus construed, the argument is a modus tollens, not an induction (see Lyons 
(2002)). However, one can read this argument as an induction. That is, given the 
historical evidence that past successful theories were abandoned as false and 
referentially unsuccessful, we can inductively argue that current or even future 
theories will also succumb to the same fate. This reasoning employs historical 
evidence to argue, inductively, for pessimism with regard to the approximate truth 
and referential success of our theories.
Though some realists have largely ignored the pessimistic induction, many more 
have taken it seriously. Some of these have attacked the argument itself (see, for 
example, Hardin and Rosenberg (1982), Psillos (1996), and Devitt (1984: 143-9)). 
Others have engaged in historical case studies in an attempt to show that the 
historical record can be reconciled with scientific realism (see, for example, Worrall 
(1989; 1994), Kitcher (1993), Psillos (1999: ch.6)). This last move usually involves 
showing that abandoned theoretical components are not essential for the explanatory 
and predictive success enjoyed by the theories they were embedded in. In other 
words, the theoretical components that survive theory change are those that are 
responsible for the abandoned theories’ successes.
In their fight against historical arguments the realists have appealed to the notion of 
mature science. By categorising those theories that have been abandoned in their 
entirety as belonging to an insufficiently developed or immature science, the realists 
hope to restore the cumulativity of scientific knowledge. The distinction between 
mature and immature science is appealing on independent grounds because many 
would like to draw a line between the early primitive/undeveloped stages of a given 
science and the latter stages where the science presumably begins to blossom.36 
Many, for instance, would find Aristotelian physics or the Ptolemaic systems of
The argument has also been put forward, independently on the face o f it, by Putnam, who says that 
“...eventually the meta-induction becomes compelling: ju st as no term used in the science o f  more 
than fifty  (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn out that no term used no w (except maybe 
observation terms, if  there are such) refers” (1978: 25) [original emphasis]. It is worth noting that the 
argument is also called ‘pessimistic meta-induction’. Obviously the ‘meta’ refers to the fact that it is 
about science and its inductive methods, rather than within science.
36 A similar distinction is utilized to demarcate science from religion.
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astronomy unworthy of even being called proto-science.37 Boyd (1984) and Putnam 
(1978) cite the phlogiston theory of combustion as another example of an immature 
science -  in this case chemistry.
The concept of maturity is notoriously elusive. Laudan complains that the vagueness 
besetting the concept risks making the realist claims RC4 and RC5 vacuously true 
because theories that have not bequeathed anything to their successors can always be 
branded ‘immature’. One way to anchor the concept is by attaching a condition of 
genuine predictive success to it. That is, unless a theory is explanatorily and 
predictively successful, it will not count as mature. Yet, even this is not enough to 
save the realists from the clutches of history. This is made obvious by Laudan’s list, 
which specifically targets theories with presumably genuine empirical success that 
were subsequently abandoned nonetheless.
Worrall has pressed for a more refined notion of mature science arguing that “[t]his 
must mean more than simply having correct empirical consequences” (1989: 153). 
His suggestion is that a science reaches maturity only when its theories can predict 
entirely novel types of phenomena. Chief amongst his examples is Fresnel’s theory 
of light. The theory unexpectedly and correctly predicted a bright spot at the centre 
of the shadow of an opaque disc that was lit from a single slit. Though this theory 
appears on Laudan’s list, Worrall argues, the essential part of the theory, namely 
Fresnel’s equations, were preserved through theory change.
Whether Worrall’s notion of maturity saves the realist from the allegedly 
embarrassing historical record is an issue that has yet to be taken up. Prima facie, it 
seems to me that his criterion is too strict in that it could eliminate approximately 
true theories that do not make any predictions of novel types of phenomena. One 
need only consider that a successor to a given theory may be closer to the truth 
simply on account of accuracy, and not by predicting new types of phenomena.
37 Michael Friedman, however, suggests that even Aristotelian physics has handed down some 
approximately correct theoretical components (see his (2001)).
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7. The Main Realist Obstacles
Given the current state of the debate, we can easily identify the main obstacles 
realists have to overcome if they are to make any progress. With little or no doubt, 
the following four are the most talked about and presumably most important 
obstacles for the realist in the current debate:
(RP1) We must be able to choose between empirically equivalent theories. That is, 
we must be able to show that from a pool of empirically equivalent theories at least 
some are more epistemically warranted than others.
(RP2) The historical record of science must be accounted for somehow. It must be 
shown that at least some components of theories, other than observational 
consequences, survive theory change, and that only those that survive were 
responsible for the success of a given theory.
(RP3) It must be shown, or at least it is preferable to show, why the success of 
science needs explaining and, furthermore, why scientific realism provides a better 
explanation than any alternative position.
(RP4) The notions of approximate truth, truthlikeness and verisimilitude need to be 
given rigorous characterisations. If no adequate formal treatments can be given, as 
indeed conceded by some realists, more robust informal accounts as well as the 
reasons why such accounts would work need to be clearly explained.
This dissertation will investigate whether structural realism can overcome RP1 and 
RP2. RP3 and RP4 are thus purposely bracketed. To include RP3 and RP4 into my 
investigation would mean either to excessively expand the dissertation or to cover 
one or more of the four obstacles only superficially. I think that RP1 and RP2 are 
sufficiently independent to be able to be addressed without first addressing RP3 and 
RP4. Regarding RP3, I will assume that the success of science needs some 
explanation, or, at least, some accounting for. Though I do not aim to provide a 
thorough answer to the question why scientific realism and in particular structural
38 Not all realists think that the success o f science needs explaining. Worrall is one such realist.
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realism offers a better explanation/account of this success than anti-realism, some of 
my arguments will be supportive of this view. Regarding RP4, I will rely, like so 
many other philosophers I mentioned earlier, on some informal understanding of the 
notion of approximate truth. I do not assume that this informal understanding is 
sufficient for a realist programme. That is an issue that needs to be investigated 
thoroughly but not in this dissertation.
8. Conclusion
Arthur Fine (1984) has suggested an alternative to both realism and anti-realism, 
which he has called the ‘natural ontological attitude’ (NOA) and which he classifies 
as non-realism. According to him, NOA is a deflationary attitude that does not seek 
to impose a ‘general interpretive scheme’ on science. Unlike realism and anti­
realism, for example, NOA does not set any aims, like truth or empirical adequacy, 
for science. So much for what NOA is not. What about its positive dimensions? Fine 
claims that NOA is to be equated with what he calls the ‘core position’, i.e. that 
which is common to both realists and anti-realists. The ‘core position’ is simply the 
view that the results of scientific enterprise are true. The realist and anti-realist 
positions are ‘unnatural’, according to Fine, because they add metaphysical theses 
about the character of truth and reality to the core position.
On the basis of the above, Fine has called for a dismissal of the whole debate 
pronouncing realism dead. His call has not been heeded however. What is more, 
NOA has been rightly criticised for its failure to adequately distinguish itself from 
realism. It has been argued, for example, that NOA is just realism in disguise, for it 
accepts something that anti-realists like van Fraassen reject, namely the truth of 
scientific claims about the unobservable world. That is, against Fine’s claims, NOA 
cannot be equated with the common core.
Despite Fine’s dismissal, many philosophers believe that at least some headway can 
be made in the debate. What seems evident from the elaboration of the debate 
offered in this chapter is that the central arguments are now more sophisticated than 
fifty or a hundred years ago. That, of course, does not necessarily mean that we are 
progressing towards a resolution of the debate. Rather, it, at least, means that a lot of 
interesting tools have been discovered or invented in the process. Indeed, some of
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these contributions have been made by structuralists, and, in particular, structural 
realists. It is to the historical and conceptual development of structural realism that I 
turn to next.
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2
TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
STRUCTURAL REALISM
1. Introduction
This chapter traces the development of structural realism within the scientific realism 
debate and the wider current of structuralism that has swept the philosophy of the 
natural sciences in the twentieth century.39 The primary aim is to make perspicuous 
the many manifestations of structural realism and their underlying claims. Among 
other things, I will compare structural realism’s various manifestations in order to 
throw more light onto the relations between them. At the end of the chapter, I will 
identify the main objections raised against the epistemic form of structural realism. 
This last task will pave the way for the evaluation of the structural realist answer to 
the main epistemological question, an evaluation that will be central to the rest of 
this dissertation.
Generally construed, structuralism is a point of view that emphasises the importance 
of relations. It takes the structure, i.e. the nexus of relations, of a given domain of 
interest to be the foremost goal of research and holds that an understanding of the 
subject matter has to be, and most successfully is, achieved in structural terms. The 
following quote from Redhead (2001a) nicely conveys this intuition: “Informally a 
structure is a system of related elements, and structuralism is a point of view which 
focuses attention on the relations between the elements as distinct from the elements 
themselves”(74). This vision has shaped research programmes in fields as diverse as 
mathematics, linguistics, literary criticism, aesthetics, anthropology, psychology, and 
philosophy of science. It is the last-mentioned that I am concerned with in this 
chapter.
The first explicit statements of a structuralist programme in the philosophy of 
science can be traced back to Henri Poincare, Pierre Duhem, and Bertrand Russell.
39 To the best o f my knowledge, the only other attempt to trace the historical and ideological 
development o f structural realism is to be found in Barry Gower (2000). Gower’s article is rather 
narrowly construed, however, for he focuses mainly on Ernst Cassirer and Moritz Schlick.
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Other structuralists or structuralist-oriented philosophers followed, notably Arthur 
Eddington, Ernst Cassirer, Rudolph Carnap, Moritz Schlick, W.V.Quine and Grover 
Maxwell. During the last decade and a half, the position has been revived, 
reformulated, and vigorously defended, by Otavio Bueno, Anjan Chakravartty, Tian 
Yu Cao, Bas van Fraassen, Steven French, James Ladyman, Michael Redhead, John 
Worrall, and Elie Zahar, to a name a few. Given the numerous differences between 
many of these authors’ philosophy it is not surprising then that there are almost as 
many structuralisms as there are structuralists.
A terminological remark is required at this point to ward off misapprehensions. 
‘Structuralism’ will refer to the general intuition that the focus is on the relations and 
not the relata. To identify each individual position I will employ variant terms like 
‘epistemic structural realism’, ‘ontic structural realism’, ‘structural empiricism’, etc. 
Often, these names are already available but, where needed, I will provide my own 
names so as to keep track of who is arguing for what.
Before we delve into the different types of structuralism, I must present a definition 
of the notion of structure that is precise enough to help disambiguate some of the 
discussions. Although, as we shall see later, matters are more complex, we can begin 
the elucidation of the various forms of structuralism by presupposing the standard 
definition of structure:40 A structure S = (U, R) is specified by two things: i) a non­
empty set U of objects (the domain of S) and ii) a non-empty set of relations R on 
U 41 A structure may also specify one-place properties but these are not essential. In 
other words, a minimum requirement for setting up a structure is to have a set- 
theoretically specifiable (i.e. extensionally defined) relation between objects. Notice 
that many of the mathematical statements central to science, i.e. functions, equations, 
laws, symmetries, principles, covariance statements, etc., postulate relations between 
terms that can usually be expressed set-theoretically in the above-mentioned way.
40 As we shall see by the end o f this chapter, John Worrall and Elie Zahar argue against such a view o f  
structure because individuals are taken as more basic than relations, i.e. relations are defined as sets o f  
ordered n-tuples o f individuals. They instead call for a new semantics that takes structures and, by 
extension, relations as more primitive than individuals.
41 The definition o f structure sometimes includes a third condition, i.e. a set O o f  operations on U 
(which may be empty). This condition is optional because operations are functions and thus can be 
regarded as special kinds o f relations capturable by condition two.
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2. The Prehistory of Structuralism
As mentioned above, the history of structuralism starts with Poincare, Duhem and 
Russell. Van Fraassen (1997; 1999), however, has recently added an interesting pre­
history to the topic that deserves consideration. Drawing from 19th century 
discussions of how science represents natural phenomena, van Fraassen (1997) 
traces the beginnings of structuralism to the emergence of non-Euclidean systems of 
geometry. The discovery of such systems led to the realisation that no system is 
privileged, i.e. to a ‘relativisation of representation’. The applicability of these 
systems to physics, van Fraassen claims, resulted in a parallel relativisation. For 
obvious reasons, this result challenged the naive realist view that there is a unique 
way to represent physical space and, more generally, the physical world. In light of 
these developments, van Fraassen argues, Russell was led from naive realism to 
structuralism. Though van Fraassen is not very informative about the reasons behind 
Russell’s change of heart, the implication seems to be that because structuralism 
necessitates the non-uniqueness of descriptions, through the idea that things can be 
described only up to isomorphism, it supports a kind of ‘relativisation of 
representation’.
In his more recent paper (1999), van Fraassen stretches our imagination even further 
by attempting to extend the prehistory of structuralism. He entertains the idea that 
structuralism could have gained support as far back as the 17th century. It is the 
increasing mathematisation of science, van Fraassen argues, that paves the way for 
structuralism. He sees Isaac Newton’s introduction of non-mechanical, highly 
abstract and mathematical descriptions of nature as the end of one era and the 
beginning of a new one. At the same time, he sees in Newton a disdain for too much 
mathematisation for fear that it may lead to the Aristotelian occult properties he so 
desperately tried to avoid. Indeed, he sees the same misgivings in James Clark 
Maxwell. Both Maxwell and Newton, according to van Fraassen, oscillated and 
agonised between two extreme positions: ‘reification’ and ‘structuralism’. These 
positions, he argues, “emerge very naturally when science proves itself too complex 
for philosophical naivete. We see a clear tendency to reify whatever theories invoke 
in their representation of nature. But conceptual difficulties and the increasingly 
mathematical character of science foster the structuralist impulse” (1999: 7). And, he 
continues, “[t]his is one of the main reasons why, I think, we see the structuralist
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reaction emerging in the 19th century. As so often happens, what is earlier seen as a 
failure or shortcoming becomes the glory of a new generation” (12).
I think van Fraassen’s claim, that Newton and Maxwell were wavering between 
reification and structuralism, is reading too much into history. His examples can only 
establish that these scientists were sceptical about too much mathematisation. 
Similarly, his colourful and somewhat cryptic remarks about the emergence of 
reification and structuralism are in need of further elaboration if they are to be taken 
seriously. Even so, it is certainly plausible that the mathematisation of nature in 
general and the rise of non-Euclidean geometries in particular, facilitated 
structuralist inclinations.
3. The Early Years
Poincare
Poincare is often thought of as a conventionalist, not only with regard to geometry 
but also physics, and as such not a realist. However, Grover Maxwell (1968), Jerzy 
Giedymin (1982), Worrall (1982; 1989; 1994), Zahar (1989; 1996; 2001), David 
Stump (1989), Stathis Psillos (1995; 1999), Barry Gower (2000), and Redhead 
(2001a) are all in agreement that Poincare was an epistemic structural realist.42 
Epistemic structural realism (ESR) is, simply put, the view that our knowledge of the 
physical world is restricted to structure. I agree that Poincare was an ESR-ist and, in 
what follows, present the reasons why I think this is the case.
Poincare was heavily influenced by German idealism, a philosophical school that, as 
is well known, considers Kant as its progenitor. More precisely, Poincare subscribed 
to the view that the non-phenomenal entities postulated by scientific theories are the 
Kantian things-in-themselves. Unlike Kant, however, he thought that it is possible to 
gain indirect knowledge of the things-in-themselves. What is it exactly that he 
thought we could know about them? Poincare is unequivocal: “[T]he aim of science 
is not things themselves, as the dogmatists in their simplicity imagine, but the
42 The term ‘structural realism’ was coined by Grover Maxwell (1968) with reference to Russell’s 
position. Stump does not use the term ‘structural realism’ but nonetheless understands Poincare as a 
structural realist.
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relations between things; outside those relations there is no reality knowable” 
([1905] 1952: xxiv). And again later on in the same book: “The true relations 
between these real objects are the only reality we can attain” (161). Despite the fact 
that the term ‘structure’ does not appear in these or other relevant passages, we are 
entitled to call Poincare an epistemic structural realist for, after all, structures in their 
simplest form are just collections of one or more relations.
As many authors have pointed out, the motivation for Poincare’s structural realism is 
largely historical.43 More precisely, he takes the survival of theoretical relations 
through theory change as indicative of their having latched onto the world. Here’s an 
illuminating passage from The Value o f Science:
...science has already lived long enough for us to be able to find out by asking its 
history whether the edifices it builds stand the test of time, or whether they are only 
ephemeral constructions.
Now what do we see? At the first blush it seems to us that the theories last only 
a day and that ruins upon ruins accumulate... But if we look more closely, we see 
that what thus succumb are the theories properly so called, those that pretend to 
teach us what things are. But there is in them something which usually survives. If 
one of them taught us a true relation, this relation is definitively acquired, and it will 
be found again under a new disguise in the other theories which will successively 
come to reign in place of the old ([1913]1946: 351).
To support his argument, Poincare draws examples from the history of science that 
exemplify precisely the survival/preservation of relations. Two main examples are 
worth citing here:
This [i.e. the prediction of optical phenomena] Fresnel’s theory enables us to do 
today as well as it did before Maxwell’s time. The differential equations are always 
true... [they] express relations, and if the equations remain true, it is because the 
relations preserve their reality. They teach us now, as they did then, that there is 
such and such a relation between this thing and that; only, the something which we 
then called motion-, we now call electric current. But these are merely names of the 
images we substituted for the real objects which Nature will hide for ever from our 
eyes ([1905]1952: 160-1).
In its primitive form, Carnot’s theory expressed in addition to true relations, other 
inexact relations, the debris of old ideas; but the presence of the latter did not alter 
the reality of the others. Clausius had only to separate them, just as one lops off 
dead branches.
43 See the section on Russell for additional insight into Poincare’s motivation.
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The result was the second fundamental law of thermodynamics. The relations 
were always the same, although they did not hold, at least to all appearance, 
between the same objects. This was sufficient for the principle to retain its value 
(165).
The first passage draws attention to the fact that Fresnel’s equations survive the shift 
from the ethereal theory of light to the non-ethereal electromagnetic theory. The 
reason for this, according to Poincare, is that they express real relations (and hence 
structures) between physical objects. By contrast, the elastic solid ether itself and the 
conception of light as consisting of disturbances transmitted through the ether are 
abandoned. The second passage draws attention to the fact that some of Carnot’s 
postulated relations in his ideal theory of heat engines, such as the so-called ‘Carnot 
cycle’, survive the transition from the caloric conception of heat to thermodynamics. 
In this case, it is the caloric, i.e. the conception of heat as a material fluid, which gets 
abandoned.
In sum, Poincare’s point is that the history of science indicates a preservation of 
these relations (but not of their relata) from theory to theory. This, he takes to be a 
good reason why we should be epistemological realists about the relations between 
which the objects hold, but not the objects themselves. As we shall see in the 
following sections, the historical evidence for structural realism becomes less clear- 
cut as we move from the classical framework to the relativistic and quantum 
revolutions of the twentieth century.
Duhem
Like Poincare, Pierre Duhem is often seen as a conventionalist. Recently, some 
authors (see, for example, Worrall (1989), Chakravarrty (1998), Gower (2000), and 
Zahar (2001)) have argued that he is either an epistemic structural realist or, at least, 
has close affinities to the position. I agree that there is a structuralist vein to Duhem’s 
work but do not think the evidence unequivocally warrants his classification as an 
epistemic structural realist. In what follows I present a short exposition of his views.
A central distinction in Duhem’s work is that between the explanatory and the 
representative parts of a theory. According to Duhem, the explanatory part of a 
theory is that ‘which proposes to take hold of the reality underlying the phenomena’
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whereas the representative part is that ‘which proposes to classify laws’. Duhem 
likens the explanatory part to a parasite saying that:
It is not to this explanatory part that theory owes its power and fertility; far from it. 
Everything good in the theory, by virtue of which it appears as a natural 
classification and confers on it the power to anticipate experience, is found in the 
representative part... On the other hand, whatever is false in the theory and 
contradicted by the facts is found above all in the explanatory part; the physicist has 
brought error into it, led by his desire to take hold of realities ([1914]1991: 32).
It is, thus, only the representative part of the theory that is doing the real work, i.e. 
that is producing the predictions. What, in Duhem’s mind, is the epistemological 
status of the representative part?
There are certainly several passages where Duhem ascribes an epistemic structural 
realist status to the representative part of theories. For example, when he says that 
physical theory “never reveals realities hiding under the sensible appearances; but 
the more complete it becomes... the more we suspect that the relations it establishes 
among the data of observation correspond to real relations among things” (26-27). 
And also a few pages later when he says “ ...we are convinced that they [i.e. the 
relations postulated by theories] correspond to kindred relations among substances 
themselves, whose nature remains deeply hidden but whose reality does not seem 
doubtful” (29). In another remarkable similarity to Poincare’s position, Duhem 
claims that science’s historical record reveals a preservation of relations through 
theory change:
When the progress of experimental physics goes counter to a theory and compels it 
to be modified or transformed, the purely representative part enters nearly whole in 
the new theory, bringing to it the inheritance of all the valuable possessions of the 
old theory, whereas the explanatory part falls out in order to give way to another 
explanation (32).
Given the context set up by the earlier passages, it seems safe to assume that the 
relations preserved through theory change reflect relations between physical objects.
Despite these striking examples, we need to take note of some important 
qualifications that Duhem makes in the same passages. Although he acknowledges 
the existence of a strongly felt intuition that our theories correspond to reality, he
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holds that the data of observation “cannot prove that the order established among 
experimental laws reflects an order transcending experience” (27). The belief in this 
correspondence is merely “an act of faith”, says Duhem, which “assures us that these 
theories are not a purely artificial system, but a natural classification” (27). Thus, 
perhaps Duhem was an anti-realist after all.
Critics of this view will undoubtedly point out that no realist holds that we can prove 
the correspondence between theories and reality. That is, realists only claim that 
there are good reasons for holding such a belief. Moreover, given the centrality of 
faith to Duhem’s thinking, the ascription of the phrase ‘act of faith’ to the belief that 
there is a structural correspondence between observation and the world does not 
seem as threatening. It could even be an indication of Duhem’s strong support for the 
idea that the representative part of our theories corresponds to reality.44
Though the last comment is admittedly speculative, the plausibility of interpreting 
Duhem as an epistemic structural realist does not seem to be severely undermined, 
given his unequivocal claim about the preservation of relations through theory 
change. At any rate, Duhem is at least a structuralist of sorts. Depending on how 
much weight one assigns to the above qualifications, his position can be seen as a 
precursor to van Fraassen’s latest position, viz. empiricist structuralism, according to 
which even the preservation of structure through theory change can be given an anti­
realist explanation (see section 8 of this chapter).
Russell
It is quite unsurprising that Russell has a substantial role in the history of 
structuralism, given that he initiated, developed, and significantly contributed to 
most important debates in analytic philosophy. What is not widely realised is how 
strongly the concept of structure permeated his philosophical work 45 One of his first
44 Duhem was a devout Catholic who placed great importance on faith. Louis de Broglie, in the 
foreword to The Aim and Structure o f  Physical Theory, suggests that aspects o f Duhem’s faith were 
also extended to his philosophical concerns. For example he says “It was not that Pierre Duhem, a 
convinced Catholic, rejected the idea o f metaphysics; he wished to separate it completely from 
physics and to give it a very different basis, the religious basis o f revelation”(ix).
45 It is worth quoting a comment from Hiram McLendon, one o f Russell’s students, who said o f  
Russell’s preoccupation with the concept o f structure: “In fact, so fundamental and pervasive is 
Russell’s use o f this concept in all his periods o f philosophizing and throughout each o f his systems 
developed in each o f  his major periods that one might well survey most o f  his philosophy since 1912,
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steps towards structuralism can be found in The Problems o f Philosophy. Having 
recently read and been influenced by the British Empiricists, Russell regards the 
items of perception, which at the time take the form of ‘sense-data’, as the 
foundation of all knowledge. He argues that we have good reasons to believe that the 
causes of the sense-data we perceive are physical objects. But what can science tell 
us about physical objects? Russell’s answer is unmistakably clear:
Assuming that there is physical space, and that it does thus correspond to private 
spaces, what can we know about it? We can know only what is required in order to 
secure the correspondence. That is to say, we can know nothing of what it is like in 
itself, but we can know the sort of arrangement of physical objects which results 
from their spatial relations... We can know the properties of the relations required 
to preserve the correspondence with sense-data, but we cannot know the nature of 
the terms between which the relations hold (1912: 15-16) [original emphasis].
And again a page later:
Thus we find that, although the relations of physical objects have all sorts of 
knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the relations of sense- 
data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown in their intrinsic nature, so 
far at least as can be discovered by means of the senses (17) [original emphasis].
Thus, Russell argues, we can know only the properties of the relations physical 
objects stand in, and not, as common-sense realism tells us, their intrinsic nature. 
This is patently an epistemic structural realist position.46
It is worth pausing here and comparing Russell to Poincare. Russell’s Kantian 
remarks that we can know nothing about what space is ‘in itself and that the 
physical objects ‘themselves remain unknown in their nature’ share much with 
Poincare’s own Kantian undertones. Unlike Poincare, Russell holds that we only 
have access to the properties of relations between physical objects, not the relations 
themselves. This does not seem to amount to a real difference since knowing the 
relations without knowing the relata simply means knowing the properties of the
when he published The Problems o f  Philosophy, from the standpoint o f his uses o f the concept o f  
similarity o f  structure [i.e. structural isomorphism]” (1955: 88). See also Michael Bradie (1977) 
where the development o f Russell’s use o f the concept o f structure is traced from The Analysis o f  
Matter to Human Knowledge.
46 Even Russell’s theory o f truth and belief, appropriately named ‘correspondence by congruence 
theory’, is structuralist (see (1912: ch.12)). The nature o f the correspondence relation is one of 
congruence, i.e. isomorphism. The truth bearer is assumed to be structurally isomorphic to the 
physical state o f affairs. For more on this see Kirkham (1992).
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relations. What does seem, at first glance, different between the two philosophers is 
their motivation. Russell does not appeal to the history of science but rather to 
foundational considerations. A closer inspection of Poincare’s work, though, reveals 
that his motivation too was not merely historical but also foundational. In The Value 
o f Science, Poincare stresses that “nothing is objective which is not transmissible, 
and consequently that the relations between the sensations can alone have an 
objective value” (348). This idea follows from Poincare’s foundational concern that 
sensations are private and therefore intransmissible. Interestingly, Russell (1948: 
485-6) makes similar remarks about the intransmissibility of everything but structure 
(see also Carnap (1928: §16) and Quine (1968: 161)). Conversely, it is not difficult 
to imagine Russell motivating his position with historical considerations. After all, if 
science identifies the properties of relations between physical objects, we should 
expect their preservation through theory change.
Russell’s version of epistemic structural realism reached maturity in The Analysis o f  
Matter (1927). There he argued that there are external causes of our perceptions, 
even though we should “not expect to find a demonstration that perceptions have 
external causes” (198) [my emphasis]. In fact, he devoted the twentieth chapter of 
this book to a causal theory of perception, rejecting “the view that perception gives 
direct knowledge of external objects” (197). We only have direct knowledge of the 
‘intrinsic character’, ‘nature’, or ‘quality’ of percepts, i.e. the items of our 
perception. The only way to attain knowledge of the external world is by drawing 
inferences from our perceptions. To underwrite such inferences Russell employed a 
number of assumptions. The most important of these are:
Helmholtz-Weyl Principle (H-W): “ ...we assume that differing percepts have 
differing stimuli” (255). In short, different effects {i.e. percepts) imply different 
causes {i.e. stimuli/physical objects).41,48
47 Psillos (2001a) suggested this name for the principle on the basis o f Helmholtz’s and W eyl’s appeal 
to it. It is worth noting that Russell sometimes uses the principle in its contrapositive (but equivalent) 
form, namely same causes imply same effects. Even Hume seems to endorse this principle as he 
advertises in the Treatise that “Like causes still produce like effects” (Book II, Part III, §1).
48 Stimuli, according to Russell, are “the events just outside the sense-organ” (1927: 227). They are 
thus classified as physical events.
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Mirroring Relations Principle (MR): “My point is that the relations which physics 
assumes... are not identical with those which we perceive... but merely correspond 
with them in a manner which preserves their logical (mathematical) properties” 
(252). In short, relations between percepts mirror {i.e. have the same mathematical 
properties as) relations between their non-perceptual causes.
For a closer examination of H-W and MR, I must ask the reader to wait until chapter 
three. For now suffice it to say that armed with these assumptions Russell argued 
that from the structure of our perceptions we can “infer a great deal as to the 
structure of the physical world, but not as to its intrinsic character” (400). More 
precisely, he argued that all that we can guarantee is that the structure of our 
perceptions is at most isomorphic to the structure of the physical world.
The notion of structure received a formal treatment from Russell. According to him, 
“[t]he ‘relation-number’ of a relation is the same as its ‘structure’, and is defined as 
the class of relations similar [i.e. isomorphic] to the given relation” (250).49 The 
concept of isomorphic relations is employed here to convey the idea that the domain 
of interest is solely that of the properties isomorphic relations share. The motivation 
behind this idea arises from Russell’s view that our epistemic access to the external 
world is indirect and, hence, cannot involve the unique identification of properties 
of, and relations between, physical objects.
Redhead (2001a) has called the notion of structure employed by Russell ‘abstract 
structure’. To understand the notion of abstract structure we must first understand 
what it means for two structures to be isomorphic. A structure S = (U, R) is 
isomorphic to a structure T = (U', R') just in case there is a bijection <|): U —»IT such 
that for all xi, ...,xn in U, (xi,...,xn) satisfies the relation Ri in U iff (<|)(xi),...,<|)(xn)) 
satisfies the corresponding relation R*' in U'. If, like Russell, one wants to talk about 
a particular relation being isomorphic to some other relation, one need not go further 
than the definition of isomorphism between structures, for any particular relation 
specifies a structure, namely a structure whose set of relations contains one, and only 
one, member. We can now define the notion of abstract structure: An abstract
49 For more on the reason why Russell’s notions o f structure and relation-number are co-extensive see 
Solomon (1989).
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structure X is an isomorphism class (or “isomorphism type”) whose members are all, 
and only those, structures that are isomorphic to some given structure (U, R). Qua 
isomorphism class, it can only identify the logico-mathematical properties of its 
members.
The notion of abstract structure is contrasted with what Redhead calls ‘concrete 
structure’. The former makes explicit that the domain of objects and the relations 
defined on these objects are not uniquely specified but only up to isomorphism. That 
is, whereas a concrete structure specifies one domain of objects that comes with a set 
of relations, an abstract structure just specifies a constraint as to which domains and 
relations qualify, namely those domains equinumerous to some given number and 
those relations that share the same properties.50
On the basis of these definitions we can now summarise Russell’s epistemic 
commitments as follows:
(REC1) Concrete observational structures.
(REC2) Abstract structures whose members are the concrete observational structures 
referred to in REC1.
(REC3) The existence of concrete physical structures that 1) have as domain 
members the causes of the concrete observational structures’ domain 
members referred to in REC1 and 2) are members of the isomorphism 
classes referred to in REC2.
Russell’s view can be presented as follows: Observational data falls into certain 
patterns allowing us to discover/postulate relations between observables.51 Taking 
observables as our domain and collecting these relations into a set gives us the so- 
called ‘concrete observational structures’. They are concrete because their domain is 
specified uniquely. The abstract structures corresponding to these concrete 
observational structures can then be deduced in a straightforward manner by a 
process o f abstraction. To do that, all one needs to do is to write down the
50 The equinumerocity requirement simply reflects the fact that for there to be a bijection between two 
sets, the sets must have the same number o f objects.
51 This involves some sort o f inference to the best explanation.
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isomorphism class that the given concrete observational structure is a member of. By 
appeal to principles H-W and MR, we can then infer that to each concrete 
observational structure corresponds one, and only one, concrete physical structure 
such that: 1) the two are isomorphic, and 2) the domain members of the concrete 
physical structure, i.e. the physical objects, are causally responsible for the domain 
members of the concrete observational structure, i.e. the observables. Being 
isomorphic just means that the two concrete structures, i.e. the observational and the 
physical, are members of the same abstract structure, i.e. the same isomorphism 
class. The figure below illuminates the relationships between concrete observational, 
concrete physical, and abstract structures.
It is extremely important to note here that Russell’s programme leans more towards 
an epistemological reconstruction of scientific knowledge rather than a description 
of what goes on in science. He does not claim that scientists actually observe first, 
and, solely on the basis of their observations, posit concrete observational structures 
that are then abstracted to a higher level, thereby allowing them to posit the existence 
of concrete physical structures instantiating the same abstract structure. The whole 
purpose of epistemological reconstruction is to offer a system through which 
knowledge claims can be evaluated, oftentimes ignoring the actual methods 
employed in science. In any case, the question whether reconstruction is a desirable 
enterprise, though interesting in its own right, will not be addressed in this 
dissertation.
Another important qualification present in Russell’s work is that the relations 
postulated between observables might not always be exact.
Hence we conclude that we have to do with a correlation which is usual but not 
invariable, and that, if we wish to construct an exact science, we must be sceptical 
of the associations which experience has led us to form, connecting sensible 
qualities with others with which they are often but not always combined 
(1927:182).
A consequence of this view is that the relations postulated to exist between the 
observables’ probable causes inherit the inexactness. This qualification should be 
kept in mind when we are evaluating Russell’s view in subsequent chapters.
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deductive inference 
(via abstraction)
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(via H-W and MR)
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Concrete Observational Concrete Physical
Structure isomorphic Structure
Figure 1: Russellian ESR
As indicated earlier, though Russell’s epistemic commitments involve the properties 
of relations and Poincare’s involve the relations themselves, no real difference seems 
evident between them. Knowing the relations without knowing the relata simply 
reduces to the view that we can only know the properties of these relations. That is 
why we appeal to the notion of abstract structure. According to standard semantics, 
the interpreted terms of first order structures uniquely pick out individuals. This is 
something that advocates of ESR cannot sign up to, since they hold that we cannot 
uniquely pick out individuals. They thus resort to notions such as that of abstract 
structure. There is, however, another option for the ESR-ist, namely to change our 
understanding of standard semantics in order to accommodate the non-uniqueness of 
representation. As we shall see in section five below, Zahar advocates precisely such 
a change.
The Newman Objection
According to most commentators in the debate, the most serious objection against 
Russell’s version of structural realism has been that of M.H.A. Newman in a critical 
review of The Analysis o f Matter. Newman argued against Russell’s claim that we 
can know only the (abstract) structure of the external world, alleging that this makes
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scientific knowledge trivial. Indeed, the only way to avoid the triviality accusation, 
according to him, is to abandon ESR. In the ensuing years, Newman’s review 
received little attention until Demopoulos and Friedman (1985) unearthed it.52 Let us 
now take a brief look at Newman’s formulation of the objection and consider its two 
main claims.
First, Newman takes ESR knowledge claims to be trivial, for he takes Russell’s 
structuralism to amount to assertions of the following type: “[t]here is a relation R 
such that the structure of the external world with reference to R is W” (1928: 144). 
He argues that, aside from indicating the required cardinality, these assertions are not 
saying anything of importance since we can derive the same assertions for any given 
class by appeal to the following theorem: “For given any aggregate A, a system of 
relations between its members can be found having any assigned structure 
compatible with the cardinal number of A” (140). In other words, given the right 
number of objects we can set up any structure we like. Yet, we expect knowledge of 
the external world to be the outcome of empirical investigation not of a priori 
reasoning. Indeed, the only information that requires empirical investigation under 
Russell’s view, according to Newman’s argument, is information about the size of a 
given class.
Second, Newman argues that the only way to avoid the triviality accusation is to give 
up ESR. This much, according to him, is evident in the idea “that it is meaningless to 
speak of the structure of a mere collection of things, not provided with a set of 
relations”, and “[tjhus the only important statements about structure are those 
concerned with the structure set up ... by a given, definite, relation” (140). The sole 
way to avoid trivialization, Newman holds, is to specify the particular relation(s) that 
generate(s) a given structure. That is, if we uniquely specify R, instead of just saying 
‘There is a relation R that has a certain structure W’, the fact that R has structure W
52 Solomon (1989) points out that Newman’s objection had been unsuccessfully employed by R. B. 
Braithwaite (1940) in a review o f Arthur Eddington’s The Philosophy o f  Physical Science. Solomon 
argues that Braithwaite did not correctly understand Newman’s objection. Moreover, he argues that 
Eddington (1941), in his reply to Braithwaite, despite being confused about the notion o f structure, 
should have realised that the objection was inapplicable in his case. See below for some brief remarks 
on Eddington’s account. Finally, I have discovered that McLendon (1955), as it seems independently 
o f Newman, also raises the triviality accusation against Russell’s position.
47
is no longer trivial. The problem is that to specify R, one inevitably goes beyond the 
epistemic commitments of the structural realist, thereby abandoning ESR.
In their article, Demopoulos and Friedman take Newman’s objection as the 
definitive refutation of structural realism. They parade Russell’s concession of the 
point in a letter to Newman (see Russell (1968: 176)) and his subsequent 
abandonment of the idea that our knowledge of the physical world is purely 
structural.53 Interestingly, their presentation of Newman’s objection is mainly a 
reconstruction that focuses on the Ramsey-sentence approach to theories. Following 
Grover Maxwell’s suggestion, they argue that “it is possible to extract from the book 
[i.e. Russell’s (1927)] a theory of theories that anticipates in several respects the 
Ramsey-sentence reconstruction of physical theories articulated by Carnap and 
others many decades later” (1985: 622).54 After all, if all we can know about the 
external world is that there are relations that have certain properties, then the 
Ramsey-sentence seems like a good candidate to express such statements, because it 
existentially quantifies over all theoretical predicates -  remember that relations are 
merely 2+w-place predicates -  thereby allowing only assertions about properties of 
such properties or properties of such relations. Demopoulos and Friedman argue that 
if  a theory is consistent and all its observational consequences true, then the truth of 
its Ramsey-sentence follows as a theorem of set theory or second-order logic. On the 
basis of the above association between the Ramsey-sentence and structural realism, 
they claim that Russell’s position collapses into phenomenalism.55 Given the gravity 
of Newman’s objection and associated results, I will devote chapter four to a 
thorough analysis of these issues.
4. The Years in Between
After Russell, the next systematic epistemic structural realist was Grover Maxwell. 
In between the two, a number of eminent philosophers espoused different forms of 
structuralism, but these were not systematically developed and have not contributed 
much to the current debate. In this section I briefly note their views.
53 For Russell’s post-1928 work on structuralism, see his An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth and 
Human Knowledge.
54 Ladyman (1998) has argued that the Newman objection is identical to an argument put forward by 
Jane English (1973).
55 The only thing that distinguishes phenomenalism and Russell’s structural realism, according to 
them, is that the latter makes a cardinality assumption with regard to the external world.
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It was Demopoulos and Friedman who first pointed out that Moritz Schlick’s 
position in General Theory o f Knowledge is quite similar to Russell’s structural 
realism. Like Russell, Schlick distinguishes between structure and quality/content 
and holds that our knowledge of the world is restricted to its structure. Unlike 
Russell, Schlick rejects the idea that we know the structure of our experience. For 
him, the term ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ is an oxymoron. We can know the 
structure of the world but we are only acquainted with the content or quality of our 
experience. Schlick thus draws a line between knowledge and acquaintance that 
perfectly coincides with his distinction between structure and content/quality.
One of the oddest types of structuralism ever proposed is that of Arthur Eddington 
(see his (1939)). In Eddington’s mind, our knowledge of the world is structural. Thus 
far his epistemological stance is in agreement with Russell’s and not at all 
unreasonable.56 The oddity can be found in his rejection of an idea common to most 
scientists and philosophers of science, i.e. that our knowledge of the physical world 
is at least justified a posteriori. According to Eddington, our knowledge of the 
physical world is purely aprioril51 Needless to say, it is hard to get used to the idea 
that a statement as implausible as this one comes from a physicist of such grand 
stature.
The implausibility of his position notwithstanding, it is worth bringing up one of the 
main motivations for Eddington’s structuralism, namely group theory. The spread of 
group theory in the twentieth century, from geometry to quantum mechanics, seems 
to have made a lasting impact on his philosophy.58 As Eddington acknowledges, his 
understanding of the notion of structure is group-theoretical. He thus says: “What 
sort of thing is it that I know? The answer is structure. To be quite precise it is
56 Steven French (2003) offers a more detailed analysis o f Eddington’s structuralism. Among other 
things, he argues that Eddington’s structuralism has both epistemological and ontological 
implications, the latter leading to a position similar to the one advocated by French himself, viz. ontic 
structural realism. This form of structural realism is discussed in a section below.
57 As Solomon (1989) has pointed out, this rejection makes Eddington’s structuralism immune to 
Newman’s objection because the latter is directed at claims that our knowledge o f the external world 
is purely structural and a-posteriori.
58 For more on this, see Steven French and James Ladyman (2003a: 50-51) but also French (2003). 
French and Ladyman argue that one other major motivation for Eddington’s structuralism was the 
implications quantum physics had for the issue o f the individuality o f particles.
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structure of the kind defined and investigated in the mathematical theory of groups” 
(147).
Another structuralist from the same period as Schlick and Eddington is Ernst 
Cassirer. French and Ladyman (2003a: 38-41) recently resuscitated Cassirer’s views. 
More precisely, they make a convincing case that Cassirer advocates an ontological 
version of structuralism, according to which relations, and hence structures, are the 
primitive ontological components of the world. Cassirer certainly drew ontological 
lessons from the developments of the quantum and relativistic revolutions. He thus 
asked questions like “Is there any sense in ascribing to them [i.e. electrons] a 
definite, strictly determined existence, which, however, is only incompletely 
accessible to us?” (1936: 178). His answer to this question and others like it is a 
resounding ‘no’, since he conceives of electrons not as individuals but simply 
“describable as ‘points of intersection’ of certain relations” (180). He thus seems to 
reject the traditional object-based ontology for a relation-based ontology that 
reconceptualises an object in terms of relations.59
At around the same time as these authors, Camap made several decisive steps 
towards structuralism. That Camap had structuralist inclinations was first suggested 
by Demopoulos and Friedman (1985). In the Aufbau, as is well known, Camap 
advocates the reconstruction of all scientific concepts on the basis of private 
experience. Yet, it is unclear what precisely Camap wants to achieve (see Creath 
(1998)). Some, for example, suggest that Camap simply tried to reduce physical 
objects to observable phenomena, implying a phenomenalist project. Against this 
interpretation, Demopoulos and Friedman suggest that there is an undeniable 
structuralist streak in the Aujbau. More specifically, they claim that for Camap, only 
those statements that express the structure of experience reveal the objectivity of 
science. Here’s a telling passage quoted by Demopoulos and Friedman:
Science wants to speak about what is objective, and whatever does not belong to the 
structure but to the material (i.e., anything that can be pointed out in a concrete 
ostensive definition) is, in the final analysis, subjective. One can easily see that 
physics is almost altogether desubjectivized, since almost all physical concepts have 
been transformed into purely structural concepts (1928, §16).
59 See also Cassirer (1944).
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Camap, they point out, sets up a program of defining scientific concepts as ‘purely 
structural definite descriptions’. The important point to note is that these definite 
descriptions contain only logical vocabulary. This is a move similar to the Ramsey 
sentence, the only difference being that Camap turns all the terms, i.e. not just the 
theoretical ones, into variables.
Recent work by Psillos (1999; 2000) has uncovered that Camap defended a more 
robust form of structuralism in the fifties and sixties. For example, in ‘The 
Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts’ Camap holds that theoretical 
variables range over natural numbers but only because the domain of the naturals has 
a kind of structure that is isomorphic to the structure of the domain of the theory. 
Camap signifies the importance of structure over its elements, saying that “the 
structure [of the domain of the theory] can be uniquely specified but the elements of 
the structure cannot” (1956: 46). In the years that follow, his structuralism becomes 
even more pronounced. The most important development is his reinvention of the 
Ramsey-sentence approach, under the name of ‘the existentialised form of 
theories’.60 He avoids a realist interpretation by holding that in Ramseyfication the 
theoretical terms are to be replaced by variables that range over mathematical 
entities.
Carnap’s agenda, throughout this period, seems to have been to uphold a neutral 
stance towards the realism-instrumentalism debate. As made obvious above, 
however, his insistence on the interpretation of theoretical variables ranging over 
mathematical entities, as opposed to physical entities, tips the balance in favour of 
the instrumentalist side. In a move to avoid instrumentalism, Camap explains that 
the variables in his system have two interpretations, one extensional and one 
intensional.61 From an extensional point of view, the theoretical variables of the 
Ramsey-sentence range over mathematical entities. From an intensional point of 
view, the theoretical variables of the Ramsey-sentence can be seen as ranging over 
physical entities in that the intensions of theoretical terms are physical concepts not
60 Psillos cites a letter from Camap to Hempel (dated February 12, 1958), where Camap reveals that 
he had read Ramsey many years before he developed his own existentialized form o f a theory but had 
completely forgotten about it.
61 See Psillos (1999: 54) where he cites a letter from Feigl to Camap (dated July 21, 1958).
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mathematical ones. This tips the balance in favour of the realist side since he allows 
the Ramsey-sentence to make existential statements about unobservable entities.
Camap struggles with these issues through various manuscripts, letters, and 
articles.62 As Salmon (1994) indicates, it is not until Grover Maxwell’s intervention 
that Carnap’s attitude towards the Ramsey-sentence settles. Through Maxwell’s 
influence, Camap comes to see the Ramsey-sentence as incompatible with 
instrumentalism, since it can both attain a truth-value and make existential 
statements about physical entities. Even though Camap adopts this view by 1974, he, 
unlike Maxwell, neither associates the Ramsey-sentence with structural realism nor 
embraces the latter. With these brief remarks on Carnap’s structuralism completed, it 
is time to turn to the Ramsey-inspired structural realists, starting with Maxwell.
5. Epistemic Structural Realism, Ramsey-Style
Maxwell
In the late sixties, Grover Maxwell published a number of articles, defending an 
epistemic version of structural realism that owes much to Russell. Maxwell traces 
the position to Poincare, Schlick, Wittgenstein and, naturally, Russell himself. 
Echoing his predecessors, he speaks of the inability to have direct knowledge of the 
external world in distinctly Kantian terms:
On the one hand there is the realm of phenomena. These are wholly in the mind (in 
our sense). Of the phenomena and only of the phenomena do we have direct 
knowledge. On the other hand, there are the things in themselves, and here our 
divergence from the views of Kant is great; although we have no direct knowledge 
of the latter, the bulk of our common sense knowledge and our scientific knowledge 
is of them... all of this knowledge is purely structural (1968: 155).
Closely adhering to Russell’s version of structural realism, Maxwell urges 
commitment to the view that “all of the external world including even our own 
bodies is unobserved and unobservable” (152). He is thus using the term
62 In the end, Camap manages a type o f neutrality, but one that is between realism and the Ramsey- 
sentence, not realism and instrumentalism (see Psillos (1999: 58-61)).
63 He also mentions Beloff (1962), Mandelbaum (1964), Aune (1967), Pepper (1967). Maxwell 
(1970b: 24) also claims that it is similar to the ‘critical realism’ of, among others, Roy Wood Sellars 
as well as to the representative realism o f Locke provided certain modifications are made.
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‘unobservable’ in a way that is different from its use today. Like Russell, he does not 
discriminate between macro and micro-physical objects. For them, the term 
‘unobservable’ denotes the set of all things inhabiting the external world, i.e. the set 
of all non-mental entities. Their claim, of course, is not that our observations have no 
causal origins in the external world, but rather that what we directly observe is 
‘wholly in our mind’. Unless otherwise noted, I will henceforth employ Russell and 
Maxwell’s meaning for the term ‘unobservable’.
Despite their agreement on what ‘unobservable’ denotes, there are certain 
differences between Russell and Maxwell that are worth pursuing. One difference is 
that Maxwell dissociates himself from reifying observable units, avoiding reference 
to things like sense-data, sensibilia, percepts, etc. (151). Instead, he places the 
spotlight on the linguistic level, with observation sentences and predicates as 
primitives. Somewhat paradoxically, Maxwell is best known for his critique of the 
distinction between observational and theoretical terms (see his (1962)). Yet, he here 
seems to advocate a strong distinction between observable and unobservable that is 
essential for his version of structural realism. The apparent tension is dissolved if one 
takes into account that, for him, the entire external world is unobservable. That is, 
this way of delineating the observable from the unobservable avoids the kinds of 
objections Maxwell raised in his earlier work. For example, seeing through 
instruments is no longer a threat to the observable-unobservable distinction since all 
seeing is restricted to the perceptual world.
Given the sense of ‘unobservable’ just sketched, how can knowledge of a wholly 
unobservable external world be had? The answer, says Maxwell, lies in the causal 
theory of perception. An important feature of this theory is that “it is not essential to 
the position [i.e. structural realism] that the sense impressions or perceptual 
experiences, or whatever we decide to call them ‘resemble’ the physical objects 
which may be among their causal antecedents” (1968: 155). What is necessary is that 
“at least a certain subset of the features of the [sense] impression are isomorphic with 
a subset of the features of the physical object” (156). Without this type of 
‘resemblance’, Maxwell insists, there can be no knowledge of the external world. 
His justification for this requirement proceeds via familiar Russellian techniques
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such as the claim that causal chains leading up to our perceptions are structure- 
preserving (1970b: 25) and the H-W principle (1968: 156).
Maxwell, like Russell, argues that the motivation for the causal theory “is virtually 
forced upon us by common sense as well as by science” (1970b: 23). In some 
limited sense, this is right. Most of us, after all, would agree that the causes of our 
perceptions originate in the external world. However, there is no widespread 
agreement on how the ‘information’ coded in our perceptions represents the external 
world if it does so at all. In other words, the claim that perceptions preserve the 
structure of their causes is more difficult to swallow. Maxwell admits that “there are 
no purely logical or purely conceptual reasons that there be structural similarities 
between objects in the external world and items in our experience” (25). 
Nevertheless, he claims that well-confirmed theories support this assumption, 
arguing that “if such [structural] similarities were fewer or, even, virtually 
nonexistent, knowledge of the physical realm would be more difficult to come by 
but not necessarily impossible” (25).
Maxwell claims that we cannot know the first-order properties of physical objects; 
we can only know their second or higher order properties, what he calls ‘structural 
properties’ (18). This is supposed to follow from the idea that first-order properties 
of phenomena, like colours, need not resemble the first-order properties of their 
causes. Maxwell’s conclusion is that “[w ]ta  holds o f colors must also be true fo r all 
o f the first order properties that we perceive directly'’ (19) [original emphasis].
Maxwell praises Russell, among other things, for the reconciliation of realism with 
the logical positivist verificationist principle. This is achieved, Maxwell claims, 
through Russell’s principle of acquaintance and his distinction between knowledge 
by acquaintance and knowledge by description. The principle of acquaintance is a 
close relative of the verificationist principle, for it states that to understand a 
proposition we must be acquainted with all of its constituents. With some perhaps 
not so trivial adjustments to the terminology, Maxwell transposes this idea to the 
current context, claiming that all descriptive terms in a meaningful sentence must 
refer to ‘items’ of our acquaintance, i.e. all descriptive terms must be observation
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terms (as opposed to theoretical terms).64 Yet realism requires that we have 
knowledge of items with which we are not acquainted. This is where Russell’s 
knowledge by description comes in, for it allows an object to be known by a list of 
descriptions -  i.e. without our first being acquainted with it. Needless to say 
Maxwell takes knowledge by description to be the same as knowledge via theory.
As I mentioned earlier, one of Maxwell’s contributions to the debate is the bridge he 
forges between the Ramsey-sentence approach and structural realism. It is at this 
point that the utility of the principle of acquaintance and the acquaintance vs. 
description distinction becomes evident. According to Maxwell, knowledge 
representation via the Ramsey-sentence approach validates both the principle and the 
distinction. This is so, because the Ramsey-sentence approach existentially 
quantifies over all theoretical terms but leaves all observation terms intact. Maxwell 
explains:
[We] can formulate propositions that refer to unobservable properties or to classes 
of unobservable things by means of existentially quantified predicate variables and 
other purely logical terms plus terms whose direct referents are observables. 
Fortunately any theory whatever can be transformed without loss of significant 
content into such a proposition. It is only necessary to replace the conjunction of the 
assertions of the theory by its Ramsey sentence (16).
In accordance with Russell’s principle of acquaintance, the ‘items’ that theoretical 
terms supposedly refer to, unlike the items of observation terms, are not ‘ingredients’ 
of a proposition. For Russell, this means that sentences expressing such a proposition 
will not contain a name or descriptive constant that refers directly to the alleged 
items. Diverging from Russell’s viewpoint, Maxwell argues that there is a sense in 
which a proposition refers to the items that its theoretical terms prescribe. It refers to 
them indirectly, through “(1) terms whose direct referents are items of acquaintance 
and (2) items of a purely logical nature such as variables, quantifiers and 
connectives” (1970a: 182-3).
The advantage of employing the Ramsey-sentence approach is that its assertions are 
restricted to properties of properties of unobservables, i.e. it does not uniquely
64 He thus assumes that the terms ‘observation’ and ‘acquaintance’ are co-extensive (1970a: 182). 
Notice that his deliberate choice o f the term ‘item’ reflects his avoidance o f  what exactly the nature of 
the objects o f our acquaintance is.
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identify the properties of unobservables. This seems in accord with Maxwell’s view 
that we do not have epistemic access to the first-order properties of unobservables.65 
Nonetheless, “our (Ramseyfied) theories tell us that they exist and what some of 
their (second and higher order) properties are” (1970b: 19) [original emphasis].
To appreciate the marriage between structural realism and the Ramsey-sentence 
approach, it is worth considering one of Maxwell’s examples. Suppose that given 
numerous observations we pronounce the truth of the following sentence: (Vx)(Vy) 
[(Ax & Dx) z> (By) Cy] where A and D are theoretical predicates which stand for ‘is 
a radium atom’ and ‘radioactively decays’ respectively, and C is an observation 
predicate which stands for ‘is an audible click in a Geiger counter’. If this sentence is 
true then its Ramsey-sentence, namely (3\\f) (3cp) (Vx) (Vy) [(\|/x & <px) => (3y) Cy] 
where ‘\j/’ and ‘(p’ are predicate variables, will also be true. The principle of 
acquaintance holds that we cannot know sentences like the first one, because they 
mistakenly include fully interpreted theoretical predicates, i.e. A and D. The Ramsey 
sentence version circumvents this problem by merely asserting that such properties 
exist. Maxwell explains that our knowledge of these properties “is by description 
and, as in all such cases, we refer to them not by predicate constants, but indirectly 
by means of purely logical terms plus an observation term, in this case, ‘C’ ” (1970a: 
186-7).
Despite the strong case that Maxwell makes, Russell’s version of structural realism 
and the Ramsey-sentence approach are inconsistent. True, both Russell and Maxwell 
advocate a notion of structure that identifies properties preserved by isomorphic 
mappings.66 It is also true that the notion of abstract structure I presented earlier 
seems ideal for the purposes of both. In spite of this agreement, the Ramsey-sentence 
of a theory preserves the logical structure of the whole theory, something directly at
65 As I argue in the next chapter (see section three), the Ramsey-sentence approach is not in accord 
with Maxwell’s idea about first-order properties, for it quantifies over any theoretical properties, i.e. 
not just those that are first-order.
66 In a puzzling footnote, Maxwell notes that the account he offers in his (1968) is incomplete and 
incorrect in that “structure should not be identified with form; rather it is form plus causal connections 
with experience” (154). I do not know what to make of this, though my suspicion is that he might be 
attempting to fend off objections on how much the notion o f abstract structure can tell us about the 
world.
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odds with Russell’s insistence that we infer the structure of the world from the 
structure of our perceptions.
To elucidate the point, consider the following example. Suppose that we have in our 
hands a theory, call it ‘K’, and that all it says about the world is captured by the 
claim: (Vx) [(Tix 3  T 2X ) & (Oix 3 - O 2 X ) ] .67 Now, according to Russell, we find out 
about the structure of the physical world through the structure of observations. First 
of all, we take the concrete observational structure of K, i.e. (Vy) (Oiy 3 -,02y), call 
it ‘O k ’ . We then deduce the abstract structure of O k, i.e. (3d>)(BvF)(Vy) (Oy 3 _,'Fy), 
call it ‘A k ’. Finally, via principles H-W and MR we postulate that there is a unique 
concrete physical structure, call it ‘P k \  which instantiates A k  and whose domain 
members are the causes of the domain members of the concrete observational 
structure. We can express Pk as (Vy) (Fy 3  ^Gy), where F and G are predicates 
referring to physical properties. Qua structural realists, we do not have epistemic 
access to the properties F and G are referring to, so we cannot say that we know Pk. 
All that we can say is that we know that there exist two predicates that: 1) refer to the 
physical properties that cause observable Oi and O2 and 2) that these predicates 
instantiate the predicate variables in Ak. We can call this last claim ‘Kp’. The point 
that I am making here is that Kp is obviously different to the Ramsey-sentence of K, 
R(K): (3@)(3Z) (Vx) [(@x 3 Zx) & (Oix 3 “O 2X)]. One major difference is that the 
Ramsey sentence of K asserts the existence of at least two physical properties, 
whereas Kp asserts the existence of just two physical properties. Moreover, the latter 
states that the two properties are the causal antecedents of Oi and O2, something 
R(K) does not do. Another major difference is that the logical properties of R(K) and 
Kp, at least in this example, are different. That suffices to establish that the two 
methods, i.e. Ramseyfication and Russell’s method, are not equivalent. No wonder 
then that even Maxwell remarks in passing that “the Ramsey sentence is 
approximately equivalent to Russell’s contention that we do have knowledge of the 
structural properties of the unobservable” (1970b: 17) [my emphasis].
67 Worrall objects that this example is artificial, for K does not involve any intricate logical relations 
between the observational and theoretical terms. This, according to him, makes the theoretical part o f  
the sentence content-free. I will address this issue in section three o f chapter four.
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Worrall and Zahar
Worrall’s and Zahar’s variety of epistemic structural realism, initially also branded 
‘syntactic realism’, is inspired by Poincare’s historical arguments, and in this respect 
differs from both Russell’s version and Maxwell’s version. The recent interest in 
structural realism was instigated by the publication of Worrall’s ‘Structural Realism: 
The Best of Both Worlds?’ a decade and half ago. Worrall there argued that a 
sensible position in the scientific realism debate needs to take into consideration two 
warring arguments: the no-miracle argument and the pessimistic induction 
argument.68 In short and as already sketched in chapter one, PI holds that since 
predictively successful scientific theories have eventually been discarded, we have 
inductive evidence that even our current theories, despite their great successes, will 
also be discarded one day. NMA holds that realism is the only view that does not 
make the predictive success of science a miracle. Worrall offers ESR as a position 
that underwrites both of these arguments and situates itself midway between 
constructive empiricism and traditional scientific realism. It underwrites the NMA 
because it argues that the success of science reflects the fact that we have got the 
structure of the world right. It underwrites PI because it concedes that non-structure 
gets abandoned.
Following Poincare, Worrall takes the Fresnel-Maxwell case as historical evidence 
for ESR. He indicates that the structure of Fresnel’s theory, as it is for example 
expressed through his equations for the relative intensities of reflected and refracted 
light at the boundary between two transparent media of differing optical densities, 
was carried over to Maxwell’s theory unscathed. Thus, Worrall argues, if  we look at 
theory change solely from the perspective of mathematical equations, the Fresnel- 
Maxwell case counts as evidence for the essentially cumulative development of 
science.69 The underlying assumption is that it is reasonable to hold that what 
survives theory change is what has really latched on to the world. According to 
Worrall, Fresnel was completely wrong about the nature of light, viz. that light 
consists of vibrations that are transmitted through an all-pervading medium, the 
ether. Fresnel was probably right, however, about its structure, i.e. that optical
68 Worrall traces PI and NMA to both Poincare and Duhem (see (1989: 140-2)).
69 Heinrich Hertz’s often quoted comment that ‘Maxwell’s theory is the system o f Maxwell’s 
equations’ is congenial with Worrall and Poincare’s claim that the essence o f the theory is the 
relations it postulates.
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effects depend on something or other that vibrates at right angles to the direction of 
propagation of light, just as required by the equations.
A question that naturally arises from the above exposition of Worrall’s views is 
whether the mathematical continuity found in the above case is a widespread 
phenomenon within the history of science. Worrall grants that the Fresnel-Maxwell 
case is ‘unrepresentative’ in that Fresnel’s equations are entailed by Maxwell’s 
theory without any modifications.70 It is more often the case that equations of an 
older theory reappear only as limiting cases of equations in a newer theory. Indeed, 
the two great theories of the twentieth century, viz. the theory of relativity and 
quantum mechanics, depart from classical physics in ways that prima facie seem 
difficult -  some people have argued impossible -  to reconcile.
Redhead (2001a), himself an ESR sympathiser, cites two cases where the structural 
continuity between old and new is difficult to maintain. The first case involves the 
relationship between Minkowskian and Galilean space-times. Unlike Galilean space­
time, Minkowskian space-time admits a non-singular metric. If, however, we let the 
speed of light tend to infinity, the metric becomes singular. This leads to the 
disappearance of the relativity of simultaneity, allowing for the recovery of Galilean 
space-time. The second case involves the relation between the Poisson and Moyal 
bracket formulations of classical and quantum mechanics respectively. The latter 
formulation generalises the former by introducing non-commutative multiplication 
for phase space functions. If we set Planck’s constant to zero, commutativity is 
recovered and so is the Poisson formulation.
Redhead’s two cases are meant to illustrate an abrupt qualitative discontinuity 
between the new and the old. Regardless of this discontinuity, Redhead notes an 
apparent affinity between old and new structures:
Qualitatively new structures emerge, but there is a definite sense in which the new 
structures grow naturally, although discontinuously, out of the old structures. To 
the mathematician introducing a metric in geometry, or non-commutativity in 
algebra are very natural moves. So looked at from the right perspective, the new
70 That the Fresnel-Maxwell case is atypical has also been pointed out by, among others, Howson 
(2001), Redhead (2001a), and Kitcher (2001).
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structures do seem to arise in a natural, if not inescapable way out of the old 
structures (19).71
In other words, if, like the mathematician, we see how natural the leap is from old to 
new structure, then we realise that the discontinuity is not debilitating. Seeing as this 
argument rests on a metaphor, it is no wonder that Redhead is reticent regarding its 
force. A major task for the structural realist then is to find a way to make concrete 
the correspondence relation between old and new structures.
Zahar has recently claimed that a proper defence of ESR requires a departure from 
standard semantics. By interpreting relations only through their relata, he maintains, 
standard semantics fails to give due priority to the relations, which are, after all, the 
focus of structural realism. Here is what Zahar says:
...according to structural realism, we often have a good reason for supposing that 
‘R’ [i.e. a specific relation] reflects a real connection between elements about 
whose intrinsic nature we know next to nothing. The conditions under which we are 
entitled to make such a realist claim obtain whenever we have a highly unified 
hypothesis H which both involves R and explains a whole host of seemingly 
disparate facts in a non-adhoc way (2001:38).
Implicit in this passage is an association between knowledge of the intrinsic nature 
of objects and classical semantics. In rejecting the former, Zahar believes that we 
must also reject the latter. The presumed association, however, is highly dubious 
since not knowing the intrinsic nature of objects does not force us to abandon the 
characterisation of relations in terms of individuals. We can simply stick with the 
less radical view that the individuals are known only up to isomorphism, expressing 
our knowledge of relations as higher order claims about sets of individuals. What is 
more, Zahar’s and Worrall’s support for the Ramsey-sentence approach does not 
seem to square with his call for a new semantics. Either, the Ramsey-sentence 
approach plus the associated classical semantics works, in which case there is no 
need for a new semantics, or it does not work and that is (potentially) why we must 
look for a new semantics.
71 See also his (2001b: 346-347).
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Another interesting development has seen the reconciliation of structural realism 
with a position proclaimed by many (see, for example, Niiniluoto (1999)) as its main 
competitor in the realist camp, namely entity realism. In a noteworthy article, 
Chakravartty (1998) has sought to bring the two together under the banner of his 
own position, ‘Semi-realism’. He argues that the properties we detect in experiments 
should be central to both accounts. Commitment to the existential claims of entity 
realism, says Chakravartty, can be achieved only through relying on relations 
between detectable properties. Conversely, these relations, which are the focus of 
structural realists, contain substantive information about entities. Thus, he concludes, 
properly understood entity and structural realism “entail one another; they are, in 
fact, one and the same position: semirealism” (407).
6. Psillos’ Objections
In a recent succession of articles ((1995), (2000a), (2001a), 2001b)) and a book 
(1999, ch. 7), Psillos has attacked various versions of structural realism, especially 
those of Russell, Maxwell and Worrall. Since a proper exposition of these criticisms 
would take rather long, I merely list them here and ask the reader to wait for a 
detailed treatment in the ensuing chapter. The seven most important objections that 
emerge from Psillos’ attack, all of them directly challenging ESR, are:
(PS1) ESR commits us only to uninterpreted equations but these are not by 
themselves enough to produce predictions (1999: 153-4).
(PS2) Structural continuity through theory change can be explained better by 
traditional scientific realism than by ESR (1999: 147-8).
(PS3) Some non-structural theoretical content is retained in theory change, and this 
is better supported by current evidence and more likely to be true than non-structural 
theoretical content in the past (1999: 147-8).
(PS4) The structure vs. nature distinction that ESR appeals to cannot be sustained 
(1999: 157).
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(PS5) ESR faces a dilemma: On the one hand, the H-W principle by itself can only 
establish a relation of embeddability between the external world and the ‘world’ of 
percepts, not a relation of isomorphism as required by ESR. Without a relation of 
isomorphism, the structural realists cannot establish inferential knowledge about the 
structure of the external world. On the other hand, H-W together with its converse, 
viz. different stimuli/physical objects imply different percepts, allow for the 
establishment of isomorphic relations but, in doing so, concede too much to idealism 
(2001a: S13-S16).
(PS6) The claim that the first-order properties and relations of unobservables are 
unknowable in principle cannot be justified (1999: 156; 2001a: S20-21).
(PS7) Knowing the abstract structure of the external world is not enough since it 
merely amounts to knowing formal properties such as transitivity, symmetry and 
reflexivity (2001a: S16-S17).
7. Ontic Structural Realism
An altogether different species of structuralism has been proposed by James 
Ladyman (1998). Ladyman argues that structural realism should be understood not 
just as an epistemological, but also as a metaphysical position. He claims that this 
much is suggested by Worrall’s version of structural realism, which, according to 
Ladyman, is ambiguous between the two manifestations. Yet, neither Worrall nor 
any other ESR-ist adopts any substantive metaphysical positions but rather asserts 
the epistemic inaccessibility to physical objects beyond the level of isomorphism. 
Steven French (1998; 1999; 2003) has joined forces with Ladyman (see their (2003a) 
and (2003b)) in advocating what they call ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ or OSR for 
short. As I have already indicated, they claim to have traced the roots of OSR to 
Ernst Cassirer. But let us take things from the beginning.
Appealing to some of the aforementioned objections to structural realism, 
particularly Newman’s objection and Psillos’ objection that the distinction between 
structure and non-structure cannot be drawn, Ladyman hastily concludes that ESR is 
incapable of solving the problem of ontological discontinuity through theory
62
change.72 He ties this problem to a type of underdetermination that originates in the 
philosophy of physics, namely whether elementary particles are individuals. A 
solution to this latter problem requires drastic measures, according to Ladyman:
What is required is a shift to a different ontological basis altogether, one for which 
questions of individuality simply do not arise... So we should seek to elaborate 
structural realism in such a way that it can defuse the problems of traditional 
realism, with respect to both theory change and underdetermination. This means 
taking the structure as primitive and ontologically subsistent (1998a: 420).
This is the crux of OSR. Crudely put, OSR prescribes that all that exists in the world 
is structure. Consequently, all that can ever be known about the world is structure.
The motivation for OSR comes from considerations about modem and, in particular 
quantum, physics. In classical physics, elementary particles are taken to be 
indistinguishable individuals. More precisely, they are only distinguishable with 
respect to their spatio-temporal coordinates but not with respect to any other 
properties they posses. Their individuality is thought of as something over and above 
these latter properties. The quantum view of elementary particles, say French and 
Ladyman, underdetermines the metaphysics of elementary particles. That is, they can 
be viewed as either individuals or non-individuals.
To illuminate this point let us take French’s example of two indistinguishable 
particles that are distributed over two states (see his (1998)). The scenario obviously 
offers four possibilities: (1) particles a and b in state A , (2) particles a and b in state 
B , (3) particle a in state A and particle b in state B , and (4) particle a in state B and 
particle b in state A. Under the orthodox view of quantum statistics, (3) and (4) are 
thought of as one and the same possibility with nothing distinguishing between 
them.74 That is, according to the Bose-Einstein statistics implicit in the orthodox 
interpretation of quantum theory, these two possibilities are considered to be the very 
same thing. French takes this to mean that the particles must be thought of as non­
individuals. He concedes, however, that there is another view within quantum 
statistics that, at least in principle, takes (3) and (4) as distinct. From this, he
72 It is puzzling how Ladyman comes to think that these problems have anything to do with the 
problem o f theory change.
73 Paradoxically, French (1998) argues that we cannot read metaphysics o ff current physics.
74 In classical statistical mechanics, (3) and (4) are thought o f as distinct.
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concludes that quantum physics underdetermines, i.e. is neutral, between the view of 
particles as individuals and that of particles as non-individuals.
Astonishingly, French and Ladyman claim that this underdetermination supports 
OSR. Yet, at most, the underdetermination seems to raise doubts about the 
individuality of particles.75 A defence of the view that we should throw away an 
individual-based ontology and reconceptualise the role of individuals in terms of 
structures, as French and Ladyman suggest, would at least require demonstrating that 
elementary particles are non-individuals. Their own insistence on 
underdetermination between the two possibilities defeats any such approach. If 
anything, the underdetermination counsels agnosticism between the two views of 
particles and, by extension, agnosticism about OSR.76
It is worth noting that in his original article, Ladyman offers the model-theoretic 
(a.k.a. semantic) approach to theories, according to which theories are conceived of 
as sets of models, as a general framework for the treatment of theories. Together 
with French, they have since then extended this framework with the so-called ‘partial 
structures approach’, developed first by Newton Da Costa (see, for example, Da 
Costa and French (1990)). Among other benefits, this approach allegedly provides a 
better representation of continuity through theory change, especially those cases 
where continuity is only approximate. As French and Ladyman have admitted, 
however, the radical shift in ontology requires a new semantics to go with it. What 
remains wanting, is the fleshing out of this much-advertised new semantics. Many 
have questioned the very possibility of conceiving of objects as structures. 
Moreover, even if the vaunted reconceptualisation were possible it is doubtful that 
this would be a good reason to abandon an object-based ontology.
In view of the fact that my dissertation deals solely with the epistemological 
dimension of the scientific realist debate, OSR will not be investigated further. It is 
mentioned here only in order to cover all major developments in structuralism of the
75 This objection, as well as many others, has also been raised by Tian Yu Cao (2003a; 2003b), Anjan 
Chakravarrty (2003) and Matteo Morganti (forthcoming).
76 Ladyman seems to have had a change o f heart. When I raised this point at a BSPS lecture given by 
French and entitled '''‘From Poincare's Crutch to Melia's Weasel: Having One's Ontological Cake and 
Eating it too" Ladyman agreed that what the underdetermination argument warrants is agnosticism.
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natural sciences. Notwithstanding the perhaps insurmountable difficulties it faces, 
OSR is at the cutting edge of metaphysics, its proposal as radical as they get.
8. Empiricist Structuralism
Van Fraassen (1997; 1999) has vehemently attacked structural realism, both its 
epistemic and ontic forms, arguing instead for an empiricist version of structuralism, 
which he aptly calls ‘empiricist structuralism’. He agrees with Worrall that there is a 
preservation of structure through theory change, but argues that the type of structure 
involved is the structure of the phenomena, not the structure of the unobservables 
(1999: 30-1).77 In van Fraassen’s eyes there are two realms of scientific 
investigation: 1) the phenomena and 2) the mathematical structures. We represent the 
structure of the phenomena with the help of mathematical structures.
Van Fraassen claims that the empiricist can explain how and why earlier theories 
were successful. Instead of the realist explanation that requires old theories to have 
latched on to the structure of the unobservables, his alleged explanation requires that 
the new theories imply “approximately the same predictions for the circumstances in 
which the older theories were confirmed and found adequately applicable” (25). 
This, according to van Fraassen, doubles up as a criterion for theory acceptance. That 
is, a new theory must at least be able to make approximately the same confirmed 
predictions as the old one. It also satisfies the no miracles intuition, continues van 
Fraassen, without making the success of science a miracle, “because in any 
theoretical change both the past empirical success retained and new empirical 
successes were needed as credentials for acceptance” (25) [original emphasis].
The motivation for van Fraassen’s structuralism is different from any of the ones we 
have seen so far. It is worth quoting him in full:
According to the semantic approach, to present a scientific theory is, in the first 
instance, to present a family of models - that is, mathematical structures offered for 
the representation of the theory's subject matter. Within mathematics, isomorphic 
objects are not relevantly different; so it is especially appropriate to refer to 
mathematical objects as "structures". Given that the models used in science are 
mathematical objects, therefore, scientific theoretical descriptions are structural;
77 As van Fraassen notes: “There was something they [i.e. the theories] got right: the structure, at 
some level o f approximation, o f those phenomena” (31).
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they do not "cut through" isomorphism. So the semantic approach implies a 
structuralist position: science's description of its subject matter is solely of structure 
(1997: 522).78
Given that mathematical objects can only be described up to isomorphism, van 
Fraassen says, our use of mathematical structures to describe the phenomenal world 
makes us structuralists. The motivation is thus primarily linguistic, in that he is 
arguing that language, in particular mathematics, gives rise to, and perhaps even 
necessitates, structuralism.79 This linguistic motivation is reminiscent of the view, 
held by Poincare and Russell, that nothing other than structure is transmissible. It is 
worth noting that, despite the jargon used by semantic theorists, the semantic 
approach is superfluous in the above argument since one need not be a semantic 
theorist to hold the two premises, i.e. that mathematical objects are describable up to 
isomorphism and that we use mathematical objects to represent the world.
Following in van Fraassen’s footsteps, Otavio Bueno (1997; 1999; 2000) argues for 
a position that he calls ‘structural empiricism’. His position inherits some of the 
main features of constructive empiricism, such as the notion of empirical adequacy, 
but also van Fraassen’s recent emphasis on structures. His notion of structure, 
however, is a bit more idiosyncratic. Like French and Ladyman, Bueno relies on a 
partial structures approach to scientific theories. Within this framework, he 
introduces variant notions of empirical adequacy, such as the notion of degrees of 
empirical adequacy, characterised in terms of the notion of partial isomorphism (see 
his (1999: section 3)). Indeed, Bueno takes himself as extending van Fraassen’s 
account by fleshing out a more flexible relation between structures, provided by the 
partial structures approach. This has been a move already suggested by van Fraassen 
(see his (1997: 524)), and Bueno acknowledges as much.
9. The Main Structural Realist Obstacles
Given the above elaboration of the historical development of structuralism and in 
particular structural realism, we can identify four main obstacles that structural 
realists need to somehow account for:
78 See also his (1999: 31-2).
79 Though van Fraassen does not elaborate on this point, I presume that his claim is not restricted to 
the language o f mathematics but any language whose statements can be translated into the language 
of mathematics.
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(SRP1) The Newman objection: The ESR claim that all we can know about the 
world is that it has a certain abstract structure makes scientific knowledge trivial. It 
presumably makes it trivial because saying, as structural realists do, that for a given 
class there exists a system of relations that specifies an abstract structure is not 
saying anything of empirical importance, since this claim follows a-priori by appeal 
to theorems of set theory and logic plus knowledge of the cardinality of the given 
class. In order to avoid the triviality accusation, appeal must be made to non- 
structural considerations. This amounts to abandoning pure ESR.
(SRP2) The structural discontinuity objection: There is insufficient historical 
evidence for structural continuity through theory change. The Fresnel-Maxwell case 
is atypical. Most current theories’ immediate predecessors are, even at the level of 
structure, discontinuous with their successors.
(SRP3) Psillos’ medley of objections: PS1-PS7.
(SRP4) The Empiricist Structuralist Challenge: There is continuity of structure 
through theory change, but it is continuity of the structure of phenomena not of the 
structure of unobservables.
These are added to the obstacles faced by scientific realism outlined in chapter one. 
The only exception is SRP2, which, naturally, overlaps with RP2 to a certain extent.
10. Conclusion
The history of structuralism in the natural sciences is rich and varied. Among the 
many structuralist positions, ESR, especially Worrall’s version, has been hailed by 
many as a refreshing new hope for realism. As we have seen, it has also been heavily 
criticised. The rest of this dissertation will be an evaluation of ESR in light of the 
objections raised against it and, more broadly, the objections raised against 
traditional versions of realism. First in line is chapter three where I address Psillos’ 
objections PS1- PS7, who spearheads the critique of structural realism. In addressing 
these objections I will try to clarify and make precise the notions and principles on 
which structural realism depends. Chapter four is devoted to the Newman objection,
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SRP1, hailed by many as the fatal blow to structural realism. In chapter five I pursue 
a historical case study in an effort to address the historical objections SRP2, and 
RP2. Following that is a chapter on underdetermination where RP1 and, for reasons 
that will become clear later, SRP4 are tackled. Finally, the seventh chapter offers a 
glimpse into the future directions the research of this dissertation can be taken.
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3
Recent Objections
Among ESR’s critics, Psillos seems the most committed to the position’s overthrow. 
In the last few years he has launched a barrage of objections against ESR (see his 
(1995), (1999), (2000a), (2001a), and (2001b)). The aim of this chapter is threefold: 
1) to evaluate Psillos’ offensive against both the Poincarean/Worrallian and the 
Russellian versions of the position, 2) to elaborate more fully what ESR involves, 
and 3) to suggest improvements where ESR is indeed failing.
1. Introduction
Psillos has praised Worrall’s revival of the Poincarean version of ESR, saying that it 
gives us an important insight into the scientific realism debate. The insight it gives is 
that we need not believe to an equal degree all that a scientific theory ascribes to the 
world. In spite of this acknowledgement, Psillos thinks that ESR faces a number of 
insurmountable objections. I have already listed these in the previous chapter but I 
reproduce them here for the reader’s convenience. The first three objections have 
been raised primarily against the Poincarean/Worrallian version of ESR:
(PS1) ESR commits us only to uninterpreted equations, but these are not by 
themselves enough to produce predictions, and, therefore, do not deserve all the 
epistemic credit (1999: 153-4; 2001a: S21).
(PS2) Structural continuity through theory change can be explained better by 
traditional scientific realism than by ESR (1999: 147-8).
(PS3) Some non-structural theoretical content is retained in theory change, and this 
is better supported by current evidence and more likely to be true than non-structural 
theoretical content in the past (1999: 147-8).
One of Psillos’ objections seems to apply to all ESR-ists, namely:
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(PS4) The structure vs. nature distinction that ESR appeals to cannot be sustained 
(1999: 157).80
Psillos has also put forward three objections that are directed at the Russellian 
version of ESR. These are:
(PS5) ESR faces a dilemma: On the one hand, the H-W principle by itself can only 
establish a relation of embeddability between the external world and the ‘world’ of 
percepts, not a relation of isomorphism as required by ESR. Without a relation of 
isomorphism, the structural realists cannot establish inferential knowledge about the 
structure of the external world. On the other hand, the converse of H-W, viz. 
different stimuli/physical objects imply different percepts, together with H-W allow 
for the establishment of isomorphic relations but, in doing so, concede too much to 
idealism (2001a: S13-S16).
(PS6) ESR cannot justify the claim that the first-order properties and relations of 
unobservables are unknowable in principle (1999: 156); (2001a: S20-21).
(PS7) Knowing the abstract structure of the external world is not enough since it 
merely amounts to knowing formal properties such as transitivity, symmetry, and 
reflexivity (2001a: S16-S17).
In what follows, I evaluate these objections by separating them into two groups, one 
comprising the Worrallian/Poincarean objections, the other comprising the Russelian 
objections. Albeit having an equal right to be in both groups, I place PS4 in the first 
group because Psillos raises this objection in the context of criticising Worrall’s 
ESR. Finally, since the second group of objections is thematically identical to 
objections made by Michael Bradie (1977) and Bas van Fraassen (1997), I include 
these there.
80 See also Ladyman (1998) and van Fraassen (1999).
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2. Terminological Issues
I must first clarify some terminological issues, which, as we shall shortly see, are the 
sources of some of the above objections. Psillos does not sufficiently explicate the 
notion of structure, and, as a consequence, draws some mistaken conclusions about 
the commitments made by ESR.81 He employs a number of terms, some of which 
introduced by the structural realists themselves, that loosely refer to what the 
structural realists have in mind but that are also misleading in their own peculiar 
way. These are: ‘mathematical structure of theories’, ‘the logico-mathematical 
structure of theories’, ‘mathematical content of theories’, ‘the mathematical form of 
laws’, ‘mathematical equations’ and ‘uninterpreted mathematical equations’.
The first one, viz. ‘mathematical structure of theories’, may be too narrow. If we take 
logic as not subsumed under mathematics, then we are leaving out structures 
specifiable by logic but not by mathematics. For obvious reasons, this problem is 
remedied by the term ‘the logico-mathematical structure of theories’. Both terms, 
however, as well as the term ‘mathematical content of theories’ may be too broad in 
that there is plenty of mathematical machinery which does not play any 
representative role.82 Typically, structures taken to represent the physical world are 
embedded in broader mathematical structures. The excess mathematical structure is 
obviously not the target of the structural realist’s commitments. Hence, to say that a 
structural realist is interested in the whole mathematical content of theories is 
misleading at best.
The next term, ‘the mathematical form of laws’, is also misleading for at least two 
reasons. One important reason is that the notion of structure should not be restricted 
to laws. Laws typically express relations between physical entities, properties and 
relations, but they are not the only theoretical statements that do so. Functions, 
equations, symmetries, principles, covariance statements, etc., postulate relations 
between terms that can usually be expressed set-theoretically in the above-mentioned 
way.83 Take, for example, the inequality relations of momentum-position, ApxAx >
81 See also Redhead’s criticism o f Psillos (2001b: 345).
82 See Redhead’s (2001a) for an interesting discussion o f so-called ‘surplus structure’, i.e. 
mathematical structure that has no representative role.
83 It is worth noting that whether we get to call something ‘law’, ‘principle’, or ‘equation’ is often a 
historical accident.
71
h/2, and time-energy, AEAt > h/2, where A(z) denotes ‘spreads’ of the value of a 
measurable quantity z ,x  a position co-ordinate, px the momentum at x, E  energy, and 
t time. These are relations, and hence specify structures, just as much as Newton’s 
inverse-square law and Boyle’s law for gases. For the same reason the last two terms 
on the above list, ‘mathematical equations’ and ‘uninterpreted mathematical 
equations’, are problematic since they restrict the applicability of the notion of 
structure to equations. As a matter of fact, since the structural realist’s epistemic 
concerns are with relations, theoretical statements expressed in natural language can 
also qualify as specifying structures so long as they are expressing relations that have 
logico-mathematical properties. For example, the statement ‘Diamonds are harder 
than topaz gemstones and topaz gemstones are harder than apatite minerals’ is 
entailed by Moh’s scale of hardness, and reflects an ordering of minerals that, among 
other logico-mathematical properties, exhibits the property of transitivity.
The other reason why the term ‘the mathematical form of laws’ is misleading is that 
it is not entirely clear what ‘mathematical form’ means. Perhaps Psillos is alluding to 
the idea expressed by the last term on our list, viz. ‘uninterpreted mathematical 
equations’, with particular emphasis on ‘uninterpreted’. Yet ESR does not subscribe 
to uninterpreted equations as Psillos suggests. It is to precisely this issue that I now 
turn to in order to tackle Psillos’ first objection.
3. The Objections Against the PoincarSan/Worrallian ESR
Objection PS1
Scientific realists, argues Psillos, deny the ESR claim that “a// of what is retained is 
empirical content and (uninterpreted) mathematical equations” (1999: 147) [original 
emphasis]. The reasoning is that “mathematical equations alone -  devoid of their 
theoretical content -  [cannot] give rise to any predictions... [predictions require 
theoretical hypotheses and auxiliary assumptions” (153). Hence, Psillos concludes, 
uninterpreted mathematical equations cannot be entirely responsible for the success
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of the scientific theories in which they appear. This claim reflects an objection that 
Psillos echoes throughout his work.84
Is the structural realist arguing that uninterpreted equations are entirely responsible 
for the success of scientific theories? More specifically, is the structural realist 
arguing that we should believe only in uninterpreted equations? A careful review of 
the literature reveals that no structural realist ever supported such a view. Even 
Worrall, the subject of Psillos’ objection, comes close to holding such a view but 
does not take the plunge. He comes dangerously close, for example, when in arguing 
that only structure gets preserved through theory change, he asserts that “Fresnel’s 
equations are taken over completely intact into the superseding theory -  reappearing 
there newly interpreted but, as mathematical equations, entirely unchanged” (1996: 
160) [my emphasis]. If one looks at the context in which this sentence was uttered, 
as I will soon be doing, one can ascertain that by ‘newly interpreted’ Worrall is 
referring to the reinterpretation of these equations under new ontological 
assumptions. He does not require any other type of reinterpretation of the equations, 
or that the equations be entirely uninterpreted.
If Psillos is referring to the interpretation that assigns values to the terms of the 
equation, then he has completely misread the structural realist project. This latter 
type of interpretation links the terms of an equation -  or any other relation for that 
matter -  to our observations, thereby allowing for the production of predictions. This 
in turn makes verification of the equations possible. Take Worrall’s example of 
Fresnel’s equations: (1) R/I = tan(0i-02) / tan(0i+02), (2) R'/T = sin(0i-02) / 
sin(0i+02), (3) X/I = (2sin02-cos0i) / (sin(0i+02)*cos(0i-02)) and (4) X7T = 
2 sin0 2 -cos0 i / (sin(0 i+0 2 ), where 0i and 0 2  are the angles made by the incident and 
refracted beams with the normal to a plane reflecting surface, and I, R, and X 
represent the amplitudes of vibration of the incident, reflected, and refracted beams 
respectively; these are the square roots of the intensities of the components polarised 
(1) in the plane of incidence I2, R2, and X2, and (2) at right angles to the plane of
84 For example, earlier in the book he says “it is best not to treat theories as abstract structures, but 
instead to appeal to the success o f interpreted scientific theories in order to argue that the kinds 
posited by them populate the world” (1999: 69). In his (2001a), he repeats: “ ...in  empirical science 
we should at least seek more than formal structure. Knowing that the world has a certain formal 
structure... allows no explanation and no prediction o f the phenomena” (S21).
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incidence I'2, R'2, and X'2. The interpretations of the angles and the intensities are 
indispensable to the successful application of the equations. Each of these 
interpretations assigns a measurable and hence broadly construed observable, as 
opposed to theoretical, property to a term.
Worrall does not question the interpretation of terms 0i and 02 as angles made by the 
incident and refracted beams, or of terms I2, R2, and X2 as the intensities of the 
components polarised. Questioning these would be tantamount to renouncing one of 
the most spectacularly successful set of equations proposed in the nineteenth 
century; equations that produced such amazing and unexpected predictions as the 
bright spot at the centre of the shadow of an opaque disc when placed in the path of 
light coming from a single slit.
Nowhere in the above discussion of the interpretations to the terms of Fresnel’s 
equations have I mentioned the ‘ontological’ interpretation that Fresnel attached to 
them, i.e. that light consists of vibrations transmitted through an all-pervading 
medium, the ether. But it is only this ontological interpretation that Worrall 
specified as being re-interpretable, not anything else. The ontological interpretation 
affects only the amplitudes I, R, and X which in Fresnel’s framework are understood 
as vibrations of the ether. One can simply reinterpret these as amplitudes of some 
sort of vibration/oscillation without any loss of predictive power. That is, Worrall 
questions what kind of thing is vibrating or oscillating: Is it the ether, the electric and 
magnetic field strengths, or something else? According to him, we should remain 
agnostic only with regard to what is doing the vibrating, i.e. only with regard to the 
‘ontological’ interpretation of Fresnel’s equations. In other words, we hang on to the 
idea that something is doing the vibrating without being able to specify what that 
something is beyond the level of isomorphism.
The above example illustrates that the structural realist is very much in need of 
interpreted equations. Indeed, Psillos’ accusation that the structural realist subscribes 
only to uninterpreted equations rests on a serious misreading of the ESR position. 
The structural realist does subscribe to interpreted equations, but attempts to 
distinguish between interpretations that link the terms to observations from those that
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do not. The hoped-for outcome is interpreted equations that represent relations 
between measurable, in a broad sense observable, things. In WorralFs version of 
ESR this information is represented via the Ramsey-sentence, which preserves the 
interpretations of observables.
Objections PS2 & PS3
Psillos acknowledges the historical claim that structure, in one form or another, often 
survives scientific revolutions. But he points out that this phenomenon requires an 
explanation. One explanation, according to him, is the following:
One might argue simply that retention at the level of equations is merely a 
pragmatic feature of scientific practice: the scientific community finds it just 
convenient and labour-saving to build upon the mathematical work of their 
predecessors. This predilection for mathematical equations, the argument would go 
on, signifies just the conservativeness of the scientific community rather than 
anything about the real relations in the world (1999: 152).
Psillos’ point is that Worrall needs to show why structural continuity between 
successive theories is not merely the result of convenient scientific practice, but 
rather the result of mathematical structures accurately representing the structure of 
the world.
It is, of course, quite obvious that the same objection can be raised about any type of 
continuity through theory change. Is it just an accidental, convenient or conservative 
feature of history or does it reflect a latching onto the world? Thus, it is not just the 
structural realist that needs to provide a bridge between historical continuity and 
accurate representation. Psillos, like many others, acknowledges that the defence of 
realism in any of its forms needs an argument that provides such a bridge. For most, 
including Worrall and Psillos, the NMA fits the bill. Thus, the bridge can, 
presumably, be constructed through an appeal to the predictive success of a theory. 
In other words, the fact that the surviving elements of scientific revolutions are 
employed in the production of successful predictions makes it unlikely that these 
elements are not accurately representing the world.
According to Psillos, the structural realist cannot appeal to traditional versions of the 
NMA, since they attempt to correlate predictive success with more than just the
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structural features of a theory. Thus, Psillos argues, if NMA is to support ESR, it 
must be formulated in a way that structures, and only structures, get credit for the 
predictive success of a theory. He offers two reasons why he thinks that this cannot 
be achieved: 1) uninterpreted equations cannot produce predictions or explain 
anything so should not take all the credit, and 2) non-structural components are 
preserved across scientific revolutions and these are better supported by current 
evidence and more likely to be true than the structural elements.
As the reader might have noticed, 1 and 2 correspond to PS1 and PS3 respectively. 
Psillos uses them to buttress PS2, i.e. the objection that traditional scientific realism 
can explain the preservation of structure through theory change better than ESR. 
Thus, Psillos’ case for PS2 hinges on the potency of PS1 and PS3. I have already 
shown that PS1 lacks potency. To reiterate last section’s resolution, the structural 
realist never championed uninterpreted equations. What about PS3?
This objection is more serious and therefore demands closer scrutiny. Psillos claims 
that the historical record exhibits continuity beyond the structural level, thereby 
lending credence to the view that ‘non-structural’ components of a theory deserve at 
least some credit for its predictive success. It is only the combination of 
mathematical equations with theoretical hypotheses and auxiliary assumptions, he 
holds, that suffices to produce a theory’s predictions. According to him, “scientists 
now have good reason to believe that the [non-structural] content of current 
theories... is better supported by the evidence, and, hence, more likely to be true” 
(147).85 In other words, not only is non-structural theoretical content retained, but it 
is also better supported, and, therefore, more likely to be true than non-structural 
theoretical content in the past.86 Indeed, Psillos maintains that scientific realists “can 
explain the fact that mathematical equations have been retained through theory
85 Psillos’ phrasing equivocates the contrast class. Does he mean that current theoretical content is 
better supported and more likely to be true than old theoretical content or that theoretical content is 
better supported and more likely to be true than structure? I take him to mean the former since the 
latter conflicts with his belief that the preservation and success o f structure is an important aspect o f  
the realist picture.
86 Compare this to what he says a page later, viz. that it is “more likely to be true than false” (148). It 
should be obvious that A being more likely to be true than B is not the same thing as A being more 
likely to be true than false.
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change by saying that they form an integral part of the well-supported and 
(approximately) true theoretical content of theories” (147) [my emphasis].
The sole, and somewhat detailed, illustration of such alleged non-structural 
components that Psillos offers, appears in his examination of Fresnel’s theory of 
light, where he lists three assumptions that Fresnel used in the derivation of his 
laws:87
(a) A m inim al m echanical assum ption  that the velocity of the displacement of the 
molecules of ether is proportional to the amplitude of the light-wave.
(b)The p rin c ip le  o f  conservation  o f  energy  [vis viva] during the propagation of 
light in the two media. Applying the principle of the conservation of energy to the 
effective components of light in the interface of the two media, he arrived at a 
general relation of the form sin 02-cos 0i (1-R2) = sin 0rcos 02’X2.
(c)A geom etrica l analysis  of the configuration of the light-rays in the interface of 
two media. (158) [abbreviated].
According to Psillos, these are theoretical assumptions that are ‘fundamentally 
correct’ but cannot be completely accounted for in structural terms. In any case, they 
were purportedly carried over from Fresnel’s to Maxwell’s theory, and therefore 
deserve at least some of the credit for the predictive success of those theories.
The first thing to note here is that Psillos seems to endorse the view that the success 
of Fresnel’s laws must rub off onto the premises actually employed to derive these 
laws. Yet, this type of reasoning is fallacious. It is common knowledge that if 
evidence e confirms a hypothesis H, it does not follow that it confirms any theory 
that entails H. The point can also be made in the context of deductive logic. A valid 
argument with a true conclusion need not have a single true premise. The premises 
may very well be true or at least approximately true, but that is an issue that needs to 
be confirmed independently. In the current context, (a) is thought to be false because 
of the reference it makes to the ether.
Setting aside the above fallacy, I find no good reason to view (a), (b), and (c) as 
‘non-structural’. The first of these, the minimal mechanical assumption, bears all the 
hallmarks of a structural component since it states a mathematical relation between
87 What follows is a shortened excerpt that contains all the important points.
77
two things, viz. the amplitude of the wave and the velocity of the displacement of the 
molecules of the ether. The fact that the latter of the two is now considered a 
fictional quantity just means that the relation stated by (a) is not verifiable and can 
thus be replaced by an electromagnetic facsimile.88 It is not strange then, to find in 
Psillos an eventual acknowledgement that the minimal mechanical assumption is not 
really performing a substantive role in the derivation of Fresnel’s laws. He thus says 
that the only assumption required is to “take energy as a function of the square of the 
amplitude of the light waves” (159). Indeed, Psillos notes that Fresnel himself had 
recognised that “no specific assumptions about the trajectories of the ethereal 
molecules were necessary” (159).89 The resulting assumption is devoid of reference 
to the ether, expresses a measurable relation, and, thus, is completely sanctioned by 
ESR.
It is even more puzzling to see the second assertion, viz. the principle of 
conservation of vis viva, on Psillos’ list of non-structural elements, since this 
principle expresses a mathematical relation. The principle had been stated in 
mathematical form as early as the seventeenth century and, despite the appearance of 
competing accounts, it continued to be treated mathematically until it was replaced 
by the modem principle of the conservation of energy. One form this principle has 
taken is the following: miVi2 + ni2V22 = mi(vi')2 + where m is mass, v is
velocity, different subscripts indicate different bodies, and the prime indicates the 
velocity of those bodies after the collision. Notice that all the terms in the equation 
are measurable and hence broadly constmed observable.
Finally, no realist would support the view that geometrical analysis, (c) on Psillos’ 
list, represents any aspect of the world. Geometrical analysis is simply a tool 
available to the theorist to facilitate modelling and calculation. Its preservation 
through scientific revolutions, therefore, has no epistemic significance for the realist, 
structural or other. Even if it had epistemic significance, I do not see how this would
88 That not all structure gets preserved is a point addressed in chapter five o f  this dissertation.
89 Jonathan Bain also makes this point when he says that, what Psillos calls the ‘minimal mechanical 
assumption’, “was used solely to express the energy associated with a light-wave as the square o f its 
amplitude with no essential reference to the medium of oscillation. Hence, again, one can argue that 
the aether was not used in the derivation” (1998: 163).
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help Psillos’ case since geometrical analysis involves nothing but mathematical 
structures and, as such, would support ESR, not traditional scientific realism.
All in all, it seems unclear how Psillos’ example stands as evidence for continuity at 
the non-structural level.90 If anything, his three assumptions appear to be thoroughly 
structural, and, hence, encourage the correlation between preservation of structure 
and predictive success. Given these results and the fact that Psillos fails to provide 
any evidence or arguments to support the claim that the content of current theories is 
better supported by the evidence and thus more likely to be true than that of older 
theories, PS3 seems unwarranted. Even if we find clear cases of non-structural 
component preservation, we must still ask whether such components are essential in 
the prediction-making and explanatory aspects of theories.91 As I indicated a few 
paragraphs ago, Psillos’ case for PS2 depends on the potency of PS1 and PS3. Since 
both PS1 and PS3 seem impotent, I conclude that, pending further evidence and 
arguments, PS2 remains unsubstantiated.
A more powerful objection to ESR that does not appear on Psillos’ list is SRP2. 
Many authors, including Worrall in his original treatment, have rightly pointed out 
that the neat preservation of equations found in the Fresnel-Maxwell case is atypical 
in the history of science (see, for example, Howson (2001), Kitcher (2001), and 
Redhead (2001a; 2001b)). This is an important objection whose discussion I must 
postpone until chapter five. There, I will consider, among other things, whether the 
correspondence principle can assist the structural realist to find more evidence of 
structural preservation.
Objection PS4
One of the weaker features of Worrall’s work on ESR concerns the way in which he 
contrasts structure to other things. Psillos rightly criticises Worrall for not being 
clear on “what exactly the distinction he wants to draw is” (1999: 155). While 
Worrall sometimes talks about the structure of a theory versus its theoretical
90 Redhead makes a similar observation when he says: “Psillos presents detailed case studies for the 
examples o f caloric and ether but what the discussion boils down to seems to be that structural aspects 
o f the old theory are preserved in the new theory” (2001b: 344).
91 In chapter five, I argue that there are cases o f non-structural preservation, but point out that these do 
not seem to be essential in the prediction-making aspects o f theories, i.e. they do not have any 
independent confirmation.
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interpretation, this being sanctioned by his advocacy of the Ramsey-sentence 
approach, at other times he talks about the structure of an entity or process versus its 
nature. Regrettably, he does not explain exactly what he means by nature.
Psillos’ critique begins by complaining that the use of the term ‘nature’ is 
anachronistic. To talk of ‘nature’, Psillos says, “over and above [the] structural 
description (physical and mathematical) of a causal agent is to hark back to medieval 
discourse of ‘forms’ and ‘substances’... [but such] talk has been overthrown by the 
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century” (155-6). Without a doubt, the term 
‘nature’ carries too much unwanted baggage with it, having been used in numerous 
philosophical debates for a variety of reasons. What exactly is meant by it in the 
present context?
Russell, Poincare, Maxwell, and Worrall all appeal to the term because of the 
Kantian undertones of their epistemology. The idea is that we do not have direct 
access to things-in-themselves, or to ‘the nature of things’, since direct access is 
limited to perceptions or phenomena. Unlike Kantian epistemology, knowledge of 
things-in-themselves can be had under ESR, yet it is indirect, i.e. mediated through 
perception, and only of a structural kind.
How can we best express this idea of natures? One approach, implicit in Worrall’s 
work, is to reduce talk about natures to talk about theoretical interpretations. The aim 
here is to turn the structure vs. nature distinction into the more familiar structure vs. 
theoretical interpretation distinction. The latter, as I have already mentioned, is 
sanctioned by the Ramsey-sentence approach, which strips a theory’s theoretical 
terms of their interpretation and leaves the logical structure and observational 
interpretation intact. Since Ramsey-sentences make assertions about the properties of 
theoretical properties, the theoretical properties themselves are presumably the 
unknowable natures.
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This understanding of the notion is similar to Russell’s understanding.92 Russell 
thinks that we can only have knowledge of the logico-mathematical properties of the 
properties that things-in-the-world possess, i.e. we can only have knowledge of the 
abstract structure. Demarcated thus, the nature of things-in-the-world is restricted to 
that part of physical properties whose description goes beyond isomorphism.93 In 
other words, we can know all physical properties (of any order) up to isomorphism. 
That this knowledge does not uniquely specify the physical properties is a trivial 
point, and will be made clear with examples in the last subsection of section four of 
this chapter.94 Nature thus refers to any non-isomorphically specifiable part of 
physical properties.
What I have just said suggests a widening of the rift between Russell and Grover 
Maxwell. According to Maxwell, the nature of things-in-themselves is restricted to 
just their first-order properties. Russell’s view, by contrast, takes the nature of 
things-in-the-world to be restricted to that part of physical properties whose 
description goes beyond isomorphism. To give an example of their disagreement, 
take a second order property of a physical object. Whereas for Maxwell this can be 
knowable, for Russell that part of the second-order property that is not captured by 
an isomorphic description will be unknowable.
As I pointed out in chapter two, Maxwell is influenced by Russell’s idea that the 
properties of phenomena need not resemble the properties of their external world 
causes. However, he mistakenly restricts these properties to first-order properties.95 
But, why, we may ask, should second (or higher)-order properties of phenomena 
necessarily resemble the second (or higher)-order properties of their causes? It is not 
clear where Maxwell acquired this idea, but it is certainly not a consequence of his 
accepting the Ramsey-sentence approach. The Ramsey-sentence quantifies over any 
theoretical properties. It thus does not force its advocates to espouse an epistemic 
distinction between first-order and higher-order theoretical properties. Owing to 
Maxwell’s interpretation of Russell, Psillos takes the distinction to be the central
92 One must not forget that there are also important differences between Russell’s ESR and Ramsey- 
style ESR, notably those discussed in the previous chapter.
93 Thus ‘nature’ in this context is not restricted to the essential properties o f  physical objects, but 
covers accidental ones too.
94 In the same section, I will make clear how properties can be known up to isomorphism.
95 He may have thought that Russell held this view.
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tenet of epistemic structural realism, and, as a consequence, needlessly raises 
objection PS6 to counter it.96
Having looked at the principal way in which structural realists understand the 
structure vs. nature distinction, let us return to Psillos’ critique. The main objection 
that Psillos raises is that “it is doubtful that [the distinction] is well-motivated” 
because: (PI) “the nature and structure of an entity form a continuum” and (P2) “the 
nature of an entity, process, or physical mechanism is no less knowable than its 
structure.” (155).97 Take PI first. According to Psillos, the nature of a theoretical 
entity is not distinct from its structure. When scientists talk about the nature of an 
entity they “talk about the way in which this entity is structured” (155). Indeed, 
Psillos offers as an example the concept of ‘mass’, saying that “by discovering more 
about the properties of mass [including its structural properties] we discover more 
about its nature” (156). This is just P2, according to which, knowing the structure of 
an entity means knowing its nature, and so, presumably, the structure of an entity 
cannot really be clearly distinguished from its nature.
There are various problems with both PI and P2. Let us consider problems with P2 
first. Despite having criticised the term ‘nature’ as anachronistic, Psillos in the above 
quotation takes it as signifying all the properties that entities possess. Defined in this 
way, it is obvious that knowing the (abstract) structure, i.e. the logico-mathematical 
properties, of an entity just means knowing some properties of that entity, and, 
hence, something about its nature. Should we decide to understand ‘nature’ as Psillos 
does, knowing the (abstract) structure of an entity is knowing something about its 
nature. Even so, the advocates of ESR can still maintain that the nature of an entity 
cannot be completely known since properties of external world entities, according to 
them, can only be known up to isomorphism. Psillos does not provide any specific 
arguments to counter this last claim.
96 That is not to say, o f course, that Psillos’ objection is not still worth mounting against Maxwell’s 
particular brand o f  ESR.
97 Psillos borders on contradiction when, on the one hand, he claims that there is something beyond 
structure that gets carried over through theory change and, on the other, he argues that the distinction 
between structure and non-structure cannot be drawn clearly.
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Alternatively, we can adopt the Russellian understanding of the term, according to 
which ‘nature’ simply refers to that part of properties of external world objects 
which is left out of an isomorphic description. Better yet, we can baptise some new 
unloaded term and infuse it with Russell’s idea. After all, what is important is what 
the term denotes. The distinction between structure and non-structure would then 
express the distinction between the logico-mathematical properties of external world 
objects on the one hand, and that part of those properties going beyond the logico- 
mathematical description on the other. In sum, P2 seems groundless and reduces to 
no more than terminological quibbling.98
What about PI, i.e. the claim that structure and nature form a continuum? Consider 
what Psillos has to say:
An exhaustive specification of this set of properties and relations leaves nothing left 
out. Any talk of something else remaining uncaptured when this specification is made 
is, I think, obscure. I conclude, then, that the ‘nature’ of an entity forms a continuum 
with its ‘structure’ (156-157) [my emphasis].
Suppose for this discussion, that by ‘nature’ we mean what Psillos means, i.e. 
presumably all the properties possessed by a given entity. First of all, let me reiterate 
that by ‘structure’ the structural realist means the logico-mathematical properties of 
physical objects. This means that there could not be a complete overlap between a 
set so specified and a set that contains all properties concerning an entity. That is, the 
set of logico-mathematical properties of an entity is a proper subset of the set of all 
its properties. More to the point, from the view that the properties specified by 
structure and those specified by nature coincide, it does not follow that they form a 
continuum. A continuum presupposes two distinct and opposite ends that define an 
interval between which lies a set that can be brought into a one-one correspondence 
with the reals. One would assume that what Psillos means by a continuum here is 
that on one end we find structure and on the other end we find nature. The 
continuum analogy can be used to express the idea of no privileged dividing line, but 
it is inconsistent with the idea that the extension of the predicate ‘structure of an
98 Redhead raises a similar point: “Surely part o f what we mean by the nature o f an entity is the 
structural property o f the relations into which it enters. I don’t at all disagree with this point. But this 
is really a semantic red herring. All that the structural realist needs to claim, on my account, is that 
part, i.e. the structural part, o f the nature o f the posited physical entities is all that we can claim to 
know” (2001b: 346) [my emphasis].
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entity’ is a proper subset of the extension of the predicate ‘nature of an entity’ or 
even with the idea that the two predicates have the same extension.
In sum, Psillos is right to criticise Worrall for not being clear on what the structure 
vs. nature distinction represents. As we have seen, however, the distinction can be 
drawn quite clearly so long as we define ‘nature’ as designating the non- 
isomorphically specifiable part of the external world.
Before we carry on to the next section, I want to consider Worrall’s recent 
suggestion that there is no such distinction between structure and non-structure. 
More accurately, he suggests that it is not meaningful to speak of non-structural 
theoretical content since all theoretical assertions are structural." When Poincare 
says that ‘the ruins of science may be still good for something’, Worrall argues, he 
means that in reality there are no ruins. Here’s Poincare’s passage in full:
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. 
Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after another; 
he sees ruins piled upon ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion to-day will in 
a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain.
This is what he calls the bankruptcy of science.
His scepticism is superficial; he does not take into account the object of 
scientific theories and the part they play, or he would understand that the ruins may 
be still good for something ([1905] 1952: 160).
Worrall’s claim is that, instead of understanding the ruins of science as a metaphor 
for the non-structural stuff that gets left behind in the wake of a scientific revolution, 
we should recognize that there are no ruins. How could there be, he asks, if a 
scientific theory properly construed is just the Ramsey-sentence?
That Poincare can be read in this way is arguable. I will not dwell on this however. 
What is even more arguable is the idea that the structure vs. non-structure distinction 
becomes obsolete if one construes scientific theories as nothing other than their 
Ramsey-sentence counterparts. It seems to me that so long as scientists posit 
metaphysical theses about the properties of physical objects, there will be ruins in the 
aftermath of scientific revolution. Even if scientists are wrong in doing so, it happens
99 He expressed this opinion in various talks and also in private communication with me.
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and that means ruins are generated. Worrall suggests that the ruins are only apparent. 
Even so, I don’t see why this interpretation forces us to abandon the structure vs. 
non-structure distinction, and, more importantly, how structural realism can survive 
without the distinction. How else can structural realism be understood as 
underwriting the pessimistic induction argument, if not for the ruins? Indeed, the 
very fact that Ramseyfication is a process by which we strip away theoretical 
interpretations should be sufficient to dissuade Worrall from giving up the structure 
vs non-structure distinction. After all, the stripping away must be directed at 
something other than structure.
4. The Objections Against the Russellian ESR
Russell’s Principles Revisited
Michael Bradie’s critique of Russell’s principles serves as a good launch pad into a 
discussion that will throw more light on the Helmholtz-Weyl principle (H-W) and 
the Mirroring Relations principle (MR). Let us take H-W first. Bradie protests that 
the principle is strictly speaking false. This, according to him, is made “clear from 
the case of colour blind persons or others whose receiving mechanisms (brains) are 
defective in some way” (1977: 444).
This objection is clearly misdirected at the H-W principle. Colour-blindness gives 
rise to perceptions of the same colour, where people without the condition perceive 
different colours. It is, thus, a case of same percepts given different stimulus/physical 
object. This counts against the converse of the H-W principle, namely that different 
stimuli/physical objects imply different percepts. Let us call this converse the ‘W-H 
principle’ (just for the sake of convenience not because either Helmholtz or Weyl 
advocated it). As I shall indicate soon, Russell shrugs off the W-H principle because 
he recognises that we often have different stimuli/physical objects that lead to the 
same percepts.
Bradie’s example fails to counter the H-W principle. But other examples, some of 
which involve defective perceptual mechanisms, are more compelling. It is, for 
instance, possible that the same stimulus can give rise to different perceptions in
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different subjects.100 Indeed, one would expect this to be the case when the subjects 
concerned have very different neurophysiologies. A stimulus that produces the 
sensation of redness in me could produce a completely different sensation in, let’s 
say, a Martian.
Though indeed correct, I do not think this last one is an effective counterexample to 
H-W. Russell insists that since our access to other minds is indirect, for all we know 
the same stimulus gives rise to different perceptions in different people. This is 
vindicated by neuroscience, which holds that brain activity in experiments where the 
same stimulus is given to different subjects is not identical; at least not in the token- 
token sense. This result is compatible with H-W, since it states that different percepts 
in any given subject arise because of that subject’s exposure to different stimuli. The 
emphasis here is on individuals. H-W does not state that two or more individuals 
each of whom experiences a different percept will have been exposed to different 
stimuli, but rather that the same individual who experiences different percepts will 
have been exposed to different stimuli.
H-W, properly understood, is not easily violated. It is hard to imagine that the same 
person would form a different perception if exactly the same stimulus was present at 
two different times. O f course, we can imagine that changes in a person’s 
neurophysiology over time could bring about such a result. This, however, does not 
seem to be the norm but rather the exception. Most individuals would, when given 
the same stimulus, identify the same percept most of the time. Were this not to hold 
then neuroscience in particular, and science as a whole, would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to pursue. Quine, indicating that we should not even require sameness of 
perceptions but rather similarity of perceptions, reinforces the argument for the 
indispensability of H-W, saying that “[pjerceptual similarity is the basis of all 
expectation, all learning, all habit formation” ([1995J1998: 19). One need only 
suppose the contrary to see how everyday reliable inferences become unavailable.101
100 Remember that H-W can be stated in its contrapositive form, i.e. ‘If same stimuli, then same 
percepts’. When stated like this, it is easier to see that the principle is violated by cases where the 
same stimuli give rise to different percepts.
101 If the same stimuli gave rise to different percepts more often than not, then we would have to 
accept that whenever members o f a team synchronize their watches a miracle takes place.
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The fact that H-W refers to individuals, instead of groups, does not mean that it has 
no intersubjective or objective implications. After all, the inference from different 
percepts is supposed to tell us all something objective about the external world, 
namely the presence of different stimuli. Perhaps more importantly, H-W’s reference 
to any given individual amounts to a universal generalisation, i.e. it holds for all 
individuals. For those who would like a formulation that is a little less centred on the 
individual, we could offer the following reformulation: ‘Same objective state of 
affairs, same perception’, where by ‘objective state of affairs’ we include facts about 
sense organs. This last formulation brings out more clearly that which objectively 
matters, so that any individual in the same objective state of affairs would have the 
same sensation. This could be further modified in accordance to Quine’s 
qualification that similarity, not just strict sameness, is in order.
Let us see how H-W works in practice. We already said that even though the same 
stimulus may induce different percepts in different individuals, the very same 
stimulus will almost always induce the same percept in the same individual. This 
spectacular fact allows for agreement between individuals. Even if two or more 
individuals have different perceptual experiences in the presence of the same 
stimulus, language allows them to express their agreement that each is experiencing 
the same thing. For example, if, whenever stimulus A is present, individual X  
experiences B  and individual Y experiences C, where B ^  C, then even if X  and Y  call 
their experiences by different names, their consistent use of those names in the 
presence of A allows for the discovery that they are talking about the same thing. 
Figure two below illustrates this point.
Although individuals X  and Y do not experience the same percept, but B and C 
respectively, and they give their own name, b and c respectively, to stimulus A , each 
experiences the same percept at various times, t\, ..., tQ, i.e. always percept B for X  
and percept C for 7. Despite the fact that percepts, like B and C, are private, each 
individual’s consistent identification of stimulus A as the cause of their percept is 
sufficient ground for agreement at time tn that b and c name the same stimulus, 
which they decide to call ‘d’. Quine makes an almost identical point when he says: 
“ ...if  two individuals jointly witness one scene, and subsequently jointly witness
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another scene, and the one witness’s global stimulations on the two occasions qualify 
for him as perceptually similar, usually the other witness’s stimulations will so 
qualify for the other witness ” (20).
Timeline: ti t2   tn
Stimulus: A A A
Individual: X Y X Y X Y
Percept: B C B C B C
Naming of
Stimulus: b c b c d
Figure 2: Agreement between individuals 
in light of different percepts.
A slight modification of the above conditions, administering two different stimuli 
that lead to two different perceptions for each individual, allows us to extend this 
point. In accordance with H-W, each individual would reason that given the two 
different percepts there are two different stimuli. Each individual’s consistent 
identification of each stimulus with a particular percept would eventually lead to the 
discovery that both individuals agree that they are talking about the same two 
different things.
Let us now turn to MR -  the principle that relations between percepts are isomorphic 
to relations between their non-perceptual causes. A sensible question to ask is 
whether Russell argues for it. Here’s one argument I have uncovered:
Let us confine ourselves to the angular co-ordinates [as an example]. My point is 
that the relations which physics assumes in assigning angular co-ordinates are not 
identical with those which we perceive in the visual field, but merely correspond 
with them in a manner that preserves their logical (mathematical properties). This 
follows from the assumption that any difference between two simultaneous percepts 
implies a correlative difference in their stimuli (1927:252) [my emphasis].10
102 Russell’s focus on the correspondence between angular co-ordinates and the visual field simply 
reflects the fact that he is giving a concrete example o f what he thinks holds in general. Also, the 
reference to simultaneity does not appear to be a necessary ingredient o f H-W.
Thus construed the argument is valid but only because Russell sneaks the term 
‘correlative’ into the formulation of H-W found in this passage and thereby 
guarantees the preservation of the logico-mathematical properties of relations. But 
this is obviously question begging since he assumes what he wants to derive. The 
argument properly construed is invalid. H-W does not by itself entail that relations 
between percepts have the same logico-mathematical properties as (i.e. are 
isomorphic to) relations between stimuli. In short, it is possible that H-W is true and 
MR false.
Perhaps the argument is an enthymeme. Earlier in the book, Russell made the remark 
that “This principle [i.e. H-W] together with spatio-temporal continuity, suffices to 
give a great deal of knowledge as to the structure of stimuli” (227). Russell’s 
principle of spatiotemporal continuity asserts, roughly speaking, that non-perceptual 
causes and their perceptual effects are spatiotemporally continuous, i.e. there is a 
continuous series of events that links the cause to the effect. Setting aside any 
difficulties facing the principle itself, it is still not all that clear why spatiotemporal 
continuity can help with the task at hand.103 Maybe Russell’s idea is that any 
spatiotemporal relations between percepts mirror spatiotemporal relations between 
their causes in the physical world. Even if true, this postulate would not license the 
inference from non-spatiotemporal relations between percepts to non-spatiotemporal 
relations between their non-perceptual causes. One could, of course, reduce all 
physical relations to spatiotemporal ones, in which case the only relations between 
percepts that matter for our purposes are spatiotemporal. Without speculating further, 
pending a clear account of how the principle of spatiotemporal continuity is meant to 
support MR we must remain sceptical.
Perhaps the implicit premise we were looking for in Russell’s argument was not the 
right one. Another candidate that might turn the enthymeme into an explicit 
argument can be found in this passage:
...perception as a source of knowledge concerning physical objects would be
impossible if there were not, in the physical world, semi-independent causal chains,
103 Among the difficulties facing the principle is one pointed out by Bradie, namely that Russell never 
explains how spatio-temporal continuity works between the space o f percepts and the space of physics 
(1977: 444-5).
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or causal lines as we may call them. The light which comes to us from a printed 
page contains retains the structure of the page; if it did not, reading would be 
impossible (314).
The idea here is that structure is preserved via the assumption that the causal chains 
leading from a physical object to the formation of our perception of it are sufficiently 
independent of causal interference. This allows us to get a clear picture of the cause 
of our perception. Russell emphasises the overall reliability of visual perception, 
saying that “light-waves travel with extraordinarily little modification through empty 
space, and without very great modification through a clear atmosphere” (164).104
This is certainly an important principle, without which the preservation of any 
information about the external world would be impossible. But it does not really 
establish that the relations between percepts are isomorphic to the relations between 
their external world causes. Otherwise put, the principle of semi-independent causal 
chains is a necessary condition for the preservation of structure or relations, but 
certainly not a sufficient one.
Bradie sums up the nature of the difficulty well:
But what gives us the right to infer structure? We get the right by assuming certain 
postulates to be true. But, then why should we not assume certain other postulates 
to be true... This is an extremely important question which needs to be thoroughly 
examined. Without a clear reason for preferring structural properties to qualitative 
properties, Russell’s epistemological position seems highly arbitrary (1977: 450).
Why, as Bradie indicates, should we accept MR and not some other principle(s) that 
preserve(s) ‘qualitative’ properties over structural ones?
But surely, it is hard to imagine how we can ever have knowledge of the external 
world without MR. Epistemological realism requires belief in the correspondence 
between language and reality, i.e. belief in semantic realism. As many have argued, 
the only type of correspondence that says anything coherent about the world is one
104 Russell goes on to speak o f the ‘causal purity’ o f light-waves and concludes that “[t]his is the 
physical merit o f sight as a source o f knowledge concerning the external world” (164).
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that says something about the relations objects in the world stand in.105 That is, it is 
assumed that the correspondence between our theories/sentences/mental 
entities/percepts and the external world reveals the latter’s relations. To be sure, 
traditional scientific realists like Psillos criticise ESR for offering too little, claiming 
that we do not only have knowledge of structure but also of something more.106 A 
more pressing question to the above then is whether there is licence to infer anything 
more than structural properties? Since the scope of this question coincides with that 
of objection PS6,1 defer its discussion for later.
Percepts, Phenomena and Observation Sentences
Before resuming my evaluation of Psillos’ objections against Russellian ESR, there 
is one more issue that needs brief discussion. There is a deep worry that commitment 
to percepts, and other such items of direct acquaintance, entails commitment to ‘the 
given’. Among others, Wilfrid Sellars famously attacked, and to the eyes of many 
defeated, the myth of the given, i.e. the idea that experience is given without prior 
conceptualisation. Is there reason for concern that percepts reincarnate the given?
No such reason exists. As is well known, Russell abandoned the idea of sense-data, 
the allegedly pure objects of our perception, by the time he wrote the Analysis o f 
Mind, replacing them with percepts.107 Unlike sense-data, percepts are conceived of 
as impure, yet, nonetheless, “the only part of [the world] that we can know without 
the help of rather elaborate and difficult inferences” (1927: 264). Russell’s percepts 
can, thus, be thought of, not as entirely un-conceptualised, but as un-conceptualised a 
mental entity as we can possibly get.
We need not even appeal to entities that sound as elusive as percepts. In my 
discussion of Grover Maxwell’s ESR in chapter two, I pointed out that he avoids the 
reification and mystification of perceptual units, trading talk of percepts for talk of
105 In the context o f theories o f truth, Marian David says: “A correspondence theory is usually 
expected to ... tell us about the workings of the correspondence relation, about the nature o f facts, and 
about the conditions that determine which truthbearers correspond to which facts. It is natural to 
tackle this by construing correspondence as an isomorphism between truthbearers and facts” (2002) 
[original emphasis].
106 In so far as traditional realists accept that we have knowledge o f the world’s structure via a 
correspondence principle they should not find MR unreasonable.
107 See ch.2, §3 for more on this transition.
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observation sentences and predicates.108 This shift is meant to focus on less 
objectionable units, like observation sentences and predicates, yet leave Russellian 
ESR essentially unaffected. All that is required is some sort of correlation between 
the epistemically relevant aspects of perception and observation 
statements/predicates. It seems clear to me that this correlation comes naturally. 
Consider my discussion of the intersubjective/objective implications of H-W once 
more. The idea was that individuals employing H-W could reach the same 
conclusions in the presence of the same stimulus despite experiencing different 
percepts. How would they come to such an agreement? As I argued earlier, language 
allows distinct individuals to express their agreement that each is experiencing the 
same thing. The particular language involved is observational. The epistemically 
relevant aspect of perceptions is thus transmissible through observation sentences 
and predicates.109 In sum, even though percepts are ‘mental’ entities and observation 
sentences are linguistic ones, the shift of focus from one set of entities to the other 
does not compromise the main tenets of Russellian ESR, since nothing epistemically 
relevant is lost.
One further issue concerns the relationship that phenomena have to percepts. It is not 
exactly clear what the term ‘phenomenon’ denotes. Sometimes phenomena are 
thought of as entities existing solely within our mind, much like percepts -  if not 
identical to them. This reading is suggested by the etymology of the term, for in its 
original form it literally means ‘appearance’. A different reading takes phenomena to 
be intermediaries between the physical objects and our mind, existing independently 
of the latter. In spite of the disagreement between these two readings, it is generally 
agreed that phenomena have an immediate effect on the mind.110 It is this 
immediateness, and the epistemic privilege that it purportedly confers, that is so 
crucial for the empirically motivated Russellian brand of ESR. Thus, whether we talk 
about phenomena or percepts does not matter much in the given context.111
108 O f course, there is no need to deny the existence o f perceptual entities; there is only a need to 
avoid making any substantive metaphysical assumptions about their nature.
109 Van Fraassen believes that observation sentences can capture the epistemically relevant content of 
phenomena.
10 For a notable exception see Bogen and Woodward (1988). According to them, data can be 
observed, whereas phenomena “in most cases are not observable in any interesting sense o f that term” 
(306).
111 Should one insist on distinguishing between percepts and phenomena, it would still be plausible to 
maintain that the relationship between physical objects, phenomena, and percepts takes the following
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Henceforth, and unless otherwise noted, I will employ the terms ‘percept’, 
‘observable’, ‘phenomenon’ and any of their derivatives more or less 
interchangeably, not because I assume that they necessarily amount to the same 
thing, but because, as I have just argued, such usage does not compromise the spirit 
of Russellian ESR.
Objection PS5
The First Horn o f the Dilemma
According to Psillos, the H-W principle can only establish a relation of 
embeddability between the external world and the world of percepts, falling short of 
a relation of isomorphism required by ESR. Without a relation of isomorphism, 
Psillos argues, structural realists cannot establish inferential knowledge about the 
external world. But in what way exactly is the H-W principle able to establish a 
relation of embeddability but not one of isomorphism?
Let us identify any set of percepts by the letter P  and any set of external world 
causes, i.e. stimuli/physical objects, by the letter C. Psillos argues that the H-W 
principle cannot give us isomorphic mappings between P  and C. To remind the 
reader, the H-W principle expresses the following conditional: If different percepts, 
then different stimuli/physical objects. This principle guarantees that a given C will 
have at least as many members as the corresponding P. More importantly, the 
principle is equivalent to saying that there is an injective mapping f .  P  —> C, such 
that if x and y  are distinct members of P, then their images in C,fic and jy , are also 
distinct. Now, for a mapping to be isomorphic it is not enough to be injective, it must 
also be suijective, i.e. for every c e C, there is at least one p  e P, such that j{p)=c. 
To establish this, we need the converse of H-W, viz. W-H: if different 
stimuli/physical objects, then different percepts.112 H-W and W-H together guarantee 
that there is a bijective mapping between the set of percepts and the set of
form: At one end lie the physical objects and at the other the observation sentences. In between lie the 
percepts and the phenomena, the former causally originating from the latter which, in turn, causally 
originate from physical objects.
112 Notice that a purely surjective mapping leaves open the possibility that two or more percepts may 
correspond to one and the same cause.
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stimuli/physical objects. A relation of isomorphism can be established when this
• • 1 1  ^bijective mapping also preserves all the relations found in the structured domains.
Psillos correctly points out that the H-W principle cannot by itself give us the much- 
desired relation of isomorphism. He is wrong, however, in arguing that the H-W 
principle allows us to establish embeddability relations, unless he is using the term 
‘embedding’ to mean injective mappings. The term ‘embedding’ is more often 
reserved for injections that also map relations, hence appeal to this notion implies 
one is already dealing with a structured domain. As we have just seen, H-W only 
takes us as far as plain injective mappings, i.e. it does not map any relations -  
something required by embeddings. More formally, an embedding of structure Si (A, 
R) into structure S2 (B, R ') is a one-one mapping/ of A into B such that: (l)7(aj)=bj 
for all ajG A and (2) <ai, ..., an>eRi iff <f(ai), ..., f(an)>eR 'i for all ie l  and all aj, 
..., aneA . It is worth noting that embeddings are isomorphic mappings of a 
particular kind. In general, we can say that a structure Si is embedded in a structure 
S2 i f  and only i f  Si is isomorphic to a substructure of S2 .
More crucially, Psillos is wrong in assuming that ESR requires a commitment to 
isomorphic relations only. Russell acknowledges that the W-H principle is unreliable 
because we often have different stimuli that lead to the same percepts. This can be 
easily illustrated in cases involving distance, as Russell’s example shows: “If we are 
observing a man half a mile away, his appearance is not changed if he frowns, 
whereas it is changed for a man observing him from a distance of three feet” (1927: 
255). Because of such examples, Russell suggests that “differences in the percept 
imply differences in the object, but not vice-versa” (339-340). Moreover, he 
recognises the limitations of the inferential powers of the H-W principle, when it is 
not accompanied by W-H. Paradoxically, Psillos takes note of this when he says that 
“[precisely because Russell doesn’t have the converse principle, he talks of ‘roughly 
one-one relation’ ” (2001a: S I5). In other words, Psillos acknowledges that Russell 
was never committed to isomorphic relations only.114
113 This is an important detail that Psillos fails to mention in his discussion.
114 The above illustrates why Russell refrains from saying that we can know the structure o f the 
physical world and instead holds that we can ‘infer a great deal’ about it.
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The more serious objection Psillos puts forward is that it is meaningless to speak of 
roughly one-one relations. Yet, even without the help of W-H, MR is a strong 
enough principle to guarantee inference at the isomorphic level. This can be seen in 
the following way: Injective mappings can easily be given inverse mappings, i.e. for 
any injective mapping /: D —> E w e  can give an inverse m apping/'1: E ' —»Z) where 
E ' = ran/  That is, E ' contains as its members all and only those objects that are 
contained in the range of /  = d f  {/5c: xe dom f ) .  Notice that by doing so we 
immediately satisfy the requirement of a surjective mapping, since for every object 
in E '  there is at least one -  in this case only one -  corresponding object in D. In 
short, we get a bijective mapping between D and E '-  where is'm ay or may not equal 
E.115 The MR principle, i.e. that relations between percepts have the same logico- 
mathematical properties as relations between their external world causes, allows us 
to turn a bijective mapping into an isomorphic one, for it allows us to preserve any 
relations the set of external world causes may have.
Psillos complains that “[f]rom a realist viewpoint, it should at least in principle be 
possible that the (unobservable) world has ‘extra structure’, i.e., structure not 
necessarily manifested in the structure of the phenomena” (S I5).116 If there is such 
extra structure, he continues, the required relation between the world of percepts and 
the external world should be that of embeddability not isomorphism. Yet, Psillos 
argues, ESR cannot be upheld by appeal to embeddability since under this relation 
“the structure of the percepts doesn’t determine the domain of the stimuli” (SI6)
117[original emphasis].
Let us first reflect on the idea that the unobservable world could have some extra 
structure that is not manifested in the structure of the phenomena. There seems to be 
no reason why ESR should be inconsistent with this idea. ESR simply says that 
structures of phenomena mirror the structures of the unobservable world. It requires 
that every phenomenal structure has a corresponding unobservable structure. It does
115 E' will be different from E only if  the cardinality o f E is greater than the cardinality o f  D.
116 Notice that Psillos uses the terms ‘percept’ and ‘phenomenon’ interchangeably. Though it is good 
practice to keep the two apart, I follow Psillos in using them interchangeably since they do not 
compromise the spirit o f Russellian ESR.
117 This quote appears in the midst o f Psillos’ discussion o f the second horn o f the dilemma but can be 
mustered here since it is an objection to the view that ESR sanctions embeddings.
95
not require the converse, i.e. that every unobservable structure has a corresponding 
phenomenal structure. In other words, ESR is compatible with the idea that not every 
unobservable structure will have a corresponding phenomenal structure, i.e. that the 
unobservable world may have extra structure. The real objection to ESR in this 
context would be to show that at least some structures of phenomena do not mirror 
the structures of the unobservable world.
What exactly does Psillos mean when he says that embeddings do not support ESR, 
since under embeddings the structure of the percepts does not determine the domain 
of the stimuli/physical objects? One way of understanding this claim is to take the 
absolute determination of the domain of the stimuli/physical objects as the complete 
description of the domain’s objects. If this is the case, his argument clearly falters on 
account of the fact that the relation of isomorphism does not require such a 
determination either. Indeed, one of the central points of ESR is that the 
stimuli/physical objects along with their properties and relations cannot be fixed 
absolutely, but only up to isomorphism.118 In short, this sort of underdetermination is 
not only compatible with ESR but constitutive of it. The only other plausible reading 
of Psillos’ claim is that a relation of isomorphism requires that the sets mapped have 
the same cardinality, whereas embeddability allows one to infer the minimum size of 
the set from which the range of the mapping is drawn. This difference does not 
amount to anything significant because there is no clause in ESR that requires the 
exact determination of the cardinality of a given set.
As Psillos admits, Russell’s epistemic commitments are restricted to embeddings. 
These, as I have indicated, still offer isomorphic mappings, albeit of a special kind, 
namely that the structure of perceptions is isomorphic to a substructure of the 
external world. This still allows inferential knowledge from the structure of 
perceptions to the structure of the external world. Indeed, that the whole of the 
unobservable world might have extra structure, i.e. structure not reflected in the 
structure of the phenomena, is a possibility that is consistent with ESR. Thus Psillos’ 
first horn of the dilemma crumbles.
118 This type o f underdetermination is independently backed up by a host o f different arguments. One 
such argument is the ontological relativity argument propounded by Quine (1969). Demopoulos and 
Friedman (1985: 628), in particular, make a compelling case for this.
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The Second Horn o f the Dilemma
It is not entirely clear what Psillos means when he says that H-W and W-H allow 
inferences at the level of isomorphism but concede too much to idealism. In support 
of this claim he quotes certain passages from Hermann Weyl, where it seems that 
Weyl takes W-H to be “the central thought of idealism” and asserts that “science 
concedes to idealism that its objective reality is not given but to be constructed” 
(1963: 117). On the basis of this quote, Psillos complains that it should not be a 
priori false for a realist that there is a divergence between the structure of the world 
and the structure of the world of percepts. According to Psillos, “[f]or all we know, 
the unobservable world may differ from the world of phenomena not just in its 
‘intrinsic nature’, but in its structure too.” (2001a: S16).
At least two things lend themselves to scrutiny here. First, Weyl seems to be too 
quick to judge W-H the central thought of idealism. Whether one is an idealist 
depends on what one takes the stimuli (referred to in the W-H principle) to be. 
Nothing prevents one from taking stimuli to be objects in the mind-independent 
physical world, or, as Russell does, as physical events. Moreover, there is no 
inconsistency in holding the belief that there is a mind-independent physical world 
and the belief that this world can only be known up to isomorphism. The point needs 
no belabouring. W-H does not imply belief in idealism. Even if it did, ESR does not 
employ W-H.
Second, and more importantly, when Psillos argues that it should not be a priori false 
that there is a variance between the structure of the external world and the structure 
of perceptions, he mistakenly implies that this is the ESR-ist view. I do not see any 
good reasons why this should be the case. Nobody would deny that perceptual 
apparatus can sometimes malfunction. This means that the structure of the external 
world need not always be correctly reflected in the structure of our perceptions. A 
similar qualification should be made with regard to H-W. As we saw earlier, most 
individuals would, when given the same stimulus, identify the same percept most of 
the time. Hence, ESR-ists can, and should, accept the view that some variance 
between the structure of the external world and the structure of perceptions exists. 
This qualification does not fundamentally undermine their programme, for the
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overall reliability of inferential knowledge about the structure of the external world 
is safeguarded.
Objection PS6
The claim that we can know only the structure of the world, charges Psillos, is 
ambiguous. It may mean one of three things: (a) that everything is knowable apart 
from the individual objects, or (b) that everything is knowable apart from the 
individual objects and their first-order properties, or (c) that everything is knowable 
apart from the individual objects, their first-order properties and their relations. Each 
of these, Psillos claims, creates a different version of epistemic structural realism. 
But which one do we choose? In other words, where exactly do we draw the line 
between what is knowable and what is not? Psillos thinks that option (c) “is the only 
characterisation of ESR which can impose a principled limitation on what is 
knowable” (S21). But (c), according to him, is questionable since it commits us to 
the idea that some properties are unknowable in principle. He says:
...it isn’t clear why the first-order properties of unobservable entities are unknowable. 
They are, after all, part and parcel of their causal role. So, if all these entities are 
individuated and become known via their causal role, there is no reason to think that 
their first-order properties, though contributing to causal role, are unknowable (SI 7) 
[my emphasis].119
It is thus implied that traditional varieties of scientific realism, of which Psillos is an 
advocate, are more reasonable than ESR because they do not preclude first-order 
properties from being knowable in principle.
Let us, first of all, make a clarification. Although (c) comes close to a faithful 
characterisation of ESR, it misrepresents the position in one important respect. ESR 
does not hold that we have absolutely no knowledge of the first-order properties of 
external world objects. This is a mistake that, as we saw earlier, originates in Grover 
Maxwell’s misconstruction of Russell’s account. ESR holds that all properties of 
external world objects are knowable up to isomorphism. More precisely, ESR really 
means (c'): Everything in the external world, i.e. objects, properties, and relations, is 
knowable up to isomorphism.
119 See also (1999: 156).
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Since I presented isomorphism as a relation that holds between relations or 
structures, I must explain what is meant by the claim that objects and properties can 
be known isomorphically. Structures specify objects, relations, and, potentially, one- 
place properties.120 We take abstract structures to represent a certain isomorphism 
class of concrete structures, i.e. to represent the concrete structures isomorphically. 
Given this character of abstract structures, the contents of their domains of objects 
and any one-place properties (understood as sets) cannot be uniquely specified. Only 
their cardinalities and the (logico-mathematical properties of the) relations they stand 
in can be specified. For example, we can say that property P has three objects and 
property Q has two objects and that a certain relation R with formal properties X, Y, 
and Z holds between objects in P and Q.121 Thus, to say that we know objects or 
properties isomorphically just means that we know them to the extent that they are 
specified by abstract structures.
Despite Psillos’ misconception of Russellian ESR, his objection can be reformulated 
thus: Why should properties of the external world be epistemically inaccessible 
beyond the level of isomorphism? This question is equivalent to the question I 
promised to return to in the section on Russell’s principles, namely: Is there licence 
to infer anything more than structural properties?
A satisfactory answer to this question can be given and finds some support in 
science. Optical science, for instance, tells me that when I see a coloured object it is 
the result of incident light waves of a given wavelength hitting my retina and 
producing nerve impulses that travel all the way to my brain where the relevant 
perception is formed. It thus tells me that colour gives us some information about the 
external world, namely that incident light waves of a given wavelength are hitting 
my retina.122 If I see two otherwise perceptually identical objects, one of which is 
red and the other green, then, ceteris paribus, I postulate that there must be some
120 Recall that in the beginning o f chapter two it was indicated that a structure may also specify one- 
place properties and not just relations, i.e. not just 1+w-place properties, where n is a positive integer.
121 An additional, crucial, component of ESR knowledge claims that is not contained in the 
isomorphism claim and is therefore sidelined here is the idea that the physical system exemplifying an 
abstract structure S* can be indirectly identified as that system which is causally responsible for the 
concrete observational structure that led us to infer S*.
1221 am aware o f the voluminous philosophical literature on colours. What I say here bodes well with 
eliminativist theories of colour, according to which physical objects have no colour. For more on this 
and other theories see David Hilbert (1998).
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difference in the two objects responsible for the difference I identify in perception.123 
In optics, this difference arises from the different properties of the surface of the two 
objects, which determine the wavelength composition of the light reflected from 
them. This is just the H-W principle in use. I infer that there must be a non-empty set 
of properties that one object has while the other does not. (NB: If I am colour blind I 
may not be able to tell the difference but that just means that I will not pick up on 
this relation. The H-W principle holds that provided we identify a difference in 
perception, we should postulate that this corresponds to a difference in the world. It 
does not guarantee that we will identify a difference. It is the W-H principle that 
requires that there be a corresponding difference in perception provided there is a 
difference in the world).
On the basis of Russell’s programme of epistemological reconstruction, although I 
can infer that there is a non-empty set of properties that one object has while the 
other does not, I cannot infer exactly what these properties are. To gain more 
information about these properties and their objects I must make more observations. 
In particular, I must find out whether any relations hold at the perceptual level. 
Placing the two objects under the microscope, for example, would presumably reveal 
such relations. Supposing MR to hold, I infer that the perceptual relations revealed 
under the microscope reflect relations between the constituent parts of the objects. 
So, at best, I know certain relations between these constituent parts of the objects, 
but I do not know the constituent parts themselves. But knowing a relation without 
knowing the relata just amounts to knowing the logico-mathematical properties of 
the relation. This is equivalent to saying that we know these relations, and the 
structure they specify, up to isomorphism. More pertinently, it means that the 
properties of the relata can only be specified up to isomorphism.
Psillos insists that first-order properties are ‘part and parcel of their causal role’ and 
thus must be knowable. ESR does not deny that first-order properties are an essential 
or integral component of the causal chains that lead up to our perceptions. But it is
123 One potential worry here might be that colour, as well as other such properties, do not correspond 
to things or the structure o f things in the world, but rather are products o f our neurological apparatus 
and the external world. Such an objection would miss the point however since, as I have detailed in 
chapter two, the external world, according to Russell and Maxwell, encompasses all that is non- 
perceptual which includes the neurological. After all, is not our nervous system composed o f physical 
entities?
100
one thing to argue for this, and quite another to claim that it shows we have 
epistemic access to the first-order properties, or indeed higher-order properties, of 
physical objects beyond the isomorphic level. Pending a more detailed argument 
explaining why this is the case, I do not see any force to this dimension of Psillos’ 
argument.
Objection PS7
Van Fraassen has recently complained that ESR is too weak a position to be realist, 
for it leads to the view that “[sjcience is now interpreted as saying that the entities 
stand in relations which are transitive, reflexive, etc. but as giving no further clue as 
to what those relations are.” (1997: 516). Similarly, Psillos thinks that the position’s 
commitment to abstract structure makes it too weak to be a genuine realist position. 
In this vein, Psillos echoes Van Fraassen’s concern:
[Grover Maxwell] thought that formal properties, such as transitivity, are purely 
structural, but added that ‘not all structural properties are purely formal’... Yet, he 
leaves us in the dark as to what these non-formal structural properties which are referred 
to by theories are (2001a: SI6-17).
The implication here is that Maxwell’s recognition of the insufficiency of formal 
properties to capture all that is of epistemic worth prompts him to view them as a 
proper subset of structural properties. Hence, both Psillos and van Fraassen object 
that knowing the abstract structure of the external world is not enough since it 
merely amounts to knowing its formal properties. In what follows, I reply to this 
objection by arguing that the characterisations of structure that structural realists 
adhere to are broader than some of their opponents say or imply.
Hereafter and until otherwise noted, let us call ‘formal properties’ of relations only 
the properties of reflexivity, irreflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, and antisymmetry. 
Neither Van Fraassen nor Psillos specify what exactly belongs to this collection of 
properties but give as examples those properties just mentioned. This vagueness is 
part of the problem, as we shall shortly see.
First of all, it should be acknowledged that formal properties are unable to uniquely 
determine specific relations. An example will help illustrate the point. Take the
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following two relations Ri = {<1 ,2 >, <2 ,1>, < 1 ,1>} and R_2 = {<1 ,2 >, <2 ,1>, <2 ,2 >} 
defined on set U = {1,2,3}. Both relations share the same formal properties, in the 
sense specified above, i.e. they are not reflexive, not irreflexive, not transitive, 
symmetric, and not antisymmetric. Suppose, for the moment, that Ri is the target 
relation. Knowing these formal properties plus the content of U does not allow one 
to infer which of the two relations is the target. In fact, the underdetermination is 
even deeper since there are a number of other relations defined over the same set that 
have the same formal properties. More specifically, there are seven other relations, 
viz. R3 = {<1 ,2 >, <2 ,1>, <3,3>}, R4 = {<1,3>, <3,1>, <1,1>}, R5 = {<1,3>, <3,1>, 
<2 ,2 >}, R6 = {<1,3>, <3,1>, <3,3>}, R7 = {<2,3>, <3,2>, <1,1>}, Rs = {<2,3>, 
<3,2>, <2 ,2 >}, and R9 = (<2,3>, <3,2>, <3,3>}.
This underdetermination resurfaces at a more abstract level, i.e. the class of 
isomorphic relations. This is the level at which the Russellian structural realist 
claims that our knowledge becomes delimited. First of all, we abstract124 from our 
domain U to domain U ' where the only information we end up having about U ' is its 
cardinality, namely that it has three objects. We can give arbitrary labels to these 
objects. Let us call them ‘o \  ‘6 ’, and ‘c*. We can then proceed to abstract from each 
concrete relation: i.e. from Ri to R i' = {<a,b>, <b,a>,<a,a>}, from R2 to R2 ' = 
{<a,b>, <b,a>,<b,b>}, from R3 to R3' = {<a,b>, <b,a>, <c,c>}, etc. 125 Notice that the 
formal properties are of course preserved despite the process of abstraction. Hence, 
the same underdetermination also holds here for the simple reason that the new 
relations share the same formal properties.
Having established that knowing the formal properties is not sufficient to determine 
the target relation, at the concrete or abstract level, we can now proceed to show that 
this underdetermination is more severe than the one faced by ESR. According to 
ESR, relations can be known up to isomorphism. Suppose, as before, that the target 
relation is Ri. Knowing Ri then means not being able to describe it beyond 
isomorphism. Five other relations are isomorphic to Ri, i.e. R2 , R4, R6, Rs, and R9. 
This eliminates three out of the nine relations, i.e. R3, R5 and R7, when compared to
124 The process o f abstraction referred to here is the same as that explained in ch. 2, §3.
125 It is important to note that nothing dictates between R /  = {<a,b>, <b,a>,<a,a>} and R /  = {<a,b>, 
<b,a>,<b,b>}. In this context, the two are equivalent. My choice is thus inconsequential.
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1 Of\the underdetermination that ensues from knowing just the formal properties. 
Hence, the underdetermination has been considerably reduced. The result is even 
better if the target relation is R3. In that case, only two other relations are isomorphic 
to it, i.e. R5 and R7. This eliminates the other six relations, reducing the 
underdetermination even more dramatically. The example clearly illustrates that 
knowing the formal properties of a relation, in the sense we have unpacked the 
notion of ‘formal properties’ above, is often times not the same thing as knowing the 
abstract structure/isomorphism class to which this relation belongs.127 The latter can 
be much more informative than the former.
At first glance then, an isomorphism seems to be able to preserve more than just 
formal properties. But there is a trick here. We have defined the term ‘formal 
properties’ in a narrow way. The reason for doing so lies in the fact that Van 
Fraassen’s and Psillos’ objection draws precisely on such a narrow meaning, or at 
least on the ambiguity that looms. In reality, we call ‘formal properties’ any 
properties that can be described in the language of mathematics. But whatever can be 
described in the language of mathematics will be described only up to isomorphism. 
As Michael Resnik aptly remarks “no mathematical theory can do more than 
determine its objects up to isomorphism” (1981: 529). This is a view not just typical 
of structuralists in the philosophy of mathematics but also of the wider mathematical 
community. An isomorphic mapping preserves any formal, i.e. logico-mathematical, 
properties we can think of. Hence, all that can be captured by an isomorphism is a 
list of formal properties, where the latter concept is now properly understood in a 
broad way. This is probably what Russell had in mind when he made such comments 
as “[ljogical properties include all those which can be expressed in mathematical 
terms” and “structure is what can be expressed by mathematical logic, which 
includes mathematics” (1927: 251, 254).
Since science employs mathematical objects as surrogates for its own objects, it is 
reasonable to argue that scientific objects can themselves only be described up to 
isomorphism. I indicated in the previous chapter that van Fraassen pushes this
126 R ] f o r  example, cannot be instantiated by R3, since the same constant cannot name two different 
things. That is, for R3 to instantiate R i', one o f a or b would have to name either 1 and 3 or 2 and 3.
127 Sometimes the severity o f the underdetermination is the same in both cases. Consider, for example, 
intended relation R! = {< !,!>} defined on set Ui = {1 ,2}.
103
argument with regard to phenomenal objects, which, in his opinion, are the only 
objects science should study. Considering that van Fraaseen adopts this view, it is 
ironic that he then turns around to criticise the ESR-ists for not being able to describe 
relations beyond isomorphism. If anything, on this issue, the two positions seem to 
stand or fall together.
One may complain that we still end up with underdetermination on our hands. The 
appropriate response to this complaint is that ESR delimits underdetermination by 
setting constraints on the type of objects, properties, and relations that are suitable 
candidates for the role of correctly representing the ontology of the world, namely 
those that belong to the same isomorphism class. This limit must be appreciated for 
it leaves realism with some breathing space. It allows us to get some, admittedly 
loose, grip on reality.
5. Conclusion
In reply to Psillos’ objections we can now give the following answers:
Reply to PS1: ESR does not involve a commitment to uninterpreted equations. 
Worrall’s version, in particular, involves a commitment to structures (including 
equations), whose observation terms are fully interpreted and whose theoretical 
terms are presumably implicitly defined through their logical relations with one 
another and with the observation terms. This just amounts to the Ramsey-sentence 
approach to theories. Contrary to Psillos’ objection, such structures have the capacity 
to produce observable predictions. On the basis of this objection, the claim cannot be 
made that structures do not deserve all the epistemic credit.
Reply to PS2 and PS3: Psillos employs PS1 and PS3 to support PS2. PS 1, as I have 
just reiterated, is unwarranted. The examples of preserved non-structural components 
that Psillos gives in support of PS3 are either devoid of epistemic significance or 
unmistakably structural. The further fact that Psillos does not back up his claim that 
the content of current theories is better supported by the evidence and thus more 
likely to be true than that of older theories, leaves PS3 unwarranted. Thus, PS2 
remains unsubstantiated.
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Reply to PS4: Though the distinction between structure and nature is unclear in 
Worrall’s work, the structural realist can appeal to Russell’s distinction which is both 
precise and wards off Psillos’ objections. In particular, Psillos’ claim that the nature 
of an entity is no less knowable than its structure cannot be upheld if we adopt the 
Russellian view that ‘nature’ just means the non-isomorphically specifiable part of 
entities. Moreover, Psillos’ idea that the nature and structure of an entity form a 
continuum is a badly chosen and ineffective metaphor since: a) Russell’s definition 
allows for a crisp distinction between nature and structure, and b) it is inconsistent 
with the idea that the extension of the predicate ‘structure of an entity’ is a proper 
subset of the extension of the predicate ‘nature of an entity’, or even with the idea 
that the two predicates have the same extension.
Reply to PS5: The so-called ‘dilemma’ for the upward path to ESR is ill conceived. 
The first horn of the dilemma rests on a misrepresentation of ESR as a position that 
relies strictly on isomorphic mappings. In any case, given MR, it was shown how 
one can arrive at isomorphic mappings from weaker claims about injective 
mappings. Psillos’ claim, that the structural realist cannot account for the possibility 
that the unobservable world may have extra structure not manifested in the 
perceptual world, was shown to be false. ESR just requires that every perceptual 
structure has a corresponding unobservable structure, not vice-versa. The bottom line 
is that some inferential knowledge about the structure of the world can be 
safeguarded, and that is all that is needed. The second horn of the dilemma rests on 
the mistaken idea that H-W and W-H concede too much to idealism. Contra Weyl, 
whom Psillos supports, it was indicated that W-H is not the central tenet of idealism 
for it is compatible with epistemic realism about the mind-independent physical 
world. At any rate, ESR does not require commitment to the W-H principle. Nor 
does ESR stipulate that there is absolutely no variance between the structure of the 
external world and the structure of our perceptions. Rather, there is evidence to 
believe that such variance is limited enough to be incapable of significantly 
undermining the reliability of inferential knowledge about the structure of the 
external world that ESR demands.
Reply to PS6: ESR does not support the view that first-order physical properties are 
completely unknowable. Rather, it supports the view that all physical properties can
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be known up to isomorphism. This mistake notwithstanding, the question can still be 
asked as to why knowledge should be restricted thus. The answer to this question 
takes the following form: We can know the physical relations without knowing the 
relata, on the presupposition that these relations are reflected in relations between 
observables. Knowing a relation without knowing the relata just amounts to knowing 
the logico-mathematical properties of the relation. This, in turn, amounts to knowing 
the isomorphism class to which these relations belong. Indeed, to know just the 
isomorphism class entails that the properties of the relata cannot be uniquely 
identified, but only up to isomorphism. Psillos’ further claim that first-order 
properties must be knowable in their entirety because they are part and parcel of their 
causal role does not, as it stands, carry any weight since no argument is provided to 
support it.
Reply to PS7: Knowing the abstract structure of the world does not merely amount 
to knowing narrowly construed formal properties such as symmetry, reflexivity, etc. 
The narrow construal is unsatisfactory since we take formal properties to be all the 
logico-mathematical properties. In fact, this is the way Russell understood the 
concept. Under such a broad construal, the notion of abstract structure coincides 
fully with that of formal properties. This is so if one takes the view, which is correct 
to my opinion, that mathematical objects can only be described up to isomorphism. 
Since mature science is mathematical, it is not unreasonable to assume that scientific 
objects can only be described up to isomorphism. Finally, although 
underdetermination is unavoidable, ESR imposes significant curbs on its impact, 
curbs that realists should rest content with.
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4
THE NEWMAN OBJECTION
1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether ESR can withstand a cluster of 
objections that fall under the umbrella of the ‘Newman objection’. I will first present 
a detailed account of the objection and some associated results. This will be followed 
by an assessment of various replies to the objection that have been proposed in 
recent years. Finally, I will offer my own solution to the objection.128
2. Newman’s Bifurcated Challenge
As we have seen, it was not until The Analysis o f Matter (1927) that Russell 
wholeheartedly embraced and developed the structuralist viewpoint. In 1928, one 
year after its publication, M.H.A. Newman, a famous mathematician and 
subsequently Bletchley Park code-breaker, published a critical notice of Russell’s 
book. There he argued that the ESR claim that we can know only the (abstract) 
structure of the external world trivialises scientific knowledge. Moreover, he argued 
that the only way to get around this problem involves giving up ESR.
The First Fork: ESR Knowledge Claims are Trivial
Newman begins by noting that Russell’s view, that we have no knowledge of the 
physical relations over and above their formal (i.e. structural) features, amounts to 
the assertion that “[t]here is a relation R such that the structure of the external world 
with reference to R is W” (1928: 144). By this, I presume, he means that the 
structural realist cannot state the particular relations that the external world 
instantiates. Rather, the structural realist can only state that there exist such relations 
of which the only thing we can know is their abstract structure W. Newman then 
urges us to consider the logical theorem that for “any aggregate A, a system of 
relations between its members can be found having any assigned structure 
compatible with the cardinal number of A” (140). According to this theorem, the 
mere number of members in an aggregate entails that there are systems of relations
128 A shorter version o f this chapter has been published as Votsis (2003b)
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definable over those members having any specified structure. Thus saying, as 
structural realists do, that for a given class there exists a system of relations that 
specifies a structure, is not saying much since this claim follows as a matter of logic 
by employing the above noted theorem plus the cardinality of the given class. But 
surely anything that is known about the external world must be discoverable 
empirically, not a-priori. Yet the only thing open for empirical determination under 
Russell’s view, according to Newman’s argument, is the cardinality of the given 
class.
Newman’s argument can be understood as a modus tollens. If  epistemic structural 
realism is true, then scientific knowledge imparts information only about the 
cardinality of the external world. But surely, science gives us more knowledge than 
this. Therefore, epistemic structural realism is false.
We can now state the theorem upon which Newman’s result is based:
(NT) Newman’s theorem: Let S = (U, Ri, ...., Rk) be a structure and V be a set. 
Suppose that there is an injection p: U -> V. Then, there exists a structure S' whose 
domain is V, and which has a substructure isomorphic to S.
The proof for this theorem can be given as follows:129 We begin by defining the 
image of mapping p as p(U) := (x e V: 3 a  e U, p(a) =x}. From this we know that 
p(U) c  V and since p is injective we know that p: U —> p (U) is a bijection. Its 
inverse is thus, p’1; p(U) —> U. We can now define a relation Ri', for each n-place 
relation Ri on U, on the set p(U) as follows: Rj':= {(xi, .. .,xn) e  Vn: xi, . . .,xn e p(U) 
a  (p '1 (xi), ..., p'^Xn)) e Ri}. In other words, R / is an n-place relation on V. Note 
that it follows from the definition of each R{ that Vai, . . . ,O n  e U, (p(ai), . . . , p ( O n ) )  
e Ri' iff (aj, .. . ,On) e  Rj. This is the condition for an isomorphism. By repeating this 
for every relation Ri on U we define relations Rj' on V and hence have a structure S' 
= (V, Ri', ...., Rk'). If we now take the restriction of S' to the subdomain p(U) c  V 
we observe that it is just the substructure (p(U), Ri', ...., Rk') which is isomorphic to 
S, i.e. (p(U), Ri', ..., Rk') ~ S. This just means that save for cardinality constraints
129 Many thanks to Jeff Ketland for providing this proof.
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we can impose any structure on a set; that structure being of course set up by some 
relation(s). Thus, saying that ‘There exists some relation R which has a specified 
structure S’ is not saying much, since that follows trivially modulo cardinality 
constraints.
The Second Fork’. ESR cannot he Salvaged
Newman correctly points out “that it is meaningless to speak of the structure of a 
mere collection of things, not provided with a set of relations” and “[t]hus the only 
important statements about structure are those concerned with the structure set up ... 
by a given, definite, [set of] relation[s]” (140). The only way to avoid trivialization, 
according to him, is by specifying the particular relation(s) that generate(s) a given 
structure. That is, if  we uniquely specify R, instead of just saying ‘There exists some 
relation R which has a specified structure W’, the fact that R has structure W is no 
longer trivial. The problem is that to uniquely specify R, one inevitably goes beyond 
the epistemic commitments of the structural realist, i.e. ESR in its pure form must be 
abandoned.
Let us remind ourselves of the structural realist’s epistemic commitments. Russell 
claims that we can at most know the abstract structure of physical relations but not 
the relations themselves, for we have no epistemic access to them.130 A consequence 
of this view is that there is an underdetermination of the physical relations by the 
abstract structure (URS for short), since infinitely many such relations correspond to 
any such structure. For some, this is the essence of Newman’s problem. Ladyman 
certainly thinks so when he says: “[t]here are serious difficulties... which were 
raised by Newman (1928)... the basic problem [being] that structure is not sufficient 
to uniquely pick out any relations in the world” (1998: 412). To explain the objection 
better, consider first the following example (taken out of context from Newman’s 
paper) that illustrates two different relations that share the same abstract structure:
Let a set, A, of objects be given, and a relation R which holds between certain 
subsets of A. Let B be a second set of objects, also provided with a relation S which 
holds between certain subsets of its members... For example A might be a random 
collection of people, and R the two-termed relation of being acquainted. A map of A
130 The use o f the term ‘physical relation’ carries no intention, either by Russell or by me, to reify the 
relations found between physical objects.
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can be made by making a dot on a piece of paper to represent each person, and 
joining with a line those pairs of dots which represent acquainted persons. Such a 
map is itself a system, B, having the same structure as A, the generating relation, S, 
in this case being “joined by a line”. (1928: 139)
Newman, like most mathematicians, tends to avoid using different symbols for a set 
and for some structure with that set as domain, since it is usually clear from the 
context what he is referring to. For the sake of clarity, we shall use asterisks to 
indicate a structure as opposed to the set that constitutes the structure’s domain. 
Thus, structure A * and structure B* have set A and set B respectively as their 
domain. The two relations, ‘being acquainted’ and ‘joined by a line’, are 
undoubtedly distinct from one another both intensionally (i.e. what they mean 
differs) and extensionally (i.e. what they denote differs). In this context, however, 
they are employed in such a way that the structures they give rise to are isomorphic 
to one another. Hence, they share the same abstract structure. Now suppose that we 
are interested in only one of these relations but we have epistemic access to neither. 
If all we have knowledge of is (abstract) structure, as the structural realist suggests, 
we cannot distinguish between the two relations. And, of course, we do not just have 
two relations to choose from but infinitely many, since there can be infinitely many 
bijective mappings that preserve the same structural properties.
Newman explores several ways in which the structural realist might try to 
distinguish between intended and unintended systems of relations, i.e. structures. 
Two of these ways stand out. The first one is an attempt to dress the distinction as 
one between real and fictitious relations. Newman defines a relation as fictitious 
when “the relation is one whose only property is that it holds between the objects 
that it does hold between” (145). Real relations can then be implicitly defined as 
those relations that have more than just this property. This, according to Newman, is 
obviously not going to be of help, since the only knowledge a structural realist would 
have of the real relations is exactly the same knowledge he would have of the 
fictitious ones, viz. that they hold between some objects. But what if we know 
something about these objects apart from their having a given structure, could we not 
then claim to have a way to distinguish the real relations from the fictitious ones? 
For instance, if  we fix the domain in the above example to the set A, i.e. the set 
whose members are people, then, at least prima facie, there is no longer a question of
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being unable to distinguish between the two relations ‘being acquainted’ and ‘being 
joined by a line’.
Anticipating this reply, Newman argues that even if the domain of the objects has 
been specified, we are still left with the problem that we must “distinguish between 
systems of relations that hold among members of a given aggregate” (147) [my 
emphasis]. Demopoulos and Friedman elaborate that “[t]his is a difficulty because 
there is always a relation with the [given] structure” (1985: 628-629). This point can 
be extended by showing that isomorphic relations, defined over the same domain, 
can yet be different in some important respects. Example: Suppose we make another 
mapping of A by painting a line between all, and only those, people who are 
acquainted. Let us call the resulting structure ‘C*’ and its generating relation ‘T’. 
Notice that C* is isomorphic to A*, which means that they share the same abstract 
structure, let us call i t ‘S*’. Notice also that C* and A* have the same set of objects 
as their domain, viz. set A. However, A* and C* are generated by different relations 
-  at least if these relations are considered as relations-in-intension. A* is generated 
by R while C* is generated by T. Thus, knowing the abstract structure S* and fixing 
the domain to set A does not allow us to uniquely pick out the so-called intended 
relation, whatever that relation may be. But surely, the argument goes, being able to 
point to the intended relation must be an essential part of scientific enterprise and 
knowledge.
Newman’s other attempt to distinguish between intended and unintended relations 
takes the form of a distinction between important and unimportant (or trivial) 
relations. But how is this distinction to be made, Newman asks, if we are to 
“compare the importance of relations of which nothing is known save their incidence 
[i.e. occurrence] (the same for all of them) in a certain aggregate” (147). The only 
way to do that without giving up ESR, Newman reasons, would be to take the term 
‘importance’ as one of “the prime unanalyzable qualities of the constituents of the 
world”, something he considers completely absurd (147).
Newman concludes that if we are to avoid trivialization, we must surrender “the 
‘structure vs. quality’ division of knowledge in its strict form” (147). But to 
surrender this distinction, he claims, is to render ESR false. As Demopoulos and
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Friedman explain “since it is indisputably true that our knowledge of structure is 
non-trivial -  we clearly do not stipulate the holding of the structural properties our 
theories have -  it cannot be the case that our knowledge of the unperceived parts of 
the world is purely structural” (1985: 630).131
In a letter sent to Newman shortly after the publication of his critical notice, Russell 
acknowledged that he was wrong in saying that only the structure of the physical 
world can be known (see his (1968: 176)). Thereafter, Russell abandoned pure ESR 
(see for example Russell (1948)), and never returned to address Newman’s problem.
A Note on the Ramsey-Sentence
As indicated in chapter two, Demopoulos and Friedman recast Newman’s objection 
against the Ramsey-sentence approach. Their main point is that if a theory 0  is 
consistent and all its observational consequences true, then the truth of 0 ’s Ramsey 
sentence is guaranteed and hence structural realism (nearly) collapses into 
phenomenalism. Indeed, the only thing separating ESR from phenomenalism, say 
Demopoulos and Friedman, is the cardinality constraint. This is so because it is taken 
to say something, i.e. how many types of objects and properties exist, about the 
unobservable world.132
Building on Demopoulos’ and Friedman’s work, Jeff Ketland (forthcoming) argues 
that Ramseyfication “yields a claim which is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the 
claim that the theory is empirically adequate” (2).133 More precisely, he argues that 
saying that the Ramsey sentence of a given theory 0 , R(0), is true is equivalent to 
saying that 0  has an empirically correct full model whose theoretical domain 
possesses the right cardinality. By ‘empirically correct’ he means that the observable 
domain and relations designated by the model is isomorphic to the appearances.134 
From this, he concludes that “the ‘structural content’ of a theory 0 , at least i f  it is
131 I presume that by ‘unperceived parts o f the world’, they simply mean what Russell and Maxwell 
mean by the term ‘unobservable’ (see ch.2, §5).
132 Russell raises this point in the aforementioned letter to Newman, saying, however, that it “is not a 
point upon which I wish to lay stress”. He also notes that the cardinal number under consideration 
must be finite if  the claim is to have any empirical significance.
133 Page numbers are from the preprint.
134 Ketland assumes a two-sorted interpreted language where first-order variables range over two 
domains, one for observable and another for unobservable/theoretical objects.
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identified with what R (0 ) ‘adds’ to the claim that 0  is empirically adequate, is just 
this Newman-esque cardinality constraint” (11). Thus, Ketland’s claim is that 
structural realism a la Ramsey is not very different from anti-realist positions such as 
constructive empiricism. The difference, again, lies in the cardinality constraint, 
which presumably says something about the unobservable world.
3. Various Replies to the Objection
As we have seen, Newman argues that if  we want to represent empirically 
determinable scientific knowledge, structure is not enough. Epistemic structural 
realists such as Grover Maxwell, John Worrall, Michael Redhead, and Elie Zahar 
share so much with Russell’s structural realism that it is no surprise that Newman’s 
objection is dusted off and pitted against them. Ever since the Demopoulos and 
Friedman paper, many authors (see, for example, van Fraassen (1997), Ladyman 
(1998), Psillos (1999) and Ketland (forthcoming)) have appealed to the objection to 
attack some version of ESR. In this section, I will be appraising replies to the 
objection offered by Psillos, Redhead, French, Ladyman, Worrall and Zahar.
Psillos
Although not a structural realist, Psillos (1999; 2000a; 2001a; 2001b) has ventured to 
show that the only way to overcome Newman’s objection is to espouse a traditional 
scientific realist position, forsaking the purely structural claims of ESR. In 
particular, Psillos argues that if the world is structured in a unique way, then we can 
simply pick out the right relations, and, hence, the right structure. He thus says, “[i]f 
the domain is already ‘carved up’ in natural kinds, then it is a far from trivial 
exercise to find a network of relations which generate a certain formal structure... 
instead of being a matter of logic, this issue becomes an open empirical problem” 
(1999: 68). How does he propose to pick out the right relations? Psillos only hints at 
how this may be done when he says that what is “required is getting the extensions 
right, i.e. identifying those and only those extensions which mark off the boundaries 
of -  and relations among -  natural kinds” (68).
The claim that the world is carved up in natural kinds does not, by itself, solve the 
Newman problem. After all, if the claim is true, it merely guarantees the existence of
113
physical properties and relations, but says nothing about our epistemic access to 
them. Psillos, in fact, acknowledges that the natural kinds claim is compatible with 
ESR. He says “[t]he thesis that the world possesses a unique natural-kind structure is 
surely compatible with the claim that, without also specifying what exactly these 
natural kinds are, of this structure the only thing that can be asserted is that it exists” 
(68) [original emphasis]. What Psillos could say in addition, and perhaps he implies 
it, is that we have direct access to the external world. Under these conditions, we can 
empirically discover its physical relations and, hence, its unique natural-kind 
structure. The problem with this suggestion is that it simply assumes what ESR 
denies, i.e. that we have direct access to the world. Psillos does not offer any 
justification for this assumption and for this reason we must leave this discussion 
aside.
Strangely enough, though Psillos admits that the natural kinds claim is compatible 
with ESR, he claims that acceptance of the claim leads to two unwanted 
consequences for ESR: (1) ESR is rendered false, and (2) the Ramsey-sentence 
approach, that some structural realists advocate, is rendered unsatisfactory. Does 
Psillos’ natural-kinds answer to Newman’s objection, if it indeed is an answer, 
exclude ESR from partaking in it?
Let us consider Psillos’ allegedly unwanted consequences for ESR one at a time. It is 
not entirely clear what he means by the first one. Perhaps what he wants to say is that 
the natural-kinds claim, i.e. the claim that the world is carved-up in natural kinds, is 
itself ‘non-structural’. That is, it is an assumption over and above those allowed by 
ESR-ists, so if it is adopted one cannot maintain a purely structural knowledge of the 
world. Yet the natural-kinds claim is an ontological assumption about what the world 
is like, and, as such, it adds nothing to the epistemological commitments of the 
structural realist. Moreover, even if these commitments were to be burdened with a 
non-structural claim, it is far from clear that the resulting ‘impure’ ESR must be 
abandoned for the sake of frill-blown realism, as Psillos ultimately wants. Unless 
Psillos provides some justification as to why we should accept the first consequence, 
or, indeed, any of the other claims I just mentioned, ESR emerges unscathed.
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Disappointingly, Psillos’ justification for his second consequence is also mere hand 
waving. He claims that the Ramsey-sentence approach proves unsatisfactory,
...for when it comes to the defence of the thesis that science captures the structure 
of the world already carved up in natural kinds, it is best not to treat theories as 
abstract structures, but instead to appeal to the success of interpreted scientific 
theories in order to argue that the kinds posited by them populate the world (69).
In other words, the success of interpreted scientific theories presumably provides a 
better defence of the natural kinds claim. The implication here is that the structural 
realist commits himself to uninterpreted theories, an accusation that we have 
witnessed on Psillos’ list of objections under PS1. I argued in the previous chapter 
(see section three) that this objection fails since the structural realist does not 
subscribe to uninterpreted, i.e. purely syntactic theories. Rather, the structural realist 
requires that the observational terms of the theory be interpreted. In particular, the 
Ramsey-sentence of a theory contains interpreted observational terms, so it cannot be 
the case that the structural realist is committed to entirely uninterpreted theories. 
Similarly, the Russellian account commits one to, among other things, concrete 
observational structures.
Redhead
Redhead’s (2001a; 2001b) stab at solving Newman’s problem involves an attempt to 
dissociate ESR from the Ramsey-sentence approach. He dismisses the Ramsey- 
sentence formulation, viz. 3 0  (W(0, O)), and opts for a logically stronger 
formulation, viz. W(R, O), where 0  is an existentially bound theoretical variable, O 
an observational term, W is an abstract structure, and R a specific physical 
relation.135 Obviously, the truth of W(R, O) cannot be a trivially established. But 
how do we justify our specification of R in the first place? Redhead’s solution is that 
we take R as being “hypothesised in some explanatory theoretical context so it exists 
as an ontological posit” claiming that “all that we have epistemic warrant for is the 
second-order [i.e. abstract] structure of [W]” (2001b: 346). Thus, we may remain 
epistemologically agnostic with regard to the specific relation R, while still asserting 
knowledge of its abstract structure W.
135 The formulations are abbreviated for the sake o f expediency.
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The perhaps not so obvious difficulty with Redhead’s solution is that our epistemic 
warrant for (abstract) structure W must somehow be derived from the nonexistent 
epistemic warrant of the hypothesised physical relation R. Psillos makes precisely 
this point in his reply to Redhead’s review of his book, when he says that he “cannot 
see how we can have epistemic warrant to believe that the structure is [W] which is 
not parasitic on having epistemic warrant to believe that R is the required (definite) 
relation” (2001b: 369). He goes on to say that “[i]t is the knowledge of (or 
commitment to) the definite relation R ... that issues the warrant to believe that its 
structure is [W] and hence issues the warrant that the relevant domain has structure 
[W]” (369). Even though the (abstract) structure W of a relation R, i.e. the broadly 
construed formal properties of R, is logically weaker than R, and thus presumably 
more epistemologically warranted, one needs first to establish that R has some 
epistemic warrant in order to be able to infer W. The problem is that admitting that R 
has epistemic warrant amounts to abandoning pure ESR, for we can no longer claim 
that only abstract structure can be known.
French and Ladyman
Ontic structural realists French and Ladyman have yet another solution to Newman’s 
objection. They argue as follows:
Worrall’s approach is thoroughly embedded in the so-called syntactic view of 
theories that adopts first-order quantificational logic as the appropriate form for the 
representation of physical theories. We will not rehearse our reasons here, but we 
consider this approach to be deeply flawed, not only because of its inadequacy in 
reflecting scientific practice, but also because of the pseudoproblems that arise once 
one has adopted it. So for example, the Newman problem is obviated if one does 
not think of structures and relations in first-order extensional terms (2003a: 33).
If, in their view, we forgo the syntactic view of theories of which the Ramsey 
sentence approach is a cornerstone, then the Newman problem will no longer be an 
obstacle. Their alternative is the model-theoretic approach to theories. At no point, 
however, do they really elaborate how the Newman problem can be obviated with 
the adoption of this approach.136
136 For an argument against the idea that by abandoning extensionalism we can avoid Newman’s 
objection see Demopoulos and Friedman (1985: 629-30).
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The problem seems equally threatening to ontic SR, regardless of which approach 
one takes to theories, for taken together (ontic SR and the Newman problem) lead to 
the view that we can have no non-trivial knowledge of the world. That is, assuming 
the following two premises are true, (a) The Newman problem, i.e. if  all we can 
know about the world is structure we cannot know anything of importance, and (b) 
all we can know of the world is structure, for all there exists is structure, we derive 
(c) we cannot know anything of importance about the world. There is nothing 
particular in ontic SR, or any of the accompanying claims that French and Ladyman 
make, that saves it from Newman’s problem.
Worrall and Zahar
Another reply to Newman’s objection originates in Worrall (2000) who, as we have 
seen, advocates a version of ESR augmented by the Ramsey-sentence approach. He 
argues that provided a distinction between observational and theoretical terms is 
made, “the fact that, for every [theory] S, S and its RS [Ramsey sentence] S* are 
empirically equivalent, [entails that] S* is co-falsifiable with S and hence for any 
falsifiable S, its RS S* cannot tell us only about the size of the universe” (8). In other 
words, if the theory itself is empirically falsifiable then its Ramsey-sentence must 
also be empirically falsifiable for the two are empirically equivalent. Hence, the 
Ramsey-sentence of such a theory cannot be trivial.
An elaboration of this argument can be found in an appendix to Zahar (2001), co­
authored by Worrall and Zahar. There it is claimed that Russell’s mistake was to opt 
for a purely structural representation that contains no observational terms:
It was admittedly unfortunate that in his 1927 Russell spoke of a purely structural 
description of reality being inferred from perceptual results. The fault lies... with 
the implicit assumption that once the inference is carried out, an exclusively 
structural account is obtained in which no observational terms occur (238) [original
137emphasis].
137 Worrall, in private communication, claims that the point does not come out correctly in the text 
just quoted. According to him, it is Newman who mistakenly viewed Russell as giving a purely 
structural description that affords no observational terms. Russell’s only fault, claims Worrall, was to 
forget that his whole view was based on the acquaintance/description distinction, a view that 
necessitates observational terms.
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A sentence expressing this pure structure would, of course, be completely 
uninterpreted. If that is then Ramseyfied, the only information it would yield would 
be that the unramseyfied sentence has at least one model whose domain can be taken 
to be countable.138 Worrall and Zahar instead opt for sentences with interpreted 
observation terms. Ramseyfying these sentences keeps the observation terms intact, 
i.e. interpreted, which means that the resulting Ramsey-sentences are empirically 
falsifiable and, therefore, not trivially satisfiable.
Worrall and Zahar claim that Newman’s objection applies only if a distinction 
between observational and theoretical terms is not made. Indeed, according to them, 
the distinction must be made. Once made, they say, Ramsey-style ESR only faces 
Demopoulos’ and Friedman’s extended objection, namely that what the Ramsey- 
sentence asserts ‘over and above’ its observational content is reducible to logic or 
mathematics. In more detail, Demopoulos, Friedman and recently Ketland argue that 
Ramsey-style ESR collapses to phenomenalism/constructive empiricism, since the 
only epistemically-relevant thing left (after the reduction of what is ‘over and above’ 
to logic/mathematics) in a Ramsey-sentence is the observational content. To be more 
precise, the accusation is one of near collapse, since, as Demopoulos, Friedman, and 
Ketland admit, there is always the something ‘over and above’ to worry about.
Against these claims, Worrall and Zahar argue that “[t]his ‘over and above’... seems 
to us to be not only badly defined but also indefinable in any non-trivial way” (240). 
They cite two reasons for this. First, the Ramsey-sentence does not logically follow 
from its observational content. The Ramsey-sentence contains empirical 
generalisations and hence cannot be deduced from the observational content of the 
theory since, according to them, the latter contains no such generalisations. 
According to them, to include empirical generalisations in the observational content 
would be to go “against the canons of even the most liberal version of empiricism” 
(241). In this sense, they argue, the Ramsey sentence makes non-trivial claims, i.e. 
claims over and above the observational content that are not reducible to logic or 
mathematics.
138 Strictly speaking, Worrall and Zahar should not call this ‘Ramseyfication’ since no observation 
terms are present in the original sentence.
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Second, Worrall and Zahar argue that if we were to count empirical generalisations 
as part of the observational content of a theory, “then the Ramsey-sentence might 
well be one of them; in which case Demopoulos’ and Friedman’s thesis would 
collapse into the trivial claim that the Ramsey-sentence follows from itself’ (240) 
[my emphasis]. What Worrall and Zahar seem to say in this blurry passage is that 
under a broad construal of the observational content, i.e. a construal that includes 
empirical generalisations, the Ramsey-sentence itself can be regarded as purely 
empirical. In that case, there is absolutely nothing ‘over and above’ to worry about, 
hence Demopoulos’ and Friedman’s claim loses its potency. Presumably, this 
empirical understanding of the Ramsey-sentence is not threatening to Worrall and 
Zahar, because they assume that the observational content broadly construed goes 
beyond what an anti-realist is willing to accept.
There are several inadequacies with Worrall’s and Zahar’s defence of the Ramsey 
approach to epistemic structural realism. First off, contra Worrall’s and Zahar’s 
remarks, there is a clear sense in which at least part of the meaning of ‘over and 
above’ is fixed. To wit, a Ramsey-sentence says something about the cardinality of 
the theoretical domain and how it is structured. Moreover, Demopoulos, Friedman, 
and Ketland complain that there is nothing in the Ramsey-sentence that restricts the 
theoretical domain to those and only those objects that are unobservable.139 If no 
such restriction can justifiably be made, Ramsey-sentence assertions are to be 
understood as indiscriminately applying to abstract objects, including mathematical 
entities. The claim that a given number of mathematical objects can be structured in 
a particular way then becomes a matter of logic/mathematics; that is, it follows from 
Newman’s theorem. The challenge for the Ramsey-style ESR-ist is to show whether 
or not a restriction can be justifiably imposed on the ‘theoretical’ domain, so that 
theoretical variables range over all and only those objects that are unobservable, i.e. 
physical objects.140
139 Ketland correctly recognises the need to have an interpreted language where first-order variables 
range over two domains, one for theoretical entities (i.e. unobservables, mathematical entities, etc.) 
and the other for observables.
140 My inclination is that a restriction to the theoretical domain can be justified as an ontological 
assumption and, hence, without any compromise on the epistemic commitments o f structural realism.
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Another problem with Worrall and Zahar’s defence is their narrow construal of the 
concept of observational content. The construal is highly questionable, for 
empiricists, like van Fraassen, have traditionally classified empirical generalisations 
as part of the observational content of a theory. Perhaps there is no good reason for 
empiricists to do so, but Worrall and Zahar need to explain why we should suddenly 
alter our understanding of empiricism. Likewise, I am unaware of any realist 
positions in the literature that take commitment to empirical generalisations as 
sufficient support for realism.141 Again, a lot more needs to be said on this issue 
before Worrall’s and Zahar’s argument can gain credibility.
The problems do not stop there. If empirical generalisations provide sufficient 
support for structural realism, why do we need Ramsey-sentences at all? The answer 
would most probably be that a Ramsey-sentence does not merely provide empirical 
generalisations, but also makes existential and generalised claims about theoretical 
predicates. Worrall and Zahar fail to explain why we need these existential claims, if, 
as shown above, what delineates structural realism from empiricist antirealism is 
empirical generalisations. Moreover, their assertion that the theoretical terms found 
in existential claims are ‘indissolubly entangled’ with the observational terms 
remains suggestive, pending further elaboration on their behalf. How, one may well 
ask, could theoretical terms be indissolubly entangled with observational ones if 
indefinitely many Ramsey-sentences, with syntactically different existential claims, 
are compatible with the observational content broadly construed? To create such 
‘rival’ Ramsey-sentences, all one needs to do is take the observational content of a 
given Ramsey sentence and simply construct other Ramsey sentences at will by 
appending syntactically different theoretical statements to the original observational 
content and then Ramseyfying.
The doubtfulness of the claim that theoretical terms are indissolubly entangled with 
observational ones is reinforced by the following considerations. Suppose <P is a 
theory that entails a set of sentences S, and that S  can be subdivided into two disjoint 
sets: O which contains true observation sentences and T which contains theoretical
141 Even Russell, who comes close to supporting such a view, demands that empirical generalisations 
mirror the structure o f  the physical world. In doing so, he commits himself to something more than 
the empirical generalisations, namely to the (at best) isomorphic correspondence between the physical 
world and the phenomenal world.
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sentences. Suppose further that O contains all the observation sentences true of the 
world, and nothing else. We know that 0  and its Ramsey-sentence R(<P) are 
empirically equivalent. So if 0  entails O, then R(0)  entails O. Since O contains all 
true observation sentences (and no false ones), no observation sentence can 
undermine the theoretical part of the Ramsey-sentence. But then, how can one decide 
between various different manifestations of the theoretical part of the Ramsey- 
sentence? For example, how could we decide between (3\}/)(3<|))(Vx)[(\]/x v <j)x) => 
Ox] and (3\|/)(3<|>)(Vx)[(—i\px & <j)x) zd Ox]?
Jane English (1973) has proved that two or more Ramsey-sentences with the same 
observational consequences cannot be inconsistent. The proof is a reductio. Here’s a 
reconstruction: We start by assuming that there are two inconsistent Ramsey 
sentences, R(Ti) = (3<|)i)... (3<j>n)Ti (Oi, ..., Ok; <>i, ..., <(>n), and R(T2) = (3\|/i)... 
(3\j/m)T2 (Oi, ..., Ok; \|/i, ..., \|/m) that are compatible with all possible observations. 
Reversing the process of Ramseyfication, we substitute distinct predicate letters for 
the second-order variables and get Ti(Oi, ..., Ok; Fi, ..., Fn) and T2(Oi, ..., Ok; Gi, 
..., Gm). Trivially, Ti & T2 implies R(Ti) & R(T2). If the pair R(Ti) and R(T2) is 
inconsistent, so is Ti and T2. The next step requires appeal to Robinson’s consistency 
theorem, which holds that Ti u  T2 is satisfiable if and only if there is no sentence in 
the common vocabulary of their languages such that one theory entails this sentence 
and the other entails its negation.142 By the completeness theorem we infer that Ti 
and T2 are inconsistent if and only if there is at least one sentence in the common 
vocabulary of their languages such that one theory entails this sentence and the other 
entails its negation. The common vocabulary in this case is the observational 
vocabulary, for Ramseyfication turns the theoretical vocabulary into variables. 
Hence, it follows that there is a sentence O in the observational vocabulary of both 
Ti(Fj) and T2(Gj), such that Ti(Fj) z> O, and T2(Gj) z> —i O. Suppose O is true. By 
modus tollens, we infer that T2 is false in virtue of its being not compatible with all 
possible observations. Since T2 and R(T2) are empirically equivalent, this means that 
R(T2) is also not compatible with all possible observations. Contradiction! Suppose 
O is false. By modus tollens, we infer that Ti is false in virtue of its being not
142 The theorem is stated thus: Let Li and L2 be two languages where L = Li n  L2. Suppose that Ti 
and T2 are theories satisfiable in Li and L2 respectively. Then T] u  T2 is satisfiable if  and only if  there 
is no sentence a  in L such that T] i= o  and T2 •= —,o.
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compatible with all possible observations. Since Ti and R(Ti) are empirically 
equivalent, this means that R(Ti) is also not compatible with all possible 
observations. Contradiction! Therefore, any Ramsey sentences that are compatible 
with all possible observations cannot be inconsistent with one another, i.e. they will 
be consistent.
Although the starting assumption in the above proof is that the Ramsey-sentences are 
compatible with all possible observations, we can replace this with the assumption 
that the Ramsey-sentences have the same set o f  consequences expressed in the 
observational vocabulary. Notice that it still follows that there is a sentence O in the 
observational vocabulary of Ti(Fj) and T2(Gj), such that Ti(Fi) z> O, and T2(Gi) Z) 
-iO. This, in effect, means that the two theories do not share the same set of 
consequences expressed in the observational vocabulary, something that contradicts 
our starting assumption. Thus we can conclude that any two Ramsey sentences that 
have the same observational consequences cannot be inconsistent, i.e. they will be 
consistent.
The severity of the problem becomes apparent when one considers that there are 
indefinitely many inconsistent alternatives to a theory that have the same 
observational consequences. The Ramsey-sentences of all of these theories are 
logically consistent with each other. Yet, the original (non-Ramseyfied) theories 
were inconsistent! The reason for this mismatch stems from the substitution of 
theoretical predicates for existentially quantified variables. Take, for example, two 
contradictory statements such as (Vx)Px and (Vx)—iPx, where P  is a theoretical 
predicate. When we Ramseyfy these statements we get (B<|))(Vx)<t)Jc and (3\|/)(Vx) 
—i\j/x respectively. Notice that nothing prevents —i\j/ = <|).
Worrall and Zahar suggest that we can choose the right Ramsey-sentence by 
recourse to such considerations as unity and simplicity. Here’s what they say:
The more demanding structural realist can go much further than this, but only by 
appealing to a metaphysical principle similar to the one invoked by both Poincare 
and Einstein. The latter put it as follows: the world is the realisation of what is 
mathematically simplest, while Poincare held the degree of unity-cum-simplicity of 
a hypothesis to be an index of its truth-likeness (2001: 249).
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Presumably then, the right Ramsey-sentence is the one that offers the most unified 
and simple account of the observables and unobservables. Needless to say, this claim 
requires fleshing out if it is to be taken seriously. Why should we take the notions of 
unity and simplicity as epistemically significant? It is well known that such notions 
are notoriously difficult to pin down, and that anti-realists like van Fraassen dismiss 
them as merely pragmatic considerations. Suppose for argument’s sake that they are 
epistemically significant. Why should there be a unique Ramsey-sentence that 
captures all the true observational consequences and offers the most unified and 
simple account of the observables and unobservables? I will return to this issue in 
chapter six, where I will be considering arguments from underdetermination.
In sum, the Ramsey-style structural realist has a lot of explaining to do before she 
can gain a foothold in the scientific realism debate.
4. Overcoming Newman’s Objection
I have already indicated in my discussion of Grover Maxwell’s ESR (see ch.2, §5) 
that Russell’s version of structural realism is incompatible with the Ramsey-sentence 
approach. Attacks on the Ramsey-sentence rendition of ESR, led by Demopoulos 
and Friedman and more recently by Ketland, therefore miss their target when it 
comes to Russell. I will argue in this section that upon closer scrutiny the accusation 
of triviality mounted against Russell’s version of ESR fails, because the position’s 
knowledge claims are informative. Moreover, I will expose as a myth the idea that 
we can uniquely pick out physical relations or indeed their relata.
First o f all, it should be made clear that if all the structural realist is arguing for is the 
claim that there exist relations with particular structures, then this is obviously trivial 
for the reasons Newman mentions. But no structural realist makes such a claim! 
Russell, in particular, claims that our epistemic commitments extend to cover REC1, 
REC2, and REC3. That is, concrete observational structures, abstract structures (i.e. 
isomorphism classes) corresponding to the concrete observational structures, and the 
existence of concrete physical structures that are causally responsible for the 
concrete observational structures and belong to the same isomorphism classes as 
them. According to this view, we empirically identify logico-mathematical
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properties of the unobservable world via the assumption that causally linked concrete 
observational structures and concrete physical structures share the same abstract 
structures, i.e. belong to the same isomorphism classes.
Is Russell’s claim trivial? Before we can answer this question, we first need to 
understand what exactly is meant by the characterisation that ESR knowledge claims 
are trivial? Customarily, the term ‘trivial’ means that the information on offer is of 
little or no importance. So, in what way are the knowledge claims of ESR of little or 
no importance? The well-rehearsed answer is that the information these claims offer 
can also be derived a-priori from set theory together with a cardinality constraint. 
Hence, the answer goes, the only important information contained in the structural 
claims concerns the cardinality of the domain. This seems to imply that any 
information contained in a statement that is also derivable a-priori lacks importance.
There is a very simple and straightforward way to show that this view is mistaken. 
Consider the following example: Take the numbers 133 and 123. I can, restricting 
myself solely to arithmetic, perform various operations on these numbers. One such 
operation is addition. Similarly, if I had two collections of 133 and 123 physical 
objects respectively, I could count them one by one and would reach the same 
result.143 Despite the similarities, there is an important difference between the two 
cases. In the latter case, the result is a property that is then ascribed to the physical 
world, in particular to the physical objects under consideration, and not merely an 
exercise of arithmetic. This claim is warranted by the employment of an empirical 
method to arrive at the given number. The fact that arithmetic allows me to perform a 
calculation between the numbers 133 and 123 a-priori -  numbers that happen to be 
the same as those involved in the two collections of physical objects -  does not mean 
that the information I reached counting the physical objects in the two collections is 
devoid of importance. One need only consider the consequences had I made an error 
in counting.
The same type of argument can be applied to the issue at hand. Provided that we 
have the right cardinality, we can set up any structure -  and by extension any
143 Assuming that the objects retain their individuality when I add them.
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abstract structure -  we want a-priori just by appeal to set theory and in particular the 
theorem employed by Newman. But we can also reach the same abstract structure a- 
posteriori. Empirical investigation leads us to the discovery/postulation of relations 
between observables. By deduction, we can then get the abstract structures of these 
relations. Appeal to H-W and MR, principles that are questionable but not the target 
of Newman’s objection, allows us to infer that relations between observables and the 
corresponding relations between unobservables share the same abstract structures. 
The method of arriving at the abstract structures is at least partly empirical in that the 
discovery of relations between observables is an empirical matter. Thus, the fact that 
set theory allows me to arrive at the same abstract structures a-priori does not mean 
that the information I have reached via observation is devoid of importance.
One further consideration should make the general point sharper. It is a feature of the 
expressive power of mathematics that it can give us all the structures that satisfy any 
given cardinality constraint. No structure is privileged in this sense. Russell’s a- 
posteriori method guarantees that some structures are privileged over others. 
According to this method, we choose those abstract structures that are instantiated by 
concrete observational structures. We choose them because of the assumption that 
concrete observational structures are isomorphic to their causal antecedents, namely 
concrete physical structures. In the above example, this would be analogous to the 
fact that although arithmetic allows me to sum any two numbers, there is only one 
number that can be correctly ascribed to the aggregate of the two collections of 
physical objects under consideration.
The critic may object that the weight of Newman’s objection is that knowing only 
the abstract structures is not enough. But why is it not enough? Demopoulos and 
Friedman suggest, borrowing a concept from Quine, that without appeal to a 
background theory the abstract structure cannot single out the intended from the 
unintended interpretations:
From a contemporary, model-theoretic standpoint, this is just the problem of 
intended versus unintended interpretations: Newman shows that there is always 
some relation, R, (on the intended domain) with [abstract] structure W. But if the 
only constraints on something's being the intended referent of 'R' are observational 
and structural constraints, no such criterion for distinguishing the intended referent 
of 'R' can be given, so that the notion of an intended interpretation is, in Quine's
125
phrase, provided by our background theory, and hence, cannot be a formal or 
structural notion in Russell's sense (1985: 633).
Demopoulos and Friedman correctly point out that observational and structural 
constraints are not sufficient to determine the referent of ‘R \ Indeed, Quine argues 
that a background theory is required to fix the interpretation. Yet, he also argues that 
this fixing is by no means absolute. For Quine, a background theory provides an 
interpretation to the logical form of a theory by “picking a new universe for its 
variables of quantification to range over, and assigning objects from this universe to 
the names, and choosing subsets of this universe as extensions of the one-place 
predicates, and so on.” (1969: 53-54). Even with a background theory at hand, 
however, “the intended references of the names and predicates have to be learned 
rather by ostension, or else by paraphrase in some antecedently familiar vocabulary” 
(54). But, Quine goes on, “the first of these two ways has proved inconclusive”, 
since it faces the usual problems of the indeterminacy of reference. That is, learning 
by ostension cannot uniquely identify the underlying physical objects, as the familiar 
example of the term ‘Gavagai’ illustrates. The second way then “is our only 
recourse; and such is ontological relativity” (54). In other words, paraphrasing in 
some antecedently familiar vocabulary just brings us back to where we started, for it 
is an appeal to another background theory. As Quine notes, “[since] questions of 
reference of the sort we are considering make sense only relative to a background 
language [or theory], then evidently questions of reference for the background 
language make sense in turn only relative to a further background language [or 
theory]” (54). That, of course, leads to a regress. The moral of the story is that the 
very choice of ontology, i.e. the background theory, is a relative matter.
The above illustrates that Demopoulos and Friedman’s appeal to Quine, in order to 
support their claim that we can avoid the problem of unintended interpretations by 
employing a (non-structural) background theory, rests on a serious misrepresentation 
of his work. Ontological relativity is the idea that we cannot eliminate unintended 
interpretations altogether, i.e. that we cannot uniquely pick out physical relations or 
indeed their relata. It is in this spirit that Quine says “we cannot require theories to 
be fully interpreted, except in a relative sense” (51). What we can do, according to
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him, is impose observational, behavioural, and structural constraints to narrow down 
the number of unintended interpretations.
Some peculiarities of Quine’s approach should be noted. Quine promotes the idea 
that one can reinterpret a theory, i.e. give it a new background theory, without any 
essential loss. He favours reinterpretation because he thinks that “what makes sense 
is to say not what the objects of the theory are, absolutely speaking, but how one 
theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in another” (51). In more detail:
Suppose... that in the statements which comprise the theory, that is, are true 
according to the theory, we abstract from the meanings of the nonlogical vocabulary 
and from the range of the variables. We are left with the logical form of the theory, 
or, as I shall say, the theory form. Now we may interpret this theory form anew...
(53).
Though this technique is similar to the Ramsey-sentence approach, it must not be 
confused with it. The main difference is that, unlike the Ramsey-sentence approach, 
Quine’s technique affects (by re-interpretation) both theoretical and observational 
terms. In Quine’s eyes, the difference between the two is that “Ramsey’s treatment 
brings out indeterminacy of reference not by reinterpretation, but by waiving the 
choice o f  interpretation” ([1995] 1998: 74) [my emphasis].144 Whether this marks a 
real difference is an open question that will not be pursued here.
Importantly, Quine draws an epistemological lesson that is similar to that of 
epistemic structural realism. This comes out clearly in many of his writings. For 
example in the discussion section of Grover Maxwell’s original article on structural 
realism, he makes the following comment: “One central plank in Professor 
Maxwell’s platform is that our knowledge of the external world consists in a sharing 
of structure. This is to my mind an important truth, or points towards one” (1968: 
161). A decade and a half later he repeats, “structure is what matters to a theory, and 
not the choice of its objects” (1981: 20). Also, in a more recent article he says: “The 
conclusion is that there can be no evidence for one ontology over against another, so 
long anyway as we can express a one-one correlation between them. Save the
144 Note also that Quine’s position is called ‘global structuralism’, because he advocates structuralism 
about concrete and abstract objects alike. F.P. Ramsey advocated structuralism only with regard to 
theoretical objects.
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structure and you save all” (1992: 8). Hence, far from being critical of ESR, as 
Demopoulos and Friedman have suggested, Quine’s views and especially his idea of 
a relativised background theory lend more credence to it.
Returning to URS, i.e. the underdetermination of the physical relations by the 
abstract structure, we can say that this type of underdetermination is not a real threat 
for ESR but rather another way of endorsing it. According to the epistemic structural 
realist, the limit of knowledge is description up to isomorphism. That may seem too 
little for some but this knowledge is already a considerable improvement over 
complete ignorance and, more importantly, over the knowledge claims of the 
empiricist. To understand the extent to which this is an improvement, let us contrast 
URS with all-out underdetermination. Suppose we have absolutely no information 
about the world, i.e. we know nothing of the objects that inhabit it, nothing of their 
number, none of their properties and relations, etc. This state of knowledge allows 
for a complete underdetermination of what the world is like if it were to be 
accurately described. Thus any logically possible object, property, and relation is a 
candidate for the role o f correctly representing the furniture of the universe. Consider 
what happens if we adopt ESR. Certain relations between observables, and hence 
their corresponding abstract structures, are singled out for their ability to produce 
highly accurate predictions. These abstract structures can be thought of as setting 
constraints on the type of objects, properties and relations that are suitable candidates 
for the role of correctly representing the ontology of the world. In terms of our 
discussion of intended vs unintended interpretations, this just means that the abstract 
structures will set constraints as to which background 
theories/ontologies/interpretations are allowed i.e. are consistent with the abstract 
structures.
The overall claim is not that the problem of unintended interpretations does not pose 
an epistemic obstacle. Rather, the claim is that it is a kind of obstacle that realists can 
live with and, if the structural realist or Quinean is right, one they must live with, for 
there is no empirically justifiable way in which we can uniquely pick out the 
ontology of the world. A ‘non-structural’ realist may of course object that there are 
ways in which we can justifiably eliminate underdetermination altogether or at least 
restrict it even further by appealing to non-structural considerations. This is a
128
legitimate reply but one which needs to be backed up by evidence. Until that 
happens the ‘non-structural’ realist cannot substantiate his claim that ESR cannot 
deliver as much knowledge of the world as can be had.
5. Conclusion
Newman’s objection and the associated results are not the knock-down punch to 
ESR as critics maintain. Yet, the perception that it is a knock-down punch persists in 
the wider philosophical community. In a way, this is not surprising, seeing as the 
attempt to rebut Newman’s objection is a recent phenomenon. Indeed, if my 
assessment of the various replies offered to the objection is correct, most attempts to 
rebut the objection have been largely unsuccessful.
Worrall and Zahar’s attempt represents the only exception. They convincingly argue 
that Ramsey-style ESR’s knowledge claims cannot be trivial, thereby disarming 
Newman’s objection. Things do not look as rosy for Ramsey-style ESR, however, 
when it comes to associated objections. As I have argued, whether Ramsey-style 
ESR avoids collapsing into phenomenalism/constructive empiricism depends on 
whether its advocates can justify a restriction of the domain over which the 
theoretical variables (of the Ramsey-sentence) range to unobservables. More 
damagingly, Worrall and Zahar’s narrow, and unargued for, construal of the concept 
of observational content goes against the concept’s conventional meaning. Indeed, 
their suggestion that commitment to empirical generalisations is enough to 
distinguish ESR from non-realist empiricism flies in the face of well-established 
ideas. At any rate, if support for structural realism comes through empirical 
generalisations, it is not at all clear why we need Ramsey-sentences. The only 
defence to this claim that Worrall and Zahar could muster is their assertion that 
theoretical variables in Ramsey-sentences are ‘indissolubly entangled’ with the 
observational terms. Yet, as I have argued, this assertion remains at best highly 
suggestive. The same holds for their appeal to the notions of unity and simplicity, by 
which they hope to show how we can choose between competing Ramsey-sentences.
Being endemic to the Ramsey-sentence formulation of ESR, these objections do not 
affect Russellian ESR. That leaves open the question whether this version of ESR 
can overcome the Newman objection. I hope to have shown that Russellian ESR is
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impervious to this objection. Newman unfairly attributed the simplistic claim ‘There 
exists a relation with a particular abstract structure’ to ESR. No epistemic structural 
realist accepts such a claim, which is obviously trivial. The Russellian structural 
realist, in particular, holds that we empirically identify logico-mathematical 
properties of the external world via the assumption that causally linked concrete 
observational structures and concrete physical structures share the same abstract 
structures, i.e. belong to the same isomorphism classes. To be precise, the Russellian 
ESR claim is this: There is a unique physical relation that is causally linked with this 
unique observational relation and the two are isomorphic'. Russellian ESR identifies, 
even if only up to isomorphism, a concrete physical structure by its causal role in 
producing perceptual relations in observers, i.e. in producing the concrete 
observational structures. Finally, I hope to have shown that the idea of being able to 
uniquely pick out physical relations or their relata rests on a myth and must be given 
up.
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5
HISTORICAL CASE STUDY: THE CALORIC 
THEORY OF HEAT
1. Introduction
The 1960s marked a turning point for the scientific realism debate. Thomas Kuhn 
and others undermined the orthodox positivist tradition by showing that a careful 
study of the historical record speaks against the linear accumulation of scientific 
knowledge. But, as is so often the case, reaction to the admittedly naive positivist 
view was disproportionate and resulted in an equally naive and diametrically 
opposite view, namely that there is no significant accumulation whatsoever. Realist 
philosophers like Richard Boyd and Hilary Putnam were quick to reply that not 
everything is lost in the wake of a scientific revolution. Successive scientific 
theories, they claimed, preserve the theoretical relations and referents of earlier 
theories so long as both belong to a mature science. This attempt to rescue realism 
did not last long, for in the late seventies and early eighties a more sophisticated anti­
realist argument appeared. The pessimistic induction argument, most often 
associated with Larry Laudan, is now widely considered to be one of the two main 
obstacles for realism (see, for example, Kitcher (1993: 136), Leplin (1997: 136) and 
Worrall (1982: 216); the other being the underdetermination of theories by 
evidence.145 Put simply, the argument holds that since past predictively successful 
scientific theories have eventually been discarded, we have inductive evidence that 
our current theories will also be discarded one day. This landmark attack has 
stimulated a realist counter-strategy (see, for example, Clyde Hardin and Alexander 
Rosenberg (1982), Philip Kitcher (1993), Jarrett Leplin (1997), Stathis Psillos (1994) 
and John Worrall (1989)) that is primarily concerned to show that the historical 
record provides grounds for optimism. More precisely, it is argued that some 
theoretical components survive theory change, and that only those are responsible for 
any success enjoyed by the rejected theories. This strategy is now the mainstream 
approach for scientific realists.
145 The pessimistic induction argument can be viewed as a constructive demonstration of 
underdetermination since the new theory, despite being incompatible with the old theory, entails its 
correct empirical consequences.
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The aim of this chapter will be to address RP2 and SRP2. That is, I will investigate 
whether theoretical components, structural or not, survive scientific revolutions and, 
if  so, whether they are indeed solely responsible for the success of abandoned 
theories. Of course, to settle this issue in a satisfactory way is an enormous task, 
since it would require a detailed analysis of all the relevant historical episodes. For 
this reason, I have chosen a more tractable problem by limiting my investigation to a 
single case study, namely the caloric theory of heat. This choice reflects three 
considerations:
A) The caloric theory appears on Laudan’s list as one of those successful theories 
that have been abandoned together with their central theoretical terms.
B) It is a case that has not yet been investigated by structural realists.
C) It has received significant attention in recent literature. Therefore, it will be easier 
to compare any structural realist claims to those of other parties in the scientific 
realism debate.
The chapter will unfold as follows: I will first present a historical account of the 
caloric theory of heat. Then, I will proceed to evaluate claims made by realists and 
anti-realists with regard to the caloric theory and its central theoretical terms. 
Subsequently, I will examine whether epistemic structural realism can make better 
sense of the history of the caloric. Even though my investigation and results will be 
restricted to this case study, whenever reasonable I will try to extrapolate more wide- 
ranging results about the history of science. Indeed, the final topic in this chapter will 
be a general assessment of the import of historical arguments in the scientific realism 
debate.
2. The Rise and Fall of the Caloric Theory of Heat
The Pre-Caloric Era
Chemistry and the study of heat were in their infancy prior to the eighteenth century. 
The Aristotelian tradition, despite its sterility, was dominant for centuries. According 
to this tradition, there were four elements or fundamental substances, namely earth,
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water, air and fire. Unsurprisingly, phenomena of heat were understood with 
reference to the element of fire. After all, it was common knowledge that objects 
could be heated by placing them on fire. The Atomists and the Epicureans had 
roughly the same conception, viewing heat/fire as a substance with weight.146 Thus, 
in both traditions ‘the materiality of heat hypothesis’ was central. Needless to say, 
the explanations furnished under either tradition were crude and qualitative in nature.
It was only with the rise of alchemy that some limited progress was achieved. 
Despite the magical underpinnings of their views, the alchemists developed several 
techniques that contributed to the advance of chemistry. They were, for example, 
good at distillation and the production of concentrated acids, alcohols, and perfumes. 
They were also very good at metallurgy, especially on amalgams and on acid/metal 
reactions.
In the seventeenth century, Robert Boyle attacked the four elements of the 
Aristotelian tradition and popularised mechanical philosophy. His mechanical world­
view took particles as elementary and explained their behaviour through forces such 
as gravity. Chemistry could not benefit from this world-view, however, since at the 
level of elementary particles there was not much one could predict about 
macroscopic phenomena, which constituted the sole domain of chemistry at the time. 
Nonetheless, some advances in the study of heat phenomena were made, for 
example, in the studies of adiabatic phenomena and the construction of instruments 
(see Robert Fox (1971: 41)).
The eighteenth century brought with it an excitement about the study of the nature of 
air and of combustion. The Aristotelian idea that air is one of four elements was 
unambiguously rejected. Instead it was conjectured that air is composed of different 
gases and that heating eventually turns matter into a gaseous state. Stephen Hales 
introduced methods for collecting and measuring the volume of gases, prompting the 
development of pneumatic chemistry. The experiments of Joseph Black, Henry 
Cavendish, Joseph Priestley, and Carl Wilhelm Scheele progressively identified 
various gases, each with its own set of properties. Black, for example, discovered
146 For more on the Atomistic and Epicurean conceptions o f heat, with an emphasis on Lucretius’ 
work, see Jesus M. Montserrat and Luis Navarro (2000).
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some of the properties of carbon dioxide, CO2, and gave it the name ‘fixed air’. 
Cavendish did the same with hydrogen and called it ‘inflammable air’. Thus, one of 
the main achievements of this period was the idea that ‘air’ has various 
manifestations, i.e. it is not just one kind of thing or substance.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Georg Ernst Stahl developed the 
phlogiston theory of combustion. ‘Phlogiston’, a Greek term which means ‘that 
which is set on fire’, was conceived of as the physical manifestation of heat. The 
materiality of heat hypothesis thus found a new carrier in phlogiston. Phlogiston was 
thought to reside in all combustible objects and to be released during burning. The 
more heat given off by an object, the more phlogiston was taken to be contained 
within that object. Among the theory’s main advocates was Joseph Priestley. He 
managed to isolate oxygen, shortly after Scheele’s independent discovery, but also to 
recognise its central role in combustion. To explain why objects bum more 
vigorously in the presence of oxygen, Priestley postulated that the gas that we now 
call ‘oxygen’ was entirely devoid of phlogiston and was therefore more receptive of 
the phlogiston present in objects than ordinary air. He thus appropriately named it 
‘dephlogisticated air’.
The Caloric Theory o f Heat
Lavoisier’s role was pivotal in discrediting the phlogiston theory of combustion. 
More important for our aim, however, was Lavoisier’s central role in proposing and 
developing the theory that in one sense replaced it, namely the caloric theory of 
heat.147 As its name suggests, the theory’s concerns were not confined to 
combustion.148 Lavoisier’s first steps towards the formulation of the theory can be 
traced back to 1766. However, a reasonably detailed account of his theory only 
appears in print about a decade later in the Memoires of the French Academy of
147 For a detailed account o f the relation between Lavoisier’s theory and his rejection o f the phlogiston 
theory see Morris (1972: 16-17).
148 Morris describes the many functions o f the theory as follows: “A single theoretical framework 
accounts for a vast array o f heat phenomena including expansion and contraction, changes o f state or 
form, the role o f heat as an agent in promoting new chemical combinations, and temperature changes 
in chemical reactions, especially combustion and respiration” (1972: 35). Fox concentrates on the 
caloric theory o f gases, though he explains that “[f]or the period covered in [his] book it would be 
quite impossible to separate the study o f gases from that o f heat, because from the late 1770s to the 
1850’s acceptance o f the static theory [of gases] generally implied belief in the imponderable, highly 
elastic fluid o f heat, or caloric” (1971: 2).
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Sciences.149 Lavoisier coined the term ‘calorique’ sometime before 1784 -  though it 
was used in print for the first time in 1787 (see Fox (1971: 6) -  and he listed caloric 
on the first table of chemical elements.150 The theory blossomed in the first half of 
the 19th century, after the death of Lavoisier, partly due to the development of more 
precise methods of calculation and measurement. During this period it came to 
dominate most of the work done in the study of heat.
Somewhat like phlogiston, the caloric is thought of as the physical manifestation of 
fire or heat, i.e. it is thought of as the substance responsible for phenomena of heat. It 
is also thought to be an imponderable, i.e. imperceptible or at least hardly 
perceptible, and almost weightless fluid. Given its imperceptibility, one may well 
ask, how can we make any inferences regarding its presence? The most common 
answer is that it is intimately related with temperature, the latter of course being a 
measurable quantity. More precisely, it is thought that the addition of caloric to a 
body raises its temperature, while its subtraction lowers it. Not all properties ascribed 
to the caloric were as widely accepted as the ones just mentioned. The following list, 
therefore, does not reflect a consensus, but rather those properties that were 
discussed the most at the time: (1) it is an imponderable almost weightless elastic 
fluid, (2) it is composed of indestructible particles, (3) its particles are mutually 
repulsive but attracted by ordinary particles, (4) its accumulation in a body is the sole 
reason for the sensation of heat, (5) its combination with, or release from, ordinary 
matter is responsible for changes of state, (6) it is a conserved quantity.
Independent developments and ideas facilitated the birth of the caloric theory.151 
First and foremost, the theory subscribes to the materiality of heat hypothesis, an 
idea that as we have seen predates the caloric theory by at least two millennia. This 
hypothesis was certainly prevalent all through the eighteenth century, taking centre
149 For a thorough account o f  the development o f the theory see Morris (1972).
150 Etymologically, the term originates from the Latin ‘calor’ which means heat. It can, for example, 
be found in Lucretius’ poem De Rerum Natura. Lavoisier, together with Guyton de Morveau, Claude 
Louis Berthollet, and Antoine Francis de Fourcroy systematised the terminology o f chemistry in 
their Methode de Nomenclature Chimique. His Traite Elementaire de Chimie offered the first table of 
elements, many o f which were to comprise the building blocks o f chemistry. Lavoisier also brought 
about the modem notion o f chemical element. Indeed, for this and other contributions he is considered 
one o f the founders o f modem chemistry.
151 For a succinct account o f  which aspects o f  the theory were Lavoisier’s innovations and which were 
not see Morris (1972: 30-34).
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stage in the works of reputable scientists such as Willem ‘sGravesande, Wilhelm 
Homberg and Nicolas and Louis Lemery. The most marked theory advocating the 
materiality of heat, well known by Lavoisier’s time, was that of Herman Boerhaave 
(1732). According to this theory, fire was composed of weightless particles, whose 
self-repulsive property resulted in elasticity. These ideas eventually resurface in both 
the phlogiston and caloric theories.152 Boerhaave’s theory, however, departed from 
the caloric theory in one important respect.153 Fire particles, Boerhaave held, are in 
constant motion, a motion that is ultimately responsible for phenomena of heat. 
More precisely, the motion of fire particles caused and sustained the motion of 
ordinary particles, the latter being directly responsible for phenomena of heat (see 
Fox (1971: 12-13). Despite the popularity of this picture of heat amongst his 
predecessors, Lavoisier opted for a static view of caloric particles where the accrual 
of caloric particles alone would explain the raising of a body’s temperature -  
property four on the above list.
Fox, justifiably in my opinion, notes that “[t]he strength of eighteenth-century belief 
in the materiality of fire is undoubtedly one of the most important elements in the 
background to the emergence of the caloric theory of heat in the 1770s” (14). At the 
same time, he admits that this “does not constitute the whole story” (14). Another 
crucial part of the story concerns the development and eventual acceptance of 
theories of electricity, magnetism, and light in the time leading up to the emergence 
of the caloric theory. One prominent example is Benjamin Franklin’s theory of 
electricity. Theories like Franklin’s postulated imponderable fluids, whose properties 
had much in common with caloric. Aside from the conception of electricity, 
magnetism, and light as fluids composed of weightless particles, there was also the 
idea that a mutually repulsive force might dictate their behaviour.
These ideas eventually led fire-theorists to the view that fire itself is a fluid. Two 
important historical figures in this context were Bryan Higgins, a physician and
152 According to Morris, the majority o f chemists in the eighteenth century considered the self- 
repulsive force between fire particles on par with gravity. Apart from Boerhaave, Morris also cites 
Pierre Joseph Macquer as a theorist who adopted the view o f fire particles having a self-repulsive 
property.
153 The idea o f motion generating heat was at least partly in line with the caloric theory’s main 
competitor in the nineteenth century, i.e. the vibratory theory o f heat, to be discussed in the next 
subsection.
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chemist, and William Cleghom, a professor of anatomy. Though working 
independently, they proposed theories of heat that bear strong resemblances to 
Lavoisier’s theory. Higgins, for example, described fire in 1775 as an elastic fluid, 
and claimed that its elasticity was due to repulsive forces between its particles. 
Cleghom’s conception of heat, found in his 1779 dissertation for the degree of MD, 
bears an even closer resemblance to Lavoisier’s theory. He describes fire as a fluid 
with all the essential properties of the caloric listed above.154 A case can thus be 
made that at least Cleghom had independently invented the caloric theory at roughly 
the same time as Lavoisier.
The exact relationship between the works of Lavoisier, Higgins and Cleghom is not 
entirely clear. Fox claims that Cleghom was definitely ignorant of Lavoisier’s and 
Higgins’ works. But there is no indication whether Higgins and Lavoisier were 
aware of each other’s work or of the work of Cleghom. What seems certain is that all 
three had knowledge of the various fluid theories available at the time. As Fox 
indicates, given the prominence of fluid theories during the latter half of eighteenth 
century, “it is inconceivable that Cleghom (or Lavoisier and Higgins, for that matter) 
would not have been thoroughly familiar with them” (16). Indeed, he points out that 
Lavoisier had acknowledged the influence of Boerhaave and Franklin. Fox also 
indicates that Cleghom was familiar with the work of Boerhaave though he says 
nothing about Higgins’s familiarity. All in all, we can say that the developments in 
fluid theories as well as Boerhaave’s theory of fire facilitated the emergence of the 
caloric theory.
In addition to the six properties listed above, we also need to consider a few central 
concepts that had a lasting impact on chemistry. Though not his own invention, 
Lavoisier distinguished between (chemically) combined caloric, i.e. caloric found “in 
bodies by affinity or elective attraction, so as to form part of the substance of the 
body”, and free caloric “which is not combined in any manner with any other body”
1541 could not find any indication whether Cleghom subscribed to the sixth property, viz. the 
conservation o f fire particles. It is worth pointing out, however, that the second property, i.e. that 
caloric particles are indestructible, together with the assumption that there is a fixed number o f caloric 
particles, guarantees their conservation.
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(1790: 19).155 In its combined form it was undetectable but became detectable, 
typically via a thermometer, when it was set free. Presumably then, whenever a body 
was producing an increase in a thermometer’s reading, it was freeing up caloric.
Lavoisier’s distinction, which first appears in print in 1772, seems to have been 
formulated independently of Black’s similar distinction postulated about a decade 
earlier.156 Black’s distinction was prompted by observations that, contrary to 
common-sense, melting ice maintains the same temperature. To explain this, he 
distinguished between latent and sensible forms of heat. According to Black, when 
ice melts the caloric is converted, i.e. not destroyed, into a state that cannot have an 
effect on the thermometer, i.e. latent heat.157 By contrast, sensible heat is conceived 
of as being able to affect the thermometer. Thus, both Black’s distinction and 
Lavoisier’s make use of the idea that one state of heat affects the thermometer while 
the other one does not. One difference between the two conceptions is that, contra 
Lavoisier’s conception, Black seems, at least until 1772, not to have thought of latent 
heat as heat chemically combined with ordinary matter.158
Another important concept that was to have a lasting effect on chemistry is that of 
heat capacity. As he notes in his manuscripts, Black started thinking about the 
concept of heat capacity around 1760.159 Black first noticed that, contrary to the 
mainstream view, “the quantities of heat which different kinds of matter must 
receive, to reduce them to an equilibrium with one another, or to raise their 
temperature by an equal number of degrees, are not in proportion to the quantity of 
matter in each” (1803: 79). In considering experiments conducted by Boerhaave, 
Gabriel Daniel Fahrenheit, and George Martine, Black realised that the same mass of
155 Morris indicates that “[t]he idea that heat matter can exist in two distinct states, free or combined, 
was used by his predecessors and contemporaries in explaining various phenomena” (1972: 31). In a 
footnote on the same page, he cites these as being Macquer, Gabriel Francis Venel, and Guillaume 
Francis Rouelle. It is also interesting to note that in the posthumously published Memoires de 
Chimie, written in the years 1792-3, Lavoisier takes the free and combined states o f caloric to 
represent the ends o f the spectrum, everything in between being represented by a mixed third state 
that he calls ‘the adherent state’ (see Morris (1972: 25)).
156 According to Morris (1972: 27-8), it seems that Lavoisier’s distinction was not based on Black’s 
since there is no indication that Lavoisier was familiar with Black’s work prior to his postulation of  
the distinction. Chang mentions also “the independent contribution o f Johan Carl Wilcke” to the 
discovery o f latent heat (forthcoming: 2).
157 Notice that this provides tacit support for the conservation o f matter (including the matter o f heat).
158 See Morris (1972: 27-28).
159 See his posthumous (1803). Niels H. de V. Heathcote and Douglas McKie (1935) provide a 
comprehensive account o f the discovery o f the concept.
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different substances require different quantities of heat for their temperature to be 
raised by the same number of degrees. From this he argued that different substances 
have different capacities for heat. More exactly, for unit masses of any two 
substances that have unequal capacities for heat, when starting from the same 
temperature and aiming to increase their temperature by the same degree, the one 
with the lesser capacity will require less heat. In his own words:
We must, therefore, conclude that different bodies, although they be of the same 
size, or even the same weight, when they are reduced to the same temperature or 
degree of heat, whatever that may be, may contain very different quantities of the 
matter of heat; which different quantities are necessary to bring them to this level, 
or equilibrium, with one another (83).
In 1780, Jean Hyacinthe de Magellan coined the term ‘chaleur specifique’, ‘specific 
heat’ in English, to convey the concept of heat capacity. Today we distinguish the 
concept of heat capacity from that of specific heat. The former is defined as the 
quantity of heat required to raise the temperature of a given substance by one degree. 
The latter is defined as the heat capacity of the substance per gram, i.e. the quantity 
of heat needed to raise the temperature of one gram of substance by 1°C. In some 
contexts, the terms ‘heat capacity’ and ‘specific heat’ are used interchangeably.
The view that caloric could be found in two forms, i.e. latent and sensible, soon 
became a major point of contention amongst the caloricists. Lavoisier and Pierre 
Simon de Laplace led those favourable to the distinction, while William Irvine, a 
student of Black’s in Glasgow who helped him perform experiments on latent heat, 
and Adair Crawford, a physician who developed Irvine’s views, led those against it. 
Irvine thought that there was only one state of caloric, and that the amount of caloric 
in a given object was the product of its absolute temperature, the relative amounts of 
heat present in equivalent weights of different substances at any particular 
temperature, and heat capacity. He explained away the state of latent heat by arguing 
that phenomena associated with it were merely due to variations in the heat capacity 
of a substance. An analogy that is often employed to make sense of Irvine’s 
explanation involves a bucket of water: As the bucket widens the level of water goes 
down and thus more water is required just to keep the water on the same level. 
Similarly with latent heat phenomena, when ice melts into water, there is an increase
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in the heat capacity leading to more heat being required just to maintain the same 
temperature.
Chang (forthcoming: 4) notes that although Irvine’s theory of heat capacity did not 
remain a serious contender beyond the early 19th century, his legacy was reflected in 
the subsequent debates.160 One important aspect of this legacy was his work on 
specifying an exact relationship between heat and temperature capable of generating 
quantitative, albeit inaccurate, predictions.161 Prior to this work, quantitative 
predictions were virtually unheard of in theories of heat. Lavoisier, for example, 
claimed that the quantity of heat contained in aeriform state was more than that 
contained in liquid state and even more than that contained in solid state (see Morris 
(1972: 15, 34)).
As indicated above, another eminent figure who advocated the caloric theory was 
Laplace. He favoured a Newtonian foundation to the caloric theory. This was 
reflected in his demand that caloric particles repelled one another but were attracted 
by ordinary matter. A universal repulsive force, similar in spirit to Newton’s law of 
gravitation, was conceived between the caloric particles. The following colourful 
description by Stephen Brush and Gerald Holton gives a few more details of what 
exactly was involved:
If heat is applied to a material object, the caloric may be pictured as diffusing 
rapidly throughout the body and clinging in a shell or atmosphere around every one 
of the corpuscles. If these corpuscles (whose caloric shells repel one another) are 
free to move apart, as indeed they are in a gas, they will tend to disperse, and more 
strongly so the greater their crowding or the heat applied... If, however, a heated 
object is in solid or liquid form, the mutual attraction among the corpuscles 
themselves (considered to be a gravitational one) so predominates that the caloric 
atmospheres can provide mutual repulsion sufficient only for the well-known slight 
expansion on heating. Or at any rate, the attraction predominates until enough 
caloric has been supplied for eventual melting or vaporisation ([1952]2001: 235).
Under this Newtonian framework, rough explanations could now be given. For 
example, as Brush and Holton point out, the expansion of body with temperature 
could be explained as the result of the repulsive force between caloric particles. In 
sum, the caloric theory became closely associated with this Newtonian picture, an
160 Chang (forthcoming) lists John Dalton, Sir John Leslie, and John Murray as notable Irvinists.
161 For more on this see Chang (forthcoming: 3-5), Fox (1971:27-39) and Morris (1972: 13)).
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association that, as we will shortly see, would mean that the latter’s eventual demise 
would hasten the demise of the former.
The Vibratory Theory o f Heat162
The idea that heat is due to the motion of particles can be traced to the Atomists and 
Epicureans. Whether it survived through the centuries or was reinvented is not 
clear.163 What we do know is that it started gaining prominence again in the sixteenth 
century. Francis Bacon, for example, remarked that ‘heat itself, its essence and its 
quiddity, is motion and nothing else’. Galileo, Boyle, Hooke, and Newton all agreed. 
Daniel Bernoulli had proposed a vibratory theory of gases in 1738, but it went 
almost completely unnoticed for a century or so. More popular in the eighteenth 
century were hybrid theories, combining elements from both material and vibratory 
accounts. These postulated that heat phenomena were due to particles of heat in 
constant motion. We have already seen an example of this type of theory in 
Boerhaave.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the main proponent of the vibratory theory is 
Sir Benjamin Thompson, who is better known as ‘Count Rumford’. The central tenet 
of the vibratory theory is that the motion or vibration of ordinary matter particles 
produces heat. Yet, the exact nature of the mechanism remains unspecified. Rumford 
admits as much when he says “I am very far from pretending to know how, or by 
what means, or mechanical contrivance, that particular kind of motion in bodies, 
which is supposed to constitute heat, is excited, continued and propagated” (1798: 
99). In an effort to justify this lack of knowledge, he cites Newton as being in an 
analogous situation. That is, not knowing its ultimate mechanism, did not bar 
Newton from articulating the law of gravity.
Rumford’s sustained attack on the caloric theories lasted three decades and was often 
backed up by experiments. One of his most famous observations came in 1798 while 
overseeing the boring of cannons in Munich. Rumford noticed that the metal chips
162 The vibratory theory is also referred to as the ‘mechanical’, ‘dynamical’, or ‘kinetic’ theory of 
heat. As in the case o f the caloric theory, there was more than one vibratory theory.
163 Given the pervasive propagation o f ancient Greek and Roman texts throughout the history o f  
western philosophy it seems more probable that the view o f heat as motion was merely inherited, i.e. 
not reinvented, by philosophers o f the sixteenth century.
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produced in the boring had a high temperature. The explanation according to the 
caloric theory would have been that caloric was being squeezed out of the cannon in 
the boring process. That is, the chips were gaining heat from the cannon and so the 
latter should have been losing heat and, consequently, temperature. Against this 
explanation, he found that the cannon was also very hot. It thus seemed to him that 
more caloric was being released than could have been contained. Indeed, Rumford 
generalised that, in order to sustain friction, the amount of heat produced would have 
to be inexhaustible. He concluded:
It is hardly necessary to add, that any thing which any insulated body, or system of 
bodies, can continue to furnish without limitation, cannot possibly be a material 
substance', and it appears to me extremely difficult, if not quite impossible, to form 
any distinct idea of any thing, capable of being excited, and communicated, in the 
manner the heat was excited and communicated in these experiments, except it be 
MOTION (1798: 99) [original emphasis].
For the caloric theory to hold, Rumford claimed, a limitless outpouring of caloric 
would be required. No material body is limitless, and so the cause of heat could not 
be material. By contrast, if heat was the result of the vibration of particles, then the 
heating up of both cannon and boring instrument could be more easily 
accommodated and explained. It was only necessary to assume that the motion was 
transferred from the borer to the boring instrument and from there on to the cannon.
One problem with Rumford’s reasoning is that it is based on the strictly speaking 
false claim that heat can be produced by friction inexhaustibly. Obviously, friction 
between two or more bodies has to stop after some finite period of time due to the 
diminution of the bodies involved. This idealisation notwithstanding, Rumford’s 
claim remains threatening to the caloricists, since a great deal of heat would still be 
produced in such experiments. The question then becomes whether the caloricists 
could explain the presence of such quantities of heat in a non-ad-hoc manner, a 
question whose answer remains unclear. Rumford’s argument that, contra what a 
caloricist would expect, both the cannon and the boring instrument were gaining heat 
seems more effective. Yet, even against this argument, the claim could be made that, 
for some reason, caloric was squeezed out of both cannon and boring instrument. 
Whether a claim like this could be explained in a non-ad-hoc way is again unclear. 
The fact is that Rumford’s two arguments were not knockdown arguments.
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Unaware of the experiments performed by Rumford, Humphry Davy conducted his 
own experiments and reached more or less the same conclusion. According to Sir 
Harold Hartley, a modem historian, Davy was “anxious to decide between the rival 
theories, that heat consists of an elastic fluid called caloric, or is due to a peculiar 
motion of the particles of matter” (1971: 94). One of his most famous experiments 
involved the rubbing of two plates of ice. It was expected that not enough caloric 
was present to melt the ice yet the friction alone resulted in the production of 
sufficient heat. In another experiment, he melted wax in a vacuum using heat 
produced by the friction of a wheel rubbing against some metal. The apparatus sat on 
top of a block of ice, maintaining a temperature of zero degrees Celsius. He argued 
that no heat could enter the system and concluded that heat was the result of the 
vibration of ordinary matter particles.
Davy reported the results in his first publication (1799), resolutely concluding that 
caloric does not exist. Yet, as numerous authors have pointed out, Davy’s conclusion 
is a non sequitur.164 Just like with Rumford’s experiments the evidence did not 
conclusively refute the caloric theory. The caloricist might not have expected the ice 
to melt under such circumstances, but it was hardly the kind of evidence that was 
irreconcilable. All that the caloricist needed to dispute was how well the 
experimental set up was insulated. In other words, the caloricist could always claim 
that caloric was leaking into the apparatus. As before, whether this claim could be 
explained in a non-ad-hoc way is not altogether clear.
Among the many experiments Rumford performed, some dealt with conduction and 
convection.165 By conduction he understood the transmission of heat via direct 
contact between particles, while by convection he understood the transmission of 
heat via the motion of particles in a fluid. Indeed, Rumford thought that heat in air 
and water, as well as probably other liquids and gases, was transmitted only via 
convection, i.e. not via conduction. His justification was that the molecules of liquids 
and gases are constantly moving, and so would not be able to sustain the
164 Brush and Holton ([1952J2001: 237). Roller (1950: 86-87) argues that Davy’s experiment of 
rubbing plates o f ice was flawed.
165 See Chang (forthcoming: 12-14).
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transmission of heat via direct contact between molecules. Among the experiments 
Rumford employed to support his view, one involved the heating of the surface of a 
vat of water. With this experiment, he showed that there was no detectable increase 
of temperature below the surface. If conduction could operate in liquids then the heat 
on the surface would be propagated below via direct contact between the molecules.
More precise experiments revealed a slow conduction of heat in liquids.166 These 
results were compatible with the caloric theory, since, for caloricists, conduction just 
meant the flow of caloric between molecules. In other words, there was nothing in 
their theory that precluded conduction in liquids. Rumford must have seen the 
acceptance of conduction in liquids as giving tacit support to the caloric theory. In 
what probably was an ad-hoc move to avoid this indirect support for the caloric 
theory, he argued that the phenomena presumed to be due to conduction in liquids 
were actually due to the radiation of heat.
Phenomena of radiant heat, however, were more of a hazard than a refuge for the 
vibratory theory. The reason was the perceived relationship between heat and light at 
the time. Many scientists in the first half of the nineteenth century thought of light 
and heat as qualitatively identical entities. A consequence of this conception was the 
view that the nature of heat depended on the nature of light, which, at the time, was 
generally regarded as particulate. Independent experiments carried out by William 
Herschel, Macedonio Melloni, and James Forbes suggested that radiant heat exhibits 
all the properties of light, i.e. properties such as reflection, refraction, and 
polarization.167 Through the independent work of caloricists Marc-Auguste Pictet 
and Pierre Prevost, whose experiments and explanations on radiant heat in the 1790s 
attained great prominence, the caloric theory gained the upper hand in this domain of 
phenomena.
166 Chang (forthcoming: 13) notes that the caloricist John Leslie, among others, rejected Rumford’s 
claims.
167 Brush and Holton indicate that, at the time, there was no distinction between radiant heat and other 
forms o f  heat and “it was therefore believed that any conclusion about the nature o f radiant heat 
would be valid for the nature o f heat in general” ([1952]2001: 238). By transitivity, since the nature o f  
radiant heat and the nature o f light do not seem all that different, it was assumed that the nature of  
heat and light must not be all that different.
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The Demise o f the Caloric Theory
The current view in the historiography of science is that Rumford’s and Davy’s 
experiments did little to overturn the caloric theory of heat. Historical facts 
notwithstanding, one needs to consider whether the evidence presented at the turn of 
the nineteenth century was strong enough to refute the caloric theory or any material 
theory of heat for that matter. It is certainly true that the caloric theory together with 
its auxiliary assumptions was in conflict with the friction experiments, since it 
rejected the idea that heat is merely due to motion.169 This evidence was not 
sufficient to refute hybrid theories, like Boerhaave’s, since they could employ 
explanations that ultimately relied on the motion of fire particles. In other words, to 
the extent that the vibratory theory could explain friction phenomena hybrid theories 
could do so, too. More importantly, even the caloric theory’s inability to square itself 
with such phenomena did not make a strong case for its abandonment since the 
vibratory theory also faced several anomalies. For example, the vibratory theory 
could not yet explain phenomena that involved the conservation of heat in 
mixtures.170 This was partly due to the vibratory theory’s undeveloped state, which 
meant that it was unable to gain the upper hand. Overall, we can say that, at least 
until after the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the reasons to replace the caloric 
with the vibratory theory were not sufficiently strong.
The question as to why the caloric theory was eventually abandoned has not been 
answered in a satisfactory way.171 Various explanations that are neither exclusive nor 
exhaustive have been put forward over the years. Fox, for example, notes that the 
rejection of the Laplacian approach to science after 1815, which was based on 
Newtonian principles and advocated belief in imponderable fluids, was “a major 
cause of the discrediting of the caloric theory” (1971: 2). Another development that 
cast doubt on the caloric theory was the electrochemical theory of Jon Jacob 
Berzelius. His theory explained phenomena of heat that arise in chemical reactions
168 See, for example, Fox (1971: 4) and Morris (1972: 33). The older view that saw Rumford’s 
experiments as crucial was propagated by Tyndall (1863).
169 It is worth reminding ourselves here o f Duhem’s point about the inability o f testing theories in 
isolation. The friction experiments cannot be conclusive, i.e. crucial experiments, against the caloric 
theory unless we can establish the innocence o f all the auxiliaries accompanying it.
170 See Brush and Holton ([1952J2001: 238).
171 Fox, whose historical study o f the caloric is the most definitive, offers only a patchwork o f reasons 
for the theory’s demise.
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as having an electrical origin. For the first time, the hegemony of the caloric theory 
in providing explanations for this domain of phenomena was challenged. Berzelius’ 
theory vied with the caloric theory for the provision of explanations of phenomena 
involving chemical heat.
As we have seen, an altogether different explanation for the fall of the caloric theory 
invokes the close relationship attributed to light and heat. When the Newtonian 
particle theory of light, which took light as a substance, held sway, it was easier to 
think of heat as a substance, too. Eventually, however, the tables were turned. By the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century, Fresnel’s successful wave theory of light 
emerged as the victor, replacing the particle theory. A consequence of this change 
was the abandonment of the view that light was a substance, thereby making it easier 
to espouse a non-substance theory of heat.172 This can be seen, for example, in Sadi 
Carnot’s posthumously published notes, where the acceptance of the wave theory of 
light is taken as evidence in support of the vibratory theory of heat.
Whatever the exact reasons, the outcome was certainly fatal. Fox summarises the 
attitude of scientists at the end of the caloric theory’s life nicely:
...the result in the 1820s was not a sudden turning towards our modem vibrational 
theory but a period of generally acknowledged agnosticism with regard to the 
nature of heat, a period that lasted until the caloric theory was finally abandoned 
about 1850 (3-4).
During this period, the research potential of the caloric theory continued to decline 
until it was relegated to a merely pedagogical role. The advent of energy 
conservation, supplanting heat conservation, dealt the final blow to the caloric 
theory. Experiments performed by James Prescott Joule confirmed the principle of 
energy conservation by illustrating the interconvertibility of heat and work. These 
experiments eventually paved the way for the vibratory theory’s coming to
172 According to Fresnel’s theory, light is transmitted through vibrations in an all-pervading elastic 
medium, the ether. Once this story was accepted it was easier to accept the idea that radiant heat was, 
in a manner similar, the result o f vibrations o f ordinary matter particles. One needs to recognise, 
however, that this similarity between light waves and radiant heat could also be accommodated by a 
hybrid theory, by supposing that it is the fire particles that are transmitted through the ether. For an in- 
depth account o f the relationship between theories o f light and theories o f heat during this period see 
Brush (1970).
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dominance in the 1850s. By that time there was no credible resistance offered by the 
caloric theory.
3. Scientific Realism and the Caloric
Laudan criticises the connection that realists make between success on the one hand 
and approximate truth and reference on the other. That is, he criticises the inference 
from the explanatory and predictive success of a theory to its approximate truth and 
referential success. Laudan believes he has shown that there are plenty of past 
theories that invalidate that inference.173 More pertinent to the historical context of 
this chapter, Laudan argues that the caloric theory, along with other fluid theories of 
the nineteenth century, is an example of a successful theory whose central theoretical 
concept turned out to be non-referring (1981: 26-27). In this section, I will examine 
the realist reactions to Laudan’s claim.
Is ‘Caloric’ a Referential Term?
Attempts to argue that theoretical terms employed in the past can be interpreted as 
referring to entities posited by current scientific theories originate with Putnam 
(1975; 1978). These attempts go hand in hand with causal theories of reference. 
According to the latter, although scientific theories come and go, some theoretical 
terms latch onto real entities, properties, and relations by virtue of causal chains 
stretching back to the original dubbing of the object, regardless of whether the 
descriptions employed were correct.174 As Boyd (2002) indicates, many, if not most, 
scientific realists now accept a causal theory of reference that incorporates 
descriptive elements (see, for example, Kitcher (1993), Papineau (1987), and Psillos 
(1999)). These hybrid accounts go by the name ‘causal-descriptivism’.
Realising that the rampant disregard for descriptions can only lead to trouble, 
Putnam augmented the causal theory of reference with a principle of charity (a.k.a. 
the principle of benefit of the doubt). In short, the principle allows us to brand an old 
theoretical term referential if the descriptions associated with it do not diverge
173 In fact, he construes the inference as two inferences, i.e. one from explanatory and predictive 
success to approximate truth, the other from explanatory and predictive success to referential success.
174 O f course, the dubbing in these cases cannot be performed indexically, since the terms purportedly 
refer to unobservables. It is assumed, however, that the dubbing can be performed through the effects 
unobservables have.
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unreasonably from those of its modem counterpart. Are realists advocating this 
principle charitable enough to include the caloric in their list of referential terms? 
Putnam does not directly answer this question. He could be understood as implying 
that it is not unreasonable to take ‘caloric’ as a referring term when he says, speaking 
also on behalf of Boyd, “we do not carry [the principle of the benefit of doubt] so far 
as to say that ‘phlogiston’ referred” (1978: 25).175 Also adhering to the principle of 
charity but being more resolute, Hardin and Rosenberg say that “[i]f one is to draw 
such a line in chemistry, for example, it would most plausibly come with the 
publication of Lavoisier’s Elements o f Chemistry and thus would exclude phlogiston 
theory as a counterexample” (1982: 612).
Many have pointed out that the approach resulting from the combination of the 
causal theory and the principle of charity is far-fetched and suffers from several 
difficulties (see, for instance, Laudan (1984), Cumminskey (1992) and Worrall 
(1994)).176 I will here only briefly mention the most serious one. If we allow 
reference fixing in the above way, many past terms can, with a little help, qualify as 
referring to entities postulated by current theories. That is, if at least one description 
associated with a past term is partially correct by our lights, referential success or 
failure depends on how reasonably close people think that description is from the 
aggregate of descriptions associated with the current term. Needless to say, opinions 
vary on what is partially correct and reasonably close. As I pointed out in the 
previous paragraph, Putnam leaves open the issue whether ‘caloric’ refers, whereas 
Hardin and Rosenberg are convinced that it does refer. Indeed, even ‘phlogiston’ can 
be made to refer under some interpretations. Phlogiston was thought of as the cause 
of combustion, a role afterwards assumed by oxygen. If one takes the description 
‘cause of combustion’ as reasonably close to the descriptions associated with the 
term ‘oxygen’ today, it could be argued that ‘phlogiston’ referred all along to the 
element oxygen. The problem is that it is certainly a desideratum of an adequate 
account of reference and scientific theory change to able to provide unambiguous 
answers to questions of referential failure or success.
175 This reading o f Putnam presupposes that he classified the phlogiston and caloric theories as 
belonging to the same science. Only thus, would we be justified to take his comments as implying that 
the caloric theory was mature, and, consequently, that the ‘caloric’ was a referring term.
176 Worrall’s article is particularly relevant, for he rejects Hardin and Rosenberg’s claims in the 
context o f defending structural realism.
148
Given the above specification of the properties ascribed to it by its advocates, I 
cannot see how one can reasonably maintain that the term ‘caloric’ refers to any 
currently accepted entity. Not a single one of its essential properties (see the list in 
subsection ‘The Caloric Theory of Heat’ above) has survived to the present. Unless 
we help ourselves to an unrealistically charitable understanding of continuity of 
reference, the caloric must be accepted as a paradigmatic case of reference failure. I 
do not think existing accounts of reference, including causal-descriptive ones, offer 
persuasive reasons why the term ‘caloric’ refers to a type of entity that we today call 
‘heat energy’. The term ‘caloric’ simply does not seem to refer to anything. Indeed, 
as we shall soon see, some realists accept the term’s reference failure and seek other 
ways to protect their turf from Laudan.
Is Caloric Central to the Caloric Theory ?
Hardin and Rosenberg (1982) were among the first to argue that realists need not tie 
the approximate truth of a theory to referential success. More recently, Psillos has 
given a new twist to this approach by arguing that not all instances of abandoned 
terms within successful, and presumably approximately true, theories should be 
alarming to the realist, for at least some of them are simply not central to those 
theories. He thus strives to separate referential success from a theory’s predictive and 
explanatory success by arguing that the latter need not entail the former. Psillos’ 
extensive study of caloric (see (1994); (1999: ch.6)) and his attempt to undermine 
Laudan’s argument makes him a prime target for this subsection.177
For Laudan’s argument to have any impact on the realists, holds Psillos, we must 
examine whether the abandoned theoretical terms were really central to the theories 
they are customarily associated with. If they were not central, then their eventual 
abandonment is inconsequential to the preservation commitments of the scientific 
realist, for their referential failure does not undermine the success, and presumably 
the truth content, their theories enjoyed. What makes a term central? A term is 
central, says Psillos, if it satisfies the following three conditions:178
177 The first half o f  Psillos (1999: ch.6) is simply a shorter and revised version o f Psillos (1994).
178 See his (1999: 129). Notice that the conditions are relative to the time period when the theory 
under consideration was reigning. This is a contentious issue that I plan to return to later on in this 
section. Notice also that it is not altogether clear what Psillos means by the term ‘indispensable’.
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(CT1) It appeared in a genuinely successful theory.
(CT2) Its descriptions were indispensable in the derivation of predictions and 
explanations of phenomena.
(CT3) It was thought of by the supporters of the theory as denoting a natural kind.
Caloric, argues Psillos, is not a central term, for it fails on account of CT2 and CT3. 
According to him, though the caloric theory is indeed successful, i.e. CT1 is 
satisfied, the caloric posit is neither indispensable in the derivation of predictions and 
explanations, nor thought of as denoting a natural kind by the main advocates of the 
theory.
To substantiate his claim that caloric is not a central term, Psillos presents a brief 
history of the transition from the caloric theory to thermodynamics. That condition 
CT3 is not met by the caloric, argues Psillos, is obvious when one looks at the 
epistemic attitude of the eminent scientists most closely associated with the caloric 
theory. As evidence, he cites these admittedly sceptical passages from leading 
scientific figures:
It has not, therefore, been proved by any experiment that the weight of bodies is 
increased by their being heated, or by the presence of heat in them... It must be 
confessed that the afore-mentioned fact [i.e. that, contra the caloric theory, heating 
does not bring about an apparent or measurable increase in weight] may be stated as 
a strong objection against this supposition [i.e. the caloric theory] (Black (1803: 
45)).179
We will not decide at all between the two foregoing hypotheses [i.e. the caloric 
theory vs the vibratory theory]. Several phenomena seem favourable to the second 
[i.e. the vibratory theory], such as the heat produced by the friction of two solid 
bodies, for example; but there are others which are explained more simply by the 
other [i.e. the caloric theory] -  perhaps they both hold at the same time (Laplace 
and Lavoisier (1780: 152-3)).180
The fundamental law [i.e. that heat is a state function] which we proposed to 
confirm seems to us however to require new verifications in order to be placed 
beyond doubt. It is based on the theory of heat as it is understood today [i.e. the 
caloric theory], and it should be said that this foundation does not appear to be of 
unquestionable solidity (Carnot (1824: 46/100-101)).
179 For more on Black’s sceptical attitude, see de V. Heathcote and McKie (1935: 27-30).
180 Psillos also quotes from Lavoisier (1790: 5).
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From these passages he concludes that “the scientists of this period were not 
committed to the truth of the hypothesis that the cause of heat was a material 
substance” and that “[t]herefore, caloric was not as central a posit as, for instance, 
Laudan has suggested” (1999: 119).181
Kyle Stanford (2003) has rightly criticized Psillos for presenting a biased reading of 
the history of caloric.182 To be specific, Stanford holds that the passages Psillos 
quotes are unrepresentative of their authors’ attitudes, since they are drawn from 
isolated remarks made about the caloric and also the ether.183 In the case of the 
caloric, he elaborates, Psillos does not take into account the fact that Black was 
simply exhibiting a widely shared aversion towards theorising that was prevalent 
amongst Scots in the eighteenth century. Even more problematic for Psillos’ account, 
argues Stanford, is the fact that Black dismissed the vibratory theory as incoherent 
on the basis of his own discoveries of latent heat. Thus, Stanford concludes, insofar 
as Black does take an epistemic stance, it is one of endorsing the caloric conception 
of heat as at least the more probable of the two.
Fox would no doubt agree with this assessment given his comments on the 
relationship between Black and the caloric theory:
There is certainly a danger of being misled by Black’s public show of caution into 
underestimating the closeness of the relationship between his work and the 
development of the material theory of heat. Black, as I have argued, did a great deal 
to further the theory, however indirectly or unwittingly; and it is also hard to believe 
that he himself thought of heat as anything but a substance when he was arriving at 
and elaborating the concepts of specific and latent heat (1971: 25).184
The same bias, says Stanford, is found in the textual evidence Psillos cites from 
Lavoisier and Laplace. The point of the Memoire sur la Chaleur, he claims, is to 
present the ice-calorimeter, an instrument measuring the quantity of heat in relation
181 The vibratory theory o f heat, says Psillos, was similarly not fully accepted. Unlike in the case o f  
the caloric theory, Psillos here blames the insufficient development o f the vibratory theory.
182 It is important to note that Stanford does not address Psillos’ claims about Camot.
183 In the case o f the ether, Stanford concedes that Psillos correctly identifies sceptical attitudes 
towards particular models o f the ether. He complains, however, that Psillos ignores the general 
conviction o f scientists that there must be some mechanical medium through which light propagates, 
even though no one was wholeheartedly committed to any particular model.
184 Fox (1971: 51) indeed makes similar remarks about Pictet, arguing that even though he had doubts 
about the nature o f heat he nonetheless worked on the basis o f the caloric theory.
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to the weight of ice melted. Since the measurement techniques of the calorimeter 
were compatible with both the caloric and vibratory theories of heat, it is not 
surprising, Stanford suggests, that Laplace and Lavoisier attempted to address the 
widest possible audience by taking a neutral stance on the nature of heat. More 
convincingly, he indicates that despite their initial remarks in the Memoire, the rest 
of the book finds Laplace and Lavoisier unequivocal in their commitment to the 
caloric theory.185 This is especially true for their explanatory accounts of various 
phenomena. What is more, Stanford says, Lavoisier’s repeated endorsements of the 
theory and its posit through the years, coupled with his appeal to the caloric for 
explanations, and his view that it is confirmed by evidence, should be enough to 
dispel the idea that his attitude towards it was agnostic.
Historians of science, like Fox and Morris, agree that Lavoisier was undoubtedly 
committed to the caloric conception of heat.186 Morris, for instance, points out that 
“[although in the 1783 joint memoir on heat the authors stated they would avoid a 
commitment to a particular theory of heat, subsequent explanations of specific 
phenomena reveal Lavoisier’s commitment to the concept of heat as a material 
substance” (1972: 30-1). Indeed, he goes on to argue that even in those texts where 
Lavoisier sounds more sceptical, he ultimately employs the material conception of 
heat in his explanations of various phenomena (31). It is only Laplace’s commitment 
that is genuinely brought into question. Yet, as Fox (1971: 30) notes, even Laplace’s 
scepticism eventually waned, so that by 1803 he was as committed to the caloric 
conception of heat as Lavoisier had been.187
Stanford’s critical remarks about the bias in Psillos’ textual evidence are reasonable 
by any standards. Psillos might object that the fact that scientists like Black, 
Lavoisier, Laplace, and Carnot had any doubts is in and of itself sufficient to 
undermine the significance of the caloric. It seems to me, however, that this dispute 
is merely a red herring. Any effort to reconstruct the epistemic attitudes of past 
scientists often relies on tenuous speculations about the extent to which each of them
185 Morris agrees with this point, saying that “[i]f Lavoisier wavered in his view, he did so only in the 
first half o f this memoir” (1972: 31n).
186 Fox (1971: 30) lists a number o f other historians who agree on Lavoisier’s loyalty to the caloric, 
namely E.M. Lemeray, G. Bachelard, C.C. Gillispie, and J.R. Partington.
187 Morris suggests that Lavoisier’s material conception o f heat may have been due to Laplace (see 
(1972: 9)).
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was committed to a given posit. In his contribution to a symposium on Psillos’ book, 
Redhead rightly complains, “the discussion looks not so much like philosophical 
analysis, but rather involves peering into the psychology and/or private notebooks to 
ascertain what scientists really meant by terms like ‘ether’ or ‘phlogiston’ ” (op.cit: 
344). Whether or not a scientific community sees a term as central is not important if 
the term is really indispensable for the predictions and explanations of phenomena. 
After all, the scientific community may well have an epistemic attitude that is 
inconsistent with the indispensability status of a theoretical term. For example, they 
may not yet realise its indispensability. Alternatively, they may think it is 
indispensable in cases where it is not. The main point I am trying to make here is that 
condition CT3 can be dropped, since it is merely parasitic on condition CT2.
Before I take up the issue of Psillos’ evidence for the claim that the caloric does not 
satisfy condition CT2, I want to make some preliminary remarks on his choice of 
this condition. While CT3 is a criterion specific to Psillos’ defence against Laudan’s 
arguments, CT2 conveys an idea familiar to the realist camp. In order to save 
scientific realism from prima facie damning historical evidence, the realists seek to 
drive a wedge between those parts that are responsible or even indispensable for the 
explanatory and predictive success of theories and those that are not. In other words, 
realists try to show that we should not expect all components of theories to be 
preserved through theory change, but only those that are genuinely supported by 
evidence.
It is worth mentioning, even briefly, two prominent realists who employ this 
strategy. Kitcher, for example, has argued in favour of drawing a similar distinction 
between working posits and presuppositional posits. In his own words:
Distinguish two kinds of posits introduced within scientific practice, working posits 
(the putative referents of terms that occur in problem-solving schemata) and 
presuppositional posits (those entities that apparently have to exist if the instances 
of the schemata are to be true) (1993: 149).
188 A notion might still be central to a theory, despite the fact that scientists have doubts about the 
theory and the notion itself. This point separates commitment to truth and centrality, a distinction 
overlooked by Psillos. Leplin raises a similar point arguing that Psillos confuses “the question o f what 
entities scientists believe in with the question o f what entities they needed to get predictive success” 
(2000: 981-2).
153
The reply to Laudan’s argument, holds Kitcher, should be that only the 
presuppositional posits are suspect. The realist can see these be rejected in the 
history of science. According to Kitcher, the ether and the caloric were such posits, 
therefore their rejection should not be seen as grounds for pessimism. After all, large 
parts of their corresponding theories got preserved. Unfortunately, Kitcher’s 
thoughts on the caloric are limited to these few remarks.
Devitt (1984) has criticised Laudan’s arguments from a variety of angles, one of 
which is rooted on a distinction similar to the one proposed by Kitcher. The realist, 
he claims, is committed only to ‘necessary’ posits, thereby implying a category of 
unnecessary ones. Devitt does not apply this idea to any historical cases. His 
comments, thus, remain merely suggestive, as he himself notes: “Perhaps many of 
the historical cases of elimination the radicals [i.e. Laudan, Kuhn, Feyerabend, etc.] 
produce are of posits which scientists did not really make” (144).
Having made these initial remarks on the prevalence of CT2 in the realist literature, I 
return to Psillos’ evidence for why he thinks that caloric does not satisfy CT2. This, 
Psillos claims, can be seen through an investigation of three cases where the caloric 
theory enjoyed success during this period. These are: 1) the laws of calorimetry, 2) 
Laplace’s prediction of the speed of sound in air, and 3) Carnot’s cycle. Let us take 
each one in turn.
Calorimetry is concerned with measuring changes in the amount of heat. Psillos 
correctly points out that the laws of calorimetry were developed independently of the 
caloric conception of the nature of heat. The theoretical basis for these laws 
consisted of two assumptions closely associated with the caloric conception, namely 
(1) the conservation of heat in the mixing of two substances, where no chemical 
reactions occur, and (2) a concept of specific heat. The basis, according to Psillos, 
was sufficiently minimal to maintain independence between calorimetry and the 
caloric theory.189 Thus, Psillos concludes, “since calorimetric laws were independent
189 Psillos’ claim, at least with regard to the principle o f the conservation o f  heat, seems to be 
vindicated by Laplace and Lavoisier’s view that the principle could be upheld without commitment to 
any theory about the nature o f heat.
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of considerations about the cause of heat, they could not be used to test either of the 
theories of the cause of heat.” (1999: 118-9).
The second case on the list, argues Psillos, is similarly independent of the caloric 
theory. Laplace’s prediction of the speed of sound in air was both successful and 
novel, yet it did not rely on the hypothesis of the materiality of heat. In making this 
prediction, Laplace had corrected Newton’s theoretical calculation, which was based 
on the assumption that the expansions and contractions of a gas occur isothermally, 
i.e. at a constant temperature. Against this assumption, Laplace suggested that the 
propagation of sound occurs adiabatically, i.e. without loss or gain of heat. The main 
point that Psillos tries to raise here is that the adiabatic conception of the 
transmission of sound was not dependent on the caloric conception.
The third case also supports the idea that the caloric was dispensable in predictions 
and explanations of phenomena, says Psillos. Before we proceed to Psillos’ 
argument, I need to explain what a Carnot cycle involves. Carnot considers two 
reservoirs that are kept at constant temperatures Ti and T2 where Ti > T2 . A tank 
with gas contained by a movable piston is subjected to a four-step process:
Step 1: The gas at state A with initial volume Va is brought in contact with the hot 
reservoir at constant temperature Ti where it undergoes an (infinitely slow) 
isothermal expansion to state B with volume Vb.
Step 2: The reservoir is removed and the gas is left to undergo an adiabatic 
expansion from state B to a state C with volume Vc, which results in a decrease of 
temperature from Ti to T2 .
Step 3: The gas at state C is brought in contact with the cold reservoir at constant 
temperature T2 where it undergoes an isothermal compression to state D with volume 
VD.
Step 4: The reservoir is removed and the gas undergoes an adiabatic compression 
from state D to its initial state A with volume Va, which results in an increase of 
temperature from T2 to Ti.
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Figure 3: Carnot’s Cycle.
Source: Adopted from Kondepudi and Prigogine (1998)
Note that the four-step process is repeatable, i.e. A —> B —» C —► D —► A —► B
Psillos indicates that although Carnot adopted the principle of the conservation of 
heat, a principle that was closely associated with the caloric theory but certainly not 
necessitating it, he purposely avoided reference to the principle in his famous 
exposition of what is now known as ‘the Carnot cycle’ (see figure three above).190 
Psillos notes, moreover, that in his description of the cycle as a four step process, 
Carnot “never explicitly said that the quantity of heat released by body A [the hot 
reservoir] was absorbed by body B [the cold reservoir]”, a statement that would 
amount to the conservation of heat (124). Indeed, Psillos cites Clausius (1850: 133- 
4), who noted that Carnot’s theorems did not depend on the assumption that heat is 
not consumed in a Carnot cycle. Put differently, they did not depend on the 
assumption of the conservation of heat.
Having presented his case for why the caloric is not a central term of the caloric 
theory, Psillos turns his attention to Laudan’s claims on the relation between 
evidence and theory. He accuses Laudan of interpreting realists as confirmational
190 The reader will notice that Psillos’ comments here are inconsistent with his earlier comments. In 
discussing the first case, i.e. the case involving the laws o f calorimetry, he claims the independence of 
the principle o f conservation o f heat from the caloric theory. Here, he emphasises their dependence in 
order to depict Carnot’s avoidance o f the principle as a general avoidance o f the caloric theory.
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holists, i.e. as committed to the idea that the observational evidence for a theory 
confirms the whole theory equally. According to Psillos, Laudan’s view originates 
from a misreading of Boyd (1981), who claims that evidence confirms not only 
observational claims but also theoretical ones. Yet, as Psillos asserts, Laudan 
mistakenly takes this to suggest that all theoretical claims -  presumably within a 
given theoretical system or framework -  are equally justified by the evidence. 
Against Laudan, he argues that it is possible to ‘localise the relations of evidential 
support’, identifying those claims of the theory that are supported by the evidence 
and to what extent. More precisely, he argues that “realism requires and suggests a 
differentiated attitude to, and differentiated degrees o f  belief in, the several 
constituents of a successful and mature scientific theory” (1999: 126).
Naturally, those theoretical claims deemed essential to the successful prediction- 
making and explaining of phenomena inspire greater degrees of belief in their 
truth/approximate truth than those deemed inessential. Psillos takes the laws of 
calorimetry, Laplace’s adiabatic process, and Carnot’s cycle as inspiring high 
degrees of belief in the truth/approximate truth of the caloric theory, independently 
of the caloric posit, which he takes as inspiring no belief at all. He summarises this 
point in the following passage:
...the laws of the caloric theory can be deemed to be approximately true 
independently of the reference failure of ‘caloric’, i.e. irrespective of the absence of 
a natural kind as the referent of the term ‘caloric’. So, a point worth highlighting is 
that when the laws established by a theory turn out to be independent of 
assumptions involving allegedly central theoretical terms, it can still make perfect 
sense to talk of the approximate truth of this theory (127).
Chang (2003) argues that none of the above three cases lends any support to Psillos’ 
conclusion. More exactly, he argues that there are two major problems affecting the 
three cases:
(Dl) Some predictively and explanatorily successful laws, beliefs, and practices of 
this era were developed independently of the caloric theory. Hence, any of these that 
were preserved would not count as supporting the view that parts of the caloric 
theory were preserved.
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(D2) Although certain assumptions about caloric made indispensable contributions 
to the successes of this era, these assumptions were not subsequently preserved.
According to Chang, the first and third of Psillos’ cases suffer from D1 while the 
second case suffers from D2. With D l, Chang challenges Psillos’ view that certain 
parts of the caloric theory were preserved. With D2, Chang challenges the more 
general view that theoretical parts crucial to the successes of a theory always get 
retained through scientific revolutions.
Let us look more closely at Chang’s analysis of each of Psillos’ three cases. The first 
case, Chang argues, is susceptible to objection D l. He agrees with Psillos that the 
laws of calorimetry are independent of the caloric conception of heat, but reaches a 
different conclusion from him. To remind the reader, Psillos concludes that the 
independence is evidence that the caloric theory properly construed, i.e. devoid of 
the metaphysical statements about the nature of heat but encompassing such things 
as the laws of calorimetry, deserves to be credited with the predictive success drawn 
from the laws of calorimetry, and hence deserves to be considered approximately 
true. Contra Psillos, Chang argues that the laws of calorimetry cannot be seen as 
evidence for the preservation of the caloric theory of heat precisely because they are 
independent of it.
The second case, claims Chang, is susceptible to objection D2. In the years after 
Laplace’s prediction, Poisson derived a general law of adiabatic expansion of gases 
that Laplacians then used to underpin Laplace’s original prediction. Chang points out 
that Poisson’s derivation was carried out by appeal to ontological assumptions 
central to the caloric theory, namely (a) that the caloric is a discrete fluid, and (b) 
that it consists of point-like particles that repel one another but attract particles of 
ordinary matter.191 Despite the eventual abandonment of these ontological 
assumptions, Chang argues, they were indispensable (in Psillos’ somewhat vague 
sense of the term) in the derivation of the correct law of adiabatic processes. 
According to Chang, we have a counterexample to the link between indispensability
191 In a perplexing manoeuvre, Psillos (1999: 120-1) brings up the issue o f Poisson’s derivation and 
its dependence on assumptions about the caloric but does not attempt to square this historical fact 
with his own account.
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and success on the one hand, and preservation and approximate truth on the other. 
That is, a theoretical component may have been essential for the production of some 
successful prediction without being preserved or approximately true.
Still in the province of the second case, Chang argues that the ‘explanatory rationale’ 
behind Laplace’s correction of Newton’s theoretical value for the speed of sound in 
air rests on assumptions about caloric. More precisely, he argues that Laplace 
understood adiabatic heating as the result of a mechanical compression leading to the 
release of caloric. Since at the time no other theory offered a plausible explanation 
for adiabatic heating, says Chang, it is reasonable to suppose that the caloric-based 
explanation offered by Laplace was indispensable (again in Psillos’ vague sense of 
the term) for the success enjoyed by Laplace’s prediction of the speed of sound in 
air. Just like above, this then serves as a counterexample to the link between 
indispensability and success on the one hand, and preservation and approximate truth 
on the other.
Psillos’s third case, Chang argues, also suffers from D l. The first thing to note, he 
claims, is that Carnot’s work was not central to the caloric tradition. His work came 
during the twilight of the caloric era, and most of the leading caloricists paid little 
attention to it. Indeed, according to Chang, Carnot had already forsaken Laplacian 
microphysics and was working within a ‘macroscopic-phenomenalistic’ framework. 
This was evident, he claims, in Carnot’s view of the adiabatic law as an empirical 
regularity, devoid of any reference to Laplacian microphysics.192 Where Carnot did 
employ the caloric theory, argues Chang, the results he derived from it were 
subsequently abandoned or at least considerably revised. As a case in point, he cites 
Lord Kelvin’s revision of Carnot’s theory, replacing heat conservation with energy 
conservation. In addition, he cites the abandonment of the picture of the production 
of mechanical work in a heat engine, where caloric merely gets redistributed 
amongst the engine’s parts. What got preserved, Chang claims, were elements 
independent of the caloric theory; elements like the principle of maximum 
efficiency, which anticipated the second law of thermodynamics.
192 For an exposition o f the adiabatic law see section four below.
159
Three issues arise from the above discussion. The first concerns the independence of 
a successful theoretical component from a given theory. Though Psillos and Chang 
agree that the first and third cases are examples of components independent from the 
caloric, their claims about the extent of this independence are quite different. Psillos 
takes the independence to be between the laws and the caloric conception of heat as 
a material substance. Chang, on the contrary, takes the independence to be between 
these components and the caloric theory as a whole. In effect, they disagree on what 
the caloric theory really was. They thus draw different conclusions. Psillos presents 
these cases as supporting the view that an essential part of the caloric theory was 
approximately true, despite the caloric’s referential failure. By contrast, Chang 
thinks that these cases do not support the caloric theory’s approximate truth, 
presumably because their total independence from the theory means that the theory 
cannot reap the benefits of their success.
In my opinion, this dispute misses what is of value. No matter whether one chooses 
to classify the laws of calorimetry and the Carnot cycle as components of the caloric 
theory, the fact of the matter is that these components have survived into the twenty- 
first century. That in itself lends some credence to the view that scientific knowledge 
is to a certain extent a cumulative enterprise.193 Of course, it all depends on what 
kind of epistemological status these components have. If they are merely 
phenomenological in nature, then this does not seem to be of any help to the realist. I 
will return to this issue in the next section.
The next issue concerns Psillos’ second case, namely Laplace’s adiabatic conception 
of the transmission of sound in air. While Psillos wants to maintain the independence 
of this conception from the caloric conception of heat, Chang wants to show that the 
conception was very much embedded within the caloric tradition. It is certainly 
undeniable that (i) Laplace’s explanations of the adiabatic propagation of sound and 
(ii) Poisson’s derivation of the general law of adiabatic processes were given on the 
basis of the caloric conception of heat. Chang then seems to win the argument here.
193 Naturally, the fact that the laws o f  calorimetry and Carnot’s cycle have been preserved is not 
sufficient to establish that all or even most successful posits get preserved, but at least they are a step 
in that direction.
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Let us consider these two cases in turn. Allegedly following Psillos’ definition of a 
successful theory or component, as one that gives better explanations when 
compared to its contemporaries, Chang lists a string of explanations that were, 
according to him, the real successes of the caloric theory.194 The most important of 
these were “the flow of heat toward equilibrium, the expansion of matter by heating, 
latent heat in changes of state, the elasticity of gases and the fluidity of liquids, the 
heat released and absorbed in chemical reactions, combustion, the radiation of heat, 
and the gas laws” (907). These explanations, says Chang, were given on the basis of 
certain ‘essentially contributing’ assumptions of the caloric theory. To cite a few: 
heat is a self-repulsive substance, temperature is simply the density of the caloric, 
caloric is a chemical substance, etc. Chang makes much of the fact that these 
assumptions were later abandoned. He suggests this supports the view that even 
components that are responsible for the success of a theory can be, and often are, in 
due course discarded.
Do we want to call the explanations present on Chang’s list ‘the real successes of the 
caloric theory’, just because no alternative explanations were as ‘plausible’ at the 
time? All they had going for them was prima facie plausibility as explanations. But 
even that evaporated in time. It is true that we can call these ‘the real successes of the 
caloric theory’ under Psillos’ criterion of success, but it is also true that Psillos’ 
account is not adequate. For a scientific statement to be successful it does not suffice 
to have some plausibility as an explanation. We must demand that these explanations 
have their own predictive merits, i.e. that they are independently confirmed.195 Here I 
side with Psillos. The three cases he considers seem to be the best examples of 
successful components of the caloric era, for they have their own predictive 
merits.196 Incidentally, Chang never explicitly denies that Psillos’ three examples are 
real successes of the caloric era, though he contests that the first and third examples
107are successes of the caloric theory.
194 I say ‘allegedly’, for I have not found the relevant passage where Psillos makes such a claim.
1951 would say that a component has independent confirmation if: (i) it directly contributes to the 
calculations o f values that can then be checked against testing and (ii) the testing involves varying the 
background conditions and the auxiliaries.
196 This will become clear in the next section.
197 By ‘caloric era’, I mean roughly the chronological period during which the caloric theory was 
popular.
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Although not a view espoused by either Psillos or Chang, it is worth noting that the 
fact that a law is derivable on the basis of certain premises, does not entail that the 
success of the law must carry over to the premises. If evidence e confirms a 
hypothesis H, it does not necessarily follow that it confirms any theory that entails 
H. I am here thinking of Poisson’s derivation of the adiabatic law. Even though there 
is confirmatory evidence for the adiabatic law, that evidence need not confirm the 
premises Poisson used to derive it. A similar point can be made without resorting to 
confirmation theory but simply by way of deductive logic. We have all been taught 
in elementary logic that a valid argument with a true conclusion need not have a 
single true premise. In other words, even if Poisson had validly inferred the law, as 
Chang maintains, the premises employed in the derivation need not be true. Indeed, 
given their lack of independent confirmation we now think that the premises under 
consideration are false.
Whether a set of sentences partakes in the confirmation obtained by any of its 
entailments depends, among other things, on whether that set can be independently 
confirmed. The premises employed by Poisson in the derivation of the adiabatic gas 
law, i.e. that the caloric is a discrete fluid and that it consists of point-like particles 
that repel one another but attract particles of ordinary matter, had no independent 
confirmation.198 Today the adiabatic law is derived from different premises. It is 
derived from the first law of thermodynamics, i.e. that energy is conserved, plus 
certain other assumptions. The first law, unlike the caloric assumptions, has the 
benefit of independent confirmation. That, of course, is no guarantee of the 
truth/approximate truth or even preservation of the first law, but it is certainly good 
reason to maintain its superiority over the caloric assumptions.
The third issue regards Psillos’ requirement of indispensability, as it appears in CT2. 
Psillos formulates CT2 so that the indispensability of the descriptions attributed to a 
term are relative to the period when the theory in question reigns. That is, these 
descriptions must be indispensable to the scientists of that era, though, presumably, 
they can become dispensable for a later one. Chang shows that the caloric posit and 
its properties were indispensable, if we follow Psillos’ formulation, to Poisson’s
198 Indeed, post-caloric theoreticians o f heat would argue for something stronger, namely that these 
premises have been discontinued by evidence.
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derivation of the adiabatic law during the era in question, i.e. in the early nineteenth 
century.
Indispensability must surely be something fixed by the relationship between the 
theory, the relevant auxiliaries, and the evidence. It must not be something 
dependent on the whims of scientists of a particular era, as Psillos maintains. Had 
Psillos opted for a period and scientist-free criterion of indispensability, he would 
have been able to distinguish between the original and modem derivations of 
Poisson’s law. He could thus reply to Chang that there is more support for the 
modem premises than for the original ones, since the modem ones enjoy 
considerable independent confirmation.
4. Structural Realism and Caloric
So much for the history of the caloric theory and the various attempts to reconcile it 
with scientific realism. It is now time to turn to epistemic structural realism in order 
to investigate whether it can offer a more plausible account of the components that 
were responsible for the successes of the caloric era.
Let us consider those components that had success. As we have seen, they can, 
without gross inaccuracies, be identified with Psillos’ three cases. To remind the 
reader these are: 1) the laws of calorimetry, 2) Laplace’s prediction of the speed of 
sound in air, and 3) Carnot’s cycle. I presume that by the first one of these, Psillos 
(but also Chang) means the following two principles:
(LI) Q = m • cp- (Tf-Tj)
(L2) Q a =  - Q b
The first principle states that the heat change Q in a substance that does not undergo 
any other, especially chemical, reactions will be equal to the product of the mass m, 
the specific heat at constant pressure cp, and final 7f minus initial T\ temperature of 
the substance. The second principle simply states that, on the assumption that the
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calorimeter is a closed system, an obvious idealisation, the heat lost by object a must 
be gained by object b 199
Laplace’s prediction of the speed of sound in air, i.e. the second case on Psillos’ list, 
was derived from the following formula:
(L3) v2 = (C p/C v) dP/dp
where v is the velocity of sound, cp the specific heat at constant pressure, cv the 
specific heat at constant volume, P  the pressure, and p  the density of air. The general 
law employed to buttress Laplace’s derivation is Poisson’s adiabatic gas law 
typically written as:
(L4) P • V7 = constant
It states that for a fixed mass of gas, which is thermally insulated, the product of its 
pressure P  and volume V will be constant; y=  Cp/cv is the ratio of the two specific 
heats, i.e. specific heat at constant pressure cp and specific heat at constant volume 
cv, of a gas at a given temperature.
Finally, Carnot’s cycle, Psillos’ third case, gives rise to what is hailed as ‘Carnot’s 
principle’ or ‘the principle of maximum efficiency’:200
(L5) T| = 1 — Tiov/Thigh
This states that a heat engine operating between two reservoirs at different 
temperatures, where 7iow is the low temperature and Thigh is the high temperature, 
will have a maximum efficiency 77, i.e. given a certain input of heat there is a limit 
on how much of that heat can be converted into work. Indeed, it states that no actual 
engine can be one hundred percent, i.e. perfectly, efficient. That is achievable only
199 This statement is idealised in at least two ways: 1) a calorimeter is not a closed system, and 2) 
some heat will be converted to work in the process o f transfer. See below for more on the relationship 
between heat and work.
200 The mathematical expression o f maximum efficiency is due to Emile Clapeyron’s mathematization 
and reformulation of Carnot’s views.
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by an ideal Camot engine. The principle of maximum efficiency is the cornerstone 
of the second law of thermodynamics.
These equations may not all have been postulated within the caloric tradition but 
they have certainly survived through the scientific revolutions of the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. They can now be found in modem textbooks on thermodynamics 
(see, for example, Kondepudi and Prigogine (1998)). What can the structural realist 
make of them?
Recall that Worrall argues that the preservation of mathematical equations, as 
opposed to the ontological interpretations underlying them, is to be expected from 
the structural realist perspective.201 His case study, as we have seen, involves the 
survival of Fresnel’s equations into Maxwell’s theory, ontologically reinterpreted to 
avoid reference to the elastic-solid ether. The obvious way to extend Worrall’s 
argument here is to simply say that the above equations should be seen as relations 
devoid of any ontological interpretation. In other words, Worrall would say that the 
caloricists got something right, namely the structure of some heat processes.202 
Given that these structures have been preserved through two hundred years of theory 
upheaval, whereas the ontological assumptions about the nature of heat associated 
with them have not, they provide evidence for structural realism.
The Phenomenological Character ofLl-L5
In a certain sense to be specified shortly, L1-L5 are phenomenological laws 203 All 
the terms appearing in L1-L5 denote broadly construed observable quantities. By 
this, I do not have in mind that the terms’ whole meaning can be captured 
observationally. Rather, what I have in mind is that we should only be concerned 
with the observational dimension of their meaning, since that is the only dimension
201 It is worth pointing out that McMullin has expressed views that are broadly sympathetic to the 
historically motivated version o f structural realism, though there is no indication that he accepts the 
Ramsey-sentence approach. In a discussion on how to overcome pessimistic induction he says: “I 
would argue that these [i.e. ethers and fluids] were often, though not always, interpretive additions, 
that is, attempts to specify what ‘underlay’ the equations o f the scientist in a way which the equations 
(as we now see) did not really sanction” (1984: 17).
202 Notice, I don’t say ‘there is something in the caloric theory’ that was right. I am concentrating on 
the fact that some successful structural components made their appearance during that era, not on 
whether or not these components were indispensable parts o f the caloric theory.
203 Chang (2003) also stresses the phenomenological character o f the principles o f calorimetry, i.e. LI 
and L2. In conversation, he opposed only the phenomenological character o f L5.
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that is testable. Each term is tied to one or more observational tests, which fully and 
completely determine its numerical value. More precisely, the values of these terms 
are determined either through direct instrument measurements or through a 
calculation that relies on such measurements.204 For example, measuring mass and 
temperature typically involves taking direct measurements from instruments like the 
triple beam balance and the thermometer. To determine heat change AQ in a 
substance requires first measuring mass, specific heat at constant pressure, and 
temperature, and second calculating a value from these. In either case, reading the 
results of measurements is an act of observation, and in this sense the relevant terms 
should be thought of as broadly construed observational. Consequently, L1-L5 
should be thought of as phenomenological laws.
That the terms in L1-L5 denote observable quantities can be demonstrated by 
looking at the units employed in measuring them. In the International System of 
Units (SI), mass, thermodynamic temperature, length, time, electric current, amount 
of substance, and luminous intensity make up the base quantities. These are 
measured in base units, namely the meter, the kilogram, the second, the ampere, the 
kelvin, the mole, and the candela respectively. The base units are the elementary 
units upon which all other units are defined. Arguably, the base units are 
phenomenological in character, for they are fixed by purely empirical means, i.e. 
without reference to theory. For example, the kilogram is equal to the mass of the 
platinum-iridium cylinder kept at the International Bureau of Weights and Measures 
at Serves, France. That cylinder is, in fact, the international prototype of the 
kilogram.205
My claim that L1-L5 are phenomenological laws is endorsed by the fact that each of 
the quantities in L1-L5 is either one of the SI base units or defined in terms of these. 
To be precise, the five equations identify seven quantities, namely velocity, heat, 
specific heat, pressure, density, volume, and maximum efficiency, that are defined in
204 One may complain that under this definition no term would count as theoretical/unobservable. This 
complaint misses the point however, since, as I just said, I do not think the whole meaning o f these 
terms can be observationally captured.
205 The other six base units are similarly fixed by purely empirical means. Admittedly, the empirical 
fixing o f some o f the other base units is more complicated, for it does not rely on a physical 
prototype.
166
terms of the first four base units, mass, temperature, length, and time.206 Even if one 
doubts the phenomenological character of some of the base units, these four seem the 
most secure.
It is insufficient to state that a quantity is observable just because it is measurable in 
units that are eventually defined on the base units. If that were true, the critic would 
complain that many quantities would qualify as observable merely by stipulating that 
they are measurable in terms of the base units. For example, according to Fresnel’s 
theory of light, the distance between two particles of the elastic solid ether under 
certain well-defined conditions is measurable in base units -  essentially in meters. 
Yet, we consider this quantity as fictional, not observable.
One must simply concede that science can make, and indeed has made, mistakes 
about what is observable or measurable. Peter Kosso (1998) makes precisely this 
point with respect to the Michelson-Morley experiment. The experiment was 
conducted because it was assumed that the ether was observable or measurable in 
some way. The fact that the expected effects of the ether were not observed is not at 
all surprising to us, because we now believe that the ether is a fictional posit. The 
moral of the story is that, at best, we should remain agnostic with respect to 
quantities that are said to be measurable, yet have not actually been measured. 
Indeed, not only must they be measured with a fair degree of accuracy and 
consistency, but also the values obtained must subsequently be rigorously tested. 
One key way to test them concerns the successful application of a variety of 
equations that rely on these quantities to predict phenomena. Since the quantities in 
L1-L5 meet these criteria, it is reasonable to suppose that they are indeed observable.
After that small digression, it is worth considering how the seven quantities at hand 
are defined in SI:207 1) Velocity is measured in terms of meters per second. To give a
206 Strictly speaking, it is thermodynamic temperature measured in the Kelvin unit that is taken to be 
the most basic. However, it is interdefinable with other units o f temperature such as the Celsius and 
the Fahrenheit, which, under SI, are taken to be derived units. Also, I have left y, the ratio that 
represents the two specific heats o f a substance, out o f this list simply because it expresses a relation 
between items on the list, i.e. two types o f specific heat, and hence is defined in terms o f them.
207 To pre-empt any objections similar to those directed at the Logical Positivists, it is not my 
intention here to present these as exhaustive definitions for these quantities, but rather to show that the 
value o f the terms denoting these quantities can be fixed using measurements.
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value to (average) velocity, all one needs to do is measure the distance covered and 
the time elapsed. 2) The units with which we measure the quantity of heat, namely 
the joule, the calorie and the BTU, are interdefmable. Thus, I need only state the 
relationship expressed by one here: One British Thermal Unit, or BTU, is the 
quantity of heat required to raise the temperature of one pound of water by one 
degree Fahrenheit. As before, the quantities in this definition, i.e. temperature and 
mass are directly measurable. 3) Similarly with specific heat, measured as a 
combination of units of heat, mass, and temperature. One combination of these units 
sees specific heat as the quantity of heat in calories required to raise the temperature 
of one gram of some substance by one degree Celsius. The calorie, as I just 
mentioned, is interdefmable with the BTU. The other two quantities are simply 
temperature and mass. 4) Pressure is measured in the pascal unit, defined as one 
newton per square meter. The newton is itself defined in more basic units as the 
force required to produce an acceleration of one meter per second per second to a 
mass of one kilogram. Acceleration is ultimately reducible to a relation between the 
measurable quantities of time, direction and length. Notice that all of the terms in the 
definition of the newton are directly measurable quantities, namely length, time, and 
mass. 5) The definition is simpler with the units of (mass) density, being specified in 
kilogram per cubic meter. 6) The same level of simplicity follows volume. It is 
measured in units of cubic meter. 7) Finally, maximum efficiency is measured in 
terms of the joule, which, as I have just pointed out, is interdefmable with the BTU.
If the testable aspect of L1-L5 brings out their phenomenogical character, as it is 
here suggested, how can any version of realism gain support from their preservation? 
More pertinently, where does this leave the structural realist? Ramsey-style ESR 
does not seem able to benefit from such laws. Ramseyfication takes theoretical terms 
and replaces them with variables, existentially quantifying over them. The above 
equations, as we have construed them here, presumably have no theoretical terms but 
only observational ones. Hence, there is nothing that needs Ramseyfying. This does 
not mean that L1-L5 count against Ramsey-style ESR. It does mean, however, that 
they do not lend any support to it since their preservation seems to be evidence for 
the accumulation of observational/phenomenal/empirical structure, not of any 
theoretical structure. Indeed, it is this kind of evidence that van Fraassen uses to
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support SRP4, namely that there is continuity of structure through theory change, but 
only of the structure of phenomena not of the structure of unobservables.
One possible reply for the advocate of Ramsey-style ESR would be to dispute the 
claim that all of the above quantities are observable. Obviously, Ramseyfication is 
no longer redundant once some of the above terms are thought of as theoretical. 
Another possible reply would be to argue that, if there is no theory, there’s no 
question of theory preservation arising. Yet another possible reply would be to say 
that it is not the equations that must be Ramseyfied but the whole theory. After all, 
since the caloric theory makes claims about theoretical entities, for instance by 
employing theoretical terms like ‘caloric’, there is something to be Ramseyfied.
How do L1-L5 fit with the Russellian approach to ESR? First, since ESR a la Russell 
is not expressed via the Ramsey-sentence approach, it avoids the problem of 
redundancy. Second, far from posing a problem, the phenomenological character of 
L1-L5 lends credence to it. According to Russell-style ESR, the rational 
reconstruction of scientific knowledge starts with concrete 
observational/phenomenal structures. As I pointed out at the beginning of chapter 
two, laws and other categories of scientific statements can be understood as 
mathematical structures. Thus, L1-L5 specify phenomenological structures of the 
kind needed to advance Russell’s programme. The next step is to extract the abstract 
from the phenomenological structures. The last and final step involves an appeal to 
H-W and MR in order to establish the claim that the physical causes of the 
phenomena have the same abstract structure as the phenomena.
As an illustration of how the Russellian treatment functions, I will here consider LI 
in some more detail. LI is a concrete observational structure that can be written 
down as follows: S0 = (U0, Ro = (m(xi, ti) = m*, cp(xi, ti) = cj, T(xj, ti) = sj, Q(mj, cj, Si) 
= qj), where Uo is the (finite) domain of observable objects and Ro is a class of 
functions defined on that domain.208 Function Q(mi, Ci, Sj) = qj represents LI. Now, 
according to the Russellian picture, from So we can extract abstract structure Sa =
208 A function is a special kind o f relation. They can thus be represented by sets o f  ordered n-tuples. 
For example, a function J(x)=y is a set/ o f ordered pairs such that whenever <x,y> e  / and <x, z> e  f  
then y=z. In the above example, I employ functions instead of set-theoretically specified relations for 
the sake o f expediency.
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(U a, R a), where U a  is the class of all sets equinumerous to Uo, and Ra is the class of 
all relations isomorphic to the relations in Ro. In other words, Sa is an isomorphism 
class that contains So as one of its members. By appeal to H-W and MR, we infer 
that there is a unique concrete physical structure whose members stand in causal 
relations with the members of So. We can call this concrete physical structure ‘Sp’. 
The claim is that Sp is isomorphic to So- Trivially, Sp is another member of the 
isomorphism class Sa. The complete Russellian claim then is that there is one 
concrete physical structure Sp, which is causally responsible for concrete 
observational structure So and can only be specified up to isomorphism, i.e. we can 
only specify Sa-
The Russellian structural realist can find hope in the preservation of 
phenomenological laws, since she assumes that relations between 
observables/phenomena are isomorphic to relations between unobservables. For 
Russell, if  you recall, the unobservables are the external world causes of the 
observables. Thus, the phenomenological laws signify underlying relations between 
unobservables that are isomorphic to the relations between the phenomena. Provided 
one accepts the H-W and MR principles, this result is surely realist in spirit, for it 
says something about the external world. Of course, the traditional way of 
understanding the scientific realist debate dictates that phenomenological laws are 
not supportive of realism in any way. However, the unorthodox way in which the 
Russellian sets up realism means that this particular type of realism derives its force 
from phenomenological laws.
5. Structural Realism and the History of Science
Is Everything Structural Preserved?
The answer to this question must be obvious by now. Not all that is structural will be 
preserved. Examples of structural components that never made it past a scientific 
revolution are plentiful. In the historical context examined in this chapter, one can 
cite the following: (a) that the quantity of heat absorbed or freed by a given body is a 
state function of its properties of pressure, volume, and temperature, (b) the Irvinist
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equation for the determination of the absolute zero point of temperature,209 (c) that 
specific heat is constant under temperature change, etc. These statements are 
structural, for they state relationships between different quantities, yet they have 
been discarded as false.
This fact is by no stretch of the imagination lethal to the epistemic structural realist. 
The preservation claim must simply be qualified to reflect a more realistic picture of 
the development of science. One suggestion is the following:
(MSSS) Not all structures may survive, but most predictively successful elements 
that do survive are structural.
The ESR-ist can concede that some structures, especially those with little or no 
predictive power, are left behind in the wake of a scientific revolution. Moreover, the 
ESR-ist can concede this and still claim that most elements that enjoy genuine 
predictive success and survive scientific revolutions are structural.210 In the previous 
subsection, I indicated that those components that are generally acknowledged as the 
caloric era’s lasting contributions to our knowledge of heat have all been structural.
Does Structure Always Survive Intact?
Worrall’s study of Fresnel’s theory of light and my study of the caloric theory of 
heat exemplify cases where structural components survive intact -  into classical 
electromagnetism and thermodynamics respectively. Although both of these theories 
are still in use today, they co-exist with theories that are considered to be even closer 
to the truth, namely quantum electrodynamics and statistical mechanics respectively. 
The relation between the two sets of theories, however, is not as straightforward as 
that between classical electromagnetism and Fresnel’s theory of light or 
thermodynamics and the caloric theory of heat. Only under certain limits, can one 
recover approximate versions of classical electromagnetism from quantum 
electrodynamics and thermodynamics from statistical mechanics.
209 See section six below. For a more thorough account see Chang (forthcoming).
210 That not all surviving components need be structural will be made clear in the next subsection. It 
will be pointed out that preservation sometimes happens for reasons other than truth/approximate 
truth.
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Critics of ESR complain that, more often than not, old equations reappear only as 
limiting cases of new equations. As Worrall points out, this fact can be 
accommodated by structural realism when appeal is made to the correspondence 
principle. According to Heinz Post’s well-received formulation of the 
correspondence principle, “this is the requirement that any acceptable new theory L 
should account for its predecessor S by ‘degenerating’ into that theory under those 
conditions under which S has been well confirmed by tests” (1993: 16).211 What Post 
has in mind is a correspondence between mathematical structures. Indeed, given that 
the principle applies solely at the level of mathematics, Worrall notes correctly that 
its applicability “is not evidence for full-blown realism -  but, instead, only for 
structural realism” (1996: 161).
The challenge is to spell out exactly what this correspondence involves while at the 
same time avoiding a trivialisation of the relationship between old and new 
structures. Without entangling myself into a lengthy discussion of the 
correspondence principle, I would like to offer one familiar type of correspondence 
that can be spelt out more precisely and that finds support from the historical record. 
Here’s my own rendition of it:
(NC): A structure L' that has a predecessor L becomes isomorphic to, or 
approximates, L when a parameter in L ' is neutralised.
The neutralisation of a ‘parameter in a structure’ just means that the relevant relation 
in the structure is redefined from an w-tuple to an (w-l)-tuple, since one of the terms 
is neutralised. Typically, the neutralisation process in equations involves one of two 
things: (1) setting the parameter to zero (as, for example, in cases where the value of 
the parameter is to be added to some other values) or (2) setting the parameter to one
2,1 Though the correspondence principle is customarily attributed to Niels Bohr, its spirit has been 
around at least since Newton pronounced that he had derived his theory from Kepler’s laws (see 
Zahar (2001: 118)).
A recent festschrift on Post’s contributions to our understanding o f the correspondence principle 
reveals diverse manifestations o f these correspondence relations (see French and Kamminga (1993)). 
Stephan Hartmann (2002) summarises these and argues in favour o f a pluralistic view. He raises 
doubts about the existence o f a universal correspondence principle. It is worth noting that nothing in 
ESR stipulates the need for a universal correspondence principle.
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(as, for example, in cases where the value of the parameter is to be multiplied by 
some other values).
Three examples that feature centrally in their respective theories will authenticate the 
validity of NC. Take momentum in the special theory of relativity (STR) and in 
classical mechanics (CM) first.212 In STR we express momentum with the formula p
= mov / V l - v 2/c 2 . In CM we express it as p = mov. In the limit, as v —» 0, the 
denominator of the STR equation for momentum is neutralised and the classical 
formula p = mov is recovered.
The second example concerns the relation between Minkowskian and Galilean 
space-times. Minkowski space-time allows for a non-singular metric which is 
represented by the matrix diagonal (1, - 1/c2, - 1/c2, - 1/c2), where c is the speed of 
light in a vacuum. Since the metric is non-singular, the above matrix diagonal has an 
inverse, namely (1, -c2, -c2, -c2). If we let c=°°, that makes 1/c = 0, and the metric 
becomes singular (1, 0, 0, 0), allowing no inverse. By doing so, relativity of 
simultaneity disappears and we recover Galilean space-time. As in the case above, 
neutralising the term 1/c allows the recovery of the old structure.
The third example concerns the relation between the Poisson bracket formulation of 
classical mechanics and the Moyal bracket formulation of quantum mechanics. The 
latter introduces non-commutative multiplication for phase space functions. If we set 
Planck’s constant h to zero, thereby neutralising it, commutativity is recovered and 
so is the Poisson bracket formulation of classical mechanics.
That some old equations can be recovered whole or approximately whole simply by 
neutralising one of (often many) parameters of new equations cannot be dismissed as 
mere mathematical trickery. NC-correspondence is quite difficult to meet. To test 
this, we can use a computer program that generates random pairs of equations. 
Because a great many different equations are possible, the odds of getting a pair that 
N-corresponds are very small. This result holds even if we allow for the most liberal
212 This example is taken from Hartmann (2002). The use I make o f this example varies from 
Hartmann’s.
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understanding of approximation acceptable in science. In other words, N- 
correspondence is not only supported by historical evidence but it is also far from 
trivially satisfiable.
One way to justify the legitimacy of NC as a correspondence principle is to think of 
neutralisation as a process of idealisation. That is, we can think of L as an idealised 
version of V . When we neutralise a term in L' we sacrifice a certain degree of 
predictive accuracy and, by extension, concreteness. Conversely, the move from L to 
U  can be thought of as one of de-idealisation. This view is common amongst 
scientists. It is also shared by some philosophers of science, notably those of the 
Poznan School (see, for example, Krajewski (1977)).
To repeat, I am not here suggesting that all cases of correspondence take this form. 
Rather, given that NC is not easy to come-by, the existence of structures that exhibit 
NC-correspondence lends some credence to the view that some robust structural 
continuity exists even where the surviving structures are not intact.
In light of the necessity to employ correspondence principles, I suggest that we 
modify MSSS thus:
(MSSS') Not all structures may survive, but most predictively successful elements 
that do survive, either intact or suitably modified (for example, according to NC), are 
structural. Indeed, most, if not all, predictively successful structures survive.213
A measure of vagueness in MSSS' is unavoidable. I just indicated one way in which 
new structure can, with reasonable modification, be made to correspond to old 
structure. That, of course, is not sufficient to fix the meaning of the clause ‘suitably 
modified’. More needs to be done in order to show the overall history of science 
bears the mark of MSSS'. My intuition is that once a theory gets on the road to 
mathematization and starts producing accurate and repeatable results, it becomes less
213 In other words, not only are most predictively successful elements that survive structures, but also 
most predictively successful structures survive.
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likely that non-structural components survive and more likely that those components 
that do survive, in some form or other, are structural.214
The Criterion o f the Maturity o f Science
Realists who seek to establish some continuity between past and present theories rely 
on a criterion of the maturity of science. The rationale is to relegate those theories 
and terms that feed Laudan’s cause to immature science, thereby avoiding the need 
to justify why these theories and terms have been abandoned. This ploy is true even 
of some structural realists. Worrall’s solution to Laudan’s challenge incorporates 
such a criterion. More precisely, his criterion requires that a science be branded 
‘mature’ only when it predicts novel types of phenomena. Worrall makes use of this 
criterion to distinguish between those sciences from which we should expect 
structural components to be preserved and those from which we should not. He is 
thus indirectly telling us that structural components from immature theories will, 
most probably, not be preserved.
This seems like overkill to me. Theories that arise in sciences deemed immature on 
Worrall’s account may still contain structural components that are preserved for 
good reasons, i.e. for their ability to make accurate predictions, though not obviously 
for their ability to predict novel types of phenomena. That is, a structure may be able 
to accurately predict existing types of phenomena due to its having latched onto the 
world, without being able to make predictions about novel types of phenomena. 
Worse yet, we can easily imagine a scenario where a postulated structure, which can 
predict novel types of phenomena, eventually gets thrown away because no one 
realises that it can. If this sounds fictional, recall that it was not Fresnel who realised 
that his theory entailed the occurrence of a bright spot at the centre of the shadow of 
an opaque disc lit from a single slit, but Poisson. This consequence of the theory is 
not at all obvious. It could have been missed altogether. Nothing guarantees that we 
can see all the consequences of a particular theory, not least because it is unlikely 
that we have all the relevant auxiliaries required to test a theory at hand. Another 
reason that could prohibit scientists from realising the potential of a theory for novel
214 Mathematization on its own is not sufficient. This is evident if  one looks, for example, at 
econometrics, where there is a high level o f mathematization and comparatively very little predictive 
power.
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predictions concerns the unavailability of the required technology to build test 
instruments. We would certainly not want to exclude structures that may otherwise 
be predictively successful from our evidence of the cumulative development of 
science. Yet, if we follow Worrall’s account, we would have to.
In general, it seems to me that criteria of maturity offer quasi-arbitrary divisions of 
the history of science that are unable to impute any epistemic benefits to those who 
use them. The epistemic structural realist can thwart anti-realist claims, i.e. that 
successful theories have nonetheless been abandoned, by simply appealing directly 
to the preservation of structure. Whether a structure comes from a mature or 
immature science or theory, or even from no theory at all, makes absolutely no 
difference.215 What makes a difference is whether the structure survives in some 
recognisable form and is directly responsible for some predictive success.
6. What the History of Science Cannot Teach Us
In the last four decades, historical arguments have played a central role in the 
scientific realism debate. In one comer, anti-realists argue that no theoretical 
preservation takes place. That, they claim, should be indicative of the falsity of 
theories past, and the likely falsity of theories present and future. In the opposite 
comer, many realists argue that at least some theoretical components get preserved, a 
detail that, they claim, should be indicative of their approximate truth. Both sides 
thus agree that the historical record is essential in settling the debate.
Without doubt, the realist needs to provide a rejoinder to the anti-realist’s historical 
arguments. Yet, the expected returns from a realist-friendly interpretation of the 
history of science have been overestimated. Realists seem to behave as though 
realism will defeat its foes on the basis of establishing historical continuity. Yet, on a 
strict reading, that would require belief in the view that the preservation of a 
component X  is a necessary and sufficient condition of X s  approximate truth/truth. 
No realist, I hope, would be happy to adopt such a strong claim. Indeed, it can easily 
be shown that the preservation of a theoretical component through theory change is
2,5 In support o f this point, I can point the reader to a recent collection o f  essays Models as Mediators 
(edited by Morgan and Morrison (1999)), whose authors (for, example, Nancy Cartwright and 
Margaret Morrison) argue that many structures in science are significantly autonomous from theory.
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neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for its truth or approximate truth.216 
Realists should not even adopt the weaker, though still strong, claim that 
preservation is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the approximate 
truth/truth of what gets preserved.
It is not a necessary condition because even though a component may be 
true/approximately true, its preservation is not guaranteed. Suppose a scientist 
postulates a law that is actually true or approximately true in its domain of 
phenomena. Many reasons, quite a few of which are social/cultural, could transpire 
to make the general scientific community cast the law aside. For example, if the law 
seems incompatible with well-established theories, there will be no guarantee it gets 
adopted. This will especially be the case when the predictive accuracy of the law 
cannot yet be fully tested -  as when the instruments to perform such measurements 
are inexistent, unreliable or inaccurate. An example of, at least temporary, 
unreliability/inaccuracy in the current historical context involves the Irvinist 
equation for the determination of the absolute zero point of temperature, cjx + L = 
cwx, where a  is the heat capacity of ice, cw the heat capacity of water, L the latent 
heat of fusion, and x the absolute temperature of ice/water at the melting point. The 
equation was contested at first but the issue could not be settled due to a lack of 
reliable and accurate measurements. Eventually, the accuracy and reliability of the 
measurements improved sufficiently to tell against the equation. This fact 
notwithstanding, the point here is that there is no guarantee that we will always be 
able to construct instruments that can assess the predictive power of theories. 
Moreover, even if we do acquire the required instruments, the theory may already 
have been shelved. For this and other reasons, there is no guarantee that 
true/approximately true theoretical components will be preserved.
A potential realist reply may take the following form: Had the scientific community 
tested the law, they would have discovered its wonderful predictive powers, making 
its rejection difficult, if not completely out of the question. In other words, the 
predictive success enjoyed by the law should guarantee that scientists, following the 
canons of rationality, would preserve it for posterity. Though this may largely be
216 That it is not a sufficient condition is a point that has also been made by Chang (2003).
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true, notice that now it is the predictive success of the law that takes centre stage, not 
its preservation. In fact, the issue of preservation becomes parasitic on the issue of 
predictive success. Preservation becomes superfluous.
It is not a sufficient condition because the mere survival of a given theoretical 
component does not guarantee that it has latched onto the world. Various reasons 
may be responsible for a component’s survival. It may be a convenient feature of 
scientific practice, or it may be a useful tool that has no power of representation. 
Plenty of examples can be drawn from the history of science to make plain that the 
preservation of a theoretical component is an insufficient condition to its 
truth/approximate truth. In the case study presented in this chapter, we traced the 
hypothesis of the materiality of heat for at least two millennia until its wholesale 
rejection in the middle of the 19th century. Its long preservation guaranteed neither 
its survival nor its truth/approximate truth.
In the recent history of science, there has been a substantial correlation between 
preservation and approximate truth. This correlation, however, can be explained by 
the fact that scientists are more likely to preserve those components that have 
predictive success and independent confirmation. Since one of science’s chief aims 
is to procure accurate predictions, any preserved elements are likely to have 
predictive merits. Indeed, as the demands for predictive accuracy increase, it will be 
reasonable to assume that so does the preservation of predictively powerful, as 
opposed to merely convenient, elements.
To be fair, very few realists would take preservation as a necessary or sufficient 
condition for a theory’s truth/approximate truth.217 But then, what role exactly does 
preservation play in the scientific realism debate? I am not claiming here that we 
should completely dismiss the importance of history in the scientific realism debate. 
Given that the pessimistic meta-induction argument is a real threat to the realist, one 
can employ cases of genuine preservation to defuse anti-realist objections stemming 
from the history of science. That, however, is as far as the preservation strategy will 
take the realist. The most telling, though admittedly not conclusive, test for which
217 Exceptions can always be found. Worrall, for example, takes preservation to be a necessary 
condition for a theory’s truth/approximate truth.
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components have latched onto the world is whether they have independent 
confirmation. Testing this can be done independently of any historical 
considerations, and, therefore, makes the requirement that a component be preserved 
superfluous. Realists should thus focus more on elaborating such prediction-based 
criteria.218
7. Conclusion
The primary aim of this chapter was to evaluate how scientific realism and structural 
realism perform when confronted with the caloric theory of heat.
In assessing scientific realism, two main strategies were considered. The first tries to 
establish that the caloric is a referential term. Like many others, I argued that this 
strategy fails to justify in a principled way which terms can be thought of as 
referential and which cannot. The second strategy, Psillos' own, tries to establish that 
caloric was not a central term in the theory. Employing, among other things, 
objections from two critics of Psillos, i.e. Stanford and Chang, I indicated that 
Psillos’ arguments by and large fail. On the basis of Psillos’ own definition of what 
counts as central, the caloric posit was neither doubted by leading figures of the 
theory as central nor was it entirely dispensable in deriving explanations.
Indeed, what Psillos hoped to achieve by this strategy is unrealistic. First, scientists’ 
epistemic attitudes towards a given theoretical term cannot always be trusted. A 
glaring example from the given historical context is the trust scientists placed -  or, 
should I say misplaced -  in the hypothesis of the materiality of heat. A more reliable 
factor seems to be whether the term’s description is really indispensable in producing 
predictions and explanations. Second, by being relative to a given epoch, Psillos’ 
criterion of indispensability is vulnerable to Chang’s objection that the caloric posit 
and its properties were indispensable-at-the-time.
In assessing structural realism, I argued that Psillos’ three cases of successful 
components are structural. The three cases involve five equations that I listed as Ll- 
L5. What seemed as prima facie support for structural realism, however, had to be
218 O f course, if  radical underdetermination holds not even prediction-based criteria can save realism.
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re-evaluated when the phenomenological character of L1-L5 was revealed. Worrall- 
style ESR does not seem to benefit from such laws, since they have no theoretical 
terms to replace with variables and quantify over as Ramseyfication prescribes. 
Though there are plausible solutions to this problem none were pursued in detail 
because Ramsey-style ESR faces other difficulties that make it unattractive.
I believe to have shown that Russellian-style ESR can more easily benefit from L l- 
L5. These laws are the concrete observational structures from which the abstract 
structure of the physical world is derived. In their capacity as concrete observational 
structures, they are, of course, supportive of constructive empiricism, too. The 
crucial difference again depends on whether or not one is willing to accept the 
principles H-W and MR. These principles allow the believer to cross the boundary 
from anti-realism to realism.
It has been pointed out that belief in ESR does not indiscriminately commit one to 
the belief that all structures will be preserved. Some structures never make it past 
scientific revolutions. Moreover, when they do survive, structures are not always 
found intact. More often than not, old structures reappear only as limiting cases of 
new structures. I suggested, following Worrall and many others, that this fact can be 
accommodated by ESR when appeal is made to the correspondence principle. I 
offered one concrete version of the correspondence principle, which I called ‘NC’, 
arguing that it is corroborated by some well-known cases in the history of modem 
physics. I believe to have shown that NC is difficult to satisfy, i.e. it is non-trivial, 
and that it should therefore not be taken lightly. In the end, I conceded that more 
work needs to be done to establish whether the history of science corresponds to 
MSSS', i.e. that “not all structures may survive, but most predictively successful 
elements that do survive, either intact or suitably modified (for, example, according 
to NC), are structural.”
The criterion of the maturity of science is one of the last issues I took up. My 
conclusion was that the structural realist does not need to draw quasi-arbitrary 
distinctions between mature and immature science. Instead, what matters is whether 
a structure survives in some recognisable form. Indeed, even this last claim is not 
strictly speaking correct, since preservation seems parasitic on the predictive power
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of structures. For this reason, I urged the participants in the scientific realism debate 
to not overestimate what can be achieved by historical continuity.
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6
UNDERDETERMINATION OF THEORIES BY 
EVIDENCE
1. Introduction
So far my discussion of underdetermination was either peripheral as in the case of 
Newman’s objection and the pessimistic meta-induction, or non-traditional, as in the 
case of the underdetermination of relations by narrowly construed formal properties 
(see chapter three, section four). In this chapter, I turn to the more traditional forms 
of underdetermination and discuss some of the central issues surrounding this topic. 
The aim will be to evaluate to what extent, if at all, the realist, and in particular the 
structural realist, can overcome the difficulties posed by underdetermination. In 
pursuing this aim, I will thus be addressing RP1 on the list of challenges any realist 
position must overcome. To remind the reader, the challenge is to show that from a 
pool of empirically equivalent theories, at least some are more epistemically 
warranted than others.
As I have already indicated in chapter one, arguments from the underdetermination 
of theories by evidence have been criticised as being unable to deliver all that the 
anti-realist wants to derive from them. Today, the debate over the epistemic 
significance of underdetermination centres on Laudan and Leplin’s seminal article. 
To repeat, Laudan and Leplin present a two-pronged critique of those 
underdetermination arguments that rely on the notion of empirical equivalence.219 
On the one hand, they question the view that all theories have genuine empirically 
equivalent rivals. On the other, they argue that, even when theories have such rivals, 
there are still justifiable ways to choose between them. Let us look at these prongs 
one at a time.
219 Though they focus on defeating the inference from empirical equivalence to underdetermination, 
the tenor o f their claims suggests that they want to defeat underdetermination altogether. For example, 
they say: “The thesis o f  underdetermination, at least in so far as it is founded on presumptions about 
the possibility o f empirical equivalence for theories -  or ‘systems o f the world’ -  stands refuted” 
(1991:466).
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2. Does Every Theory have Empirically Equivalent Rivals?
Laudan and Leplin cite three theses which, when taken together, allegedly “cast 
doubt on empirical equivalence in general” (1991: 451). These are:220
(VRO) What is observable varies through time.
(NAP) The derivation of observable consequences typically requires auxiliaries. 
(IAA) Auxiliaries vary through time.
On the basis of these, they argue that the observational consequences of a theory are 
not fixed but vary over time, and conclude that they are not clearly identifiable and 
that empirical equivalence is, therefore, defeasible. In their own words:
... any determination of the empirical consequence class of a theory must be 
relativized to a particular state of science. We infer that empirical equivalence itself 
must be so relativised, and, accordingly, that any finding of empirical equivalence is 
both contextual and defeasible (454).
One immediate reply to this argument is that whether the observational 
consequences of a theory are fixed or vary over time is a matter independent of 
whether theories are empirically equivalent. Underdetermination is supposed to hold 
for any given body of observational evidence, giving rise to infinitely many 
empirically equivalent theories that diverge on their theoretical claims. We can 
capture the variability of a theory’s observational consequences over time by saying 
that out of a class Q which contains n sets of observation sentences as members, i.e. 
Oi, O2, ..., On, the theory (plus any auxiliaries) at any time t entails just one set, 
though we may not know which one. Given the definition of UTE-CE, i.e. the 
underdetermination thesis, any member Oj of class Q will be a set entailed by 
infinitely many theories that diverge on their theoretical claims. Hence, if the 
underdetermination thesis is correct, whatever the set of observational consequences 
entailed by a given theory plus auxiliaries, other incompatible theories will also have 
that set as their set of observational consequences. Naturally, the correctness of the 
underdetermination thesis cannot be assumed, since it is what is at stake here. 
Nonetheless, if Laudan and Leplin are to assume its incorrectness in order to prove 
that their objection holds, then they are simply begging the question. It thus seems
220 The acronyms are those used by the authors.
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that raising doubt about the stability of a theory’s observational consequences does 
not dent the underdetermination thesis.
Laudan and Leplin anticipate this reply and, as a consequence, devote a whole 
section of their paper trying to undermine it.221 Their argument consists of two 
strategies. First, to reject the view that there exists an algorithm that can generate 
empirically equivalent rivals for any given theory. Second, to deny that the cases 
offered as examples of empirically equivalent theories are genuine.
I will begin with the second claim since it can be more easily dismissed. In pursuit of 
the second strategy, Laudan and Leplin concoct an example, inspired by one of van 
Fraassen’s examples in The Scientific Image, and show how it fails to be a case of 
empirical equivalence. We need not delve into the details. Showing that the two 
theories under consideration are not empirically equivalent is, of course, a correct 
step on the path to showing that examples of empirically equivalent theories are not 
genuine. It is, however, a far cry from showing that neither has any empirically 
equivalent rivals. It is this latter claim that needs to be established in order for 
Laudan and Leplin’s conclusion to go through, namely if there is at least one theory 
that has no empirically equivalent rivals, then, obviously, not all theories have 
empirically equivalent rivals.
In pursuit of the first strategy, Laudan and Leplin examine the prospects of 
algorithms that reduce theories to their instrumentalist counterparts, and claim that 
these would invariably fail.222 There are at least two problems with Laudan and 
Leplin’s suggestion. Firstly, such algorithms do not suffice to produce rival theories, 
for they need to be augmented with a mechanism that expands the instrumentalist 
counterpart of the original theory into the theoretical vocabulary. The expansion 
must be conducted in different ways so as to yield inconsistent, i.e. rival, theories. 
Unsurprisingly, after a short discussion of the limitations of instrumentalist
221 Here’s what they say “[t]he response we anticipate to our argument is a challenge to its assumption 
that empirical consequence classes must be identified for their empirical equivalence to be 
established” (455).
222 Though they do not give any examples o f instrumentalist algorithms, they may have something 
like the Ramsey-sentence in mind. Naturally, quite a few philosophers, including Grover Maxwell and 
John Worrall would oppose this identification, since they believe that the Ramsey-sentence o f a 
theory T is not an instrumental reduction o f T, but rather is T when properly construed.
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algorithms, Laudan and Leplin state the obvious, i.e. “what application of an 
instrumentalist algorithm to a theory produces is manifestly not an alternative 
theory” (456) [original emphasis].
Secondly, after their rejection of instrumentalist algorithms, they hastily conclude: 
“We know of no algorithm for generating genuine theoretical competitors to a given 
theory” (457). Laudan and Leplin start this section of their paper by claiming they 
can defeat the idea that there exist empirically equivalent theories for any given 
theory. All they end up showing, however, is that they cannot themselves devise an 
algorithm to produce such theories. As we have seen, the only type of algorithm they 
consider, viz. instrumentalist algorithm, is not even a suitable candidate, for it 
produces instrumentalist versions of theories and not genuine rival theories. In 
general, we can say that our inability to devise an algorithm for producing 
empirically equivalent theories does not entail that such theories do not exist.223
This point can be supported by a lesson learned in the theory of recursion. Two 
definitions will help us here: (1) We say that a set A is recursive (or decidable) if 
there exists a Turing machine, i.e. an algorithm, which can determine in a finite 
number of steps whether or not any given object is a member of A. (2) We say that a 
set A is recursively enumerable if it can be written as a sequence A = {ai, a2, as,...} 
which can be generated by means of a Turing machine. All recursive sets are also 
recursively enumerable but not vice-versa. A halting set, for example, is recursively 
enumerable but not recursive.224 Some sets are not even recursively enumerable, 
namely non-diophantine sets. The moral of the story is that these are non-empty sets 
that cannot be specified algorithmically. Likewise, in our context, should it turn out 
that there is no algorithm for producing empirically equivalent rivals, the conclusion 
need not be that sets containing such rivals are empty.225
223 In the formulation o f underdetermination arguments, there is no requirement that empirically 
equivalent alternatives must be produced first, but rather that such alternatives exist.
224 A halting set is a recursively enumerable set consisting o f all inputs on which a computer program 
halts.
225 We can even apply this moral to the issue about the identifiability o f  a theory’s set o f observational 
consequences, which Laudan and Leplin contest. That is, we can think o f  sets that are purportedly not 
clearly identifiable as sets that cannot be produced algorithmically. These can nonetheless be non­
empty and well-defined sets.
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Algorithmically Produced Rivals
Is it really the case that not all theories have empirically equivalent rivals? To 
evaluate this claim, let us consider some of the obstacles that arise when we try to 
devise rival theories. A simple algorithm for producing rival theories has the 
following form: Take an existing theory and add to it a hitherto un-included 
theoretical claim. Suppose we have a theory X. We add to it theoretical claim Ti, 
making sure that X does not contain or entail T\. The result X&Ti is a new theory 
rivalling the old one. We can repeat this process indefinitely, each time adding a 
different theoretical claim that is not included in the original theory.
Obviously, this method is grossly inadequate. One major problem is that it does not 
guarantee empirical equivalence. To rectify this, we must require that the new 
theoretical claim does not, when taken together with the original theory, affect its 
observational consequences. I can think of three different types of theoretical claims 
that might conceivably satisfy this condition:
(1) Theoretical claims that have no observational consequences whatsoever.
(2) Theoretical claims whose observational consequences are already amongst 
the consequences of the original theory.
(3) Theoretical claims that have observational consequences only when 
conjoined to other statements, none of which are entailed by the original 
theory.
The first type of theoretical claim seems straightforward enough. Are there any 
examples of such claims? Take Newton’s notion of absolute space. According to 
Newton, “[ajbsolute space, of its own nature without reference to anything external, 
always remains homogeneous and immovable” ([1726] 1999: 410). Many of us 
would doubt whether the sentence asserting the existence of absolute space has any 
observational consequences.226 It is, however, always possible to construct 
conditional sentences that endow observational consequences to theoretical claims of 
type one. In the example just mentioned, such a conditional sentence would take the 
form ‘If there is absolute space, then P’, where P must be an observation sentence.
226 Stephen Brush and Gerald Holton go as far as to brand such claims meaningless (see ([1952]2001: 
163).
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This just means that no theoretical claims of the first type exist, since we can always 
find additional sentences that when conjoined with any theoretical claim produce 
observational consequences.
The second type of theoretical claim comprises those that have observational 
consequences already entailed by the theory in question. This preserves the original 
set of observational consequences, and thus the empirical equivalence is not violated. 
It may be objected that if the extra theoretical claim does not contribute any new 
observational consequences then why append it to the original theory in the first 
place. In particular, it may be argued that these claims can be rejected on account of 
parsimony. Though this objection is intuitively sound, it does not eliminate all 
theoretical claims of this type, since such claims can be desirable for reasons 
independent of their observational consequences.227 For example, a theoretical claim 
of this type may be explanatory in some way that the original theory is not. Given 
that realists value the explanatory power of theoretical claims, they would find it 
difficult to dismiss this possibility. Finally, it is worth recalling that the notion of 
parsimony is notoriously difficult to define and defend.
The third type of theoretical claim finds support from Duhem’s thesis, according to 
which theories or statements cannot be tested in isolation, for they never have 
observational consequences of their own. Laudan and Leplin would have to accept 
this type of claim, since their thesis NAP is premised on an almost identical point, 
i.e. that theories often require auxiliaries in order to entail observable consequences 
(see (1991: 452)).228 The point here is that the addition of certain theoretical claims 
T{ to a theory T yields a theory T8iT{ that is empirically equivalent to T, since for T{ 
to have any observational consequences, they have to be supplemented with 
additional theoretical claims 7]/'. An example of this type of theoretical claim, taken 
from Duhem, is that light consists of projectiles that are emitted at great speed from 
luminous sources like the sun. Taken on its own, this central claim of the emission 
theory of light does not entail anything observable. The projectiles are so small and 
travel so fast that we cannot directly observe them. To derive observational
227 1 am not claiming here that the reasons are epistemologically significant. They could very well be 
merely pragmatic.
228 Unlike Duhem, we can concede that some, but not all, theories/theoretical claims can be tested in 
isolation. Laudan and Leplin also make this point.
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consequences we need to assume additional theoretical claims, i.e. that these 
projectiles penetrate all transparent bodies, that they experience attractions and 
repulsions, etc. The collection of these propositions allowed the derivation of die 
observational claim that light travels faster in water than in air. Contrary to this 
claim, Jean Foucault showed in 1851 that the speed of light in air is greater than in 
water.
Laudan and Leplin never really elaborate what characteristics a rival theory should 
have to be considered genuine. They mention the obvious, namely that they do not 
consider logically equivalent theories as rivals. Their only other remarks on this 
issue are obscure: “As we do not question the empirical equivalence of logically 
equivalent theories, we ignore this suggestion and assume henceforth that theories 
whose empirical equivalence is at issue are logically and conceptually distinct” 
(1991: 455). I presume that by ‘logically and conceptually distinct’ they mean ‘not 
logically equivalent’. So far, the focal point of my discussion of producing 
empirically equivalent theories has been the addition of theoretical claims to existing 
theories. This allows the production of logically inequivalent rivals but not 
necessarily the production of incompatible rivals. We thus come to the question: 
Does every theory have logically inconsistent rivals that are nonetheless empirically 
equivalent?
One obvious way of producing such rivals involves replacing -  instead of adding -  
theoretical claims with claims incompatible with them. Like before, eligible 
theoretical claims can take one of the following forms:
(1) Theoretical claims that, (a) have observational consequences but only when 
conjoined to other statements none of which are included in the original 
theory, or (b) have observational consequences already contained in the 
main theory. These must be replaced with theoretical claims that are either
229 Adding a theoretical claim T\ to a theory T does not always mean that the new theory T&Ti will be 
logically inequivalent to the original theory T. This is a simple logical point. The result o f conjoining 
some sentence Q to some sentence P, i.e. P&Q, is not always logically inequivalent to P. Indeed, it is 
equivalent if  and only if  P entails Q.
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of form (a) or (b), and that result in a theory that is logically incompatible to 
the original.230
(2) Theoretical claims with observational consequences that, if removed, will 
alter the observational consequence set of a theory must be replaced with 
theoretical claims that will return the set to its original state and will result in 
a theory logically incompatible to the original.
There may not exist historical examples for each of the above ways through which 
replacement can be performed, but, as we saw earlier, the point about 
underdetermination can be made independently of such examples. The above two 
methods’ logic of constructing empirically equivalent theories that are logically 
incompatible is quite straightforward: Replace theoretical claims so that 1) the 
resulting theory is incompatible with the original theory, and 2) the observational 
consequence set remains untouched.
The realist might object that these are not genuine rivals. Yet, the notion ‘genuine 
rival’ remains elusive. As we have seen earlier, Laudan and Leplin’s scant remarks 
were insufficient to pin it down. Until an elaboration and defence of this notion 
appears, the realist cannot simply rely on the admittedly innocuous-sounding 
proclamation that some theories have no empirically equivalent rivals. That is not to 
say that the anti-realist is better off, for the problem of defining the concept of a 
‘genuine rival’ concerns both parties in the debate. In sum, it is not clear where the 
burden of proof lies.
3. Can we Justifiably Choose between Empirically Equivalent Theories?
This takes us to the next prong of Laudan and Leplin’s critique. They claim that even 
if two theories are empirically equivalent, we can still choose between them. More 
precisely, they hold that (1) a theory may be supported by evidence that does not 
form part of its observational consequences, and (2) the observational consequences 
of a theory need not provide support for it. In other words, they are claiming that
230 I treat the two types o f theoretical claims discussed above jointly, because the empirical 
equivalence between original and modified theory will still hold even if  the theoretical claim replaced 
is not o f  the same type.
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empirical equivalence does not entail co-confirmation, i.e. two empirically 
equivalent theories need not be equally confirmed by the evidence.
In support of their second claim, Laudan and Leplin simply point out that the fact 
that H  entails e does not necessarily mean that e confirms H. This seems correct, but 
presents no problems to empirical equivalence cases. One need only restrict a 
theory’s observational consequence set S  to a subset Sc containing as members all 
and only those observational statements that have the power to confirm. Notice that 
this restriction is equivalent to simply taking a theory whose set of observational 
consequences is Sc to begin with. But there is no reason to suppose that this latter 
theory has no empirically equivalent rivals.231 Thus, all that Laudan and Leplin’s 
point achieves is to trade one empirical equivalence class for another.
In support of their first claim they make use of the following argument. Suppose that 
hypothesis H  entails evidence e and that e confirms H. Evidence that confirms a 
hypothesis H  will also confirm (a) any theory T that entails H  and (b) any other 
hypothesis entailed by T. The point is that while H  entails e, need not. In other 
words, a hypothesis may be supported by evidence that it does not entail. Here’s a 
reconstruction of the form of argument that Laudan and Leplin sanction (see (464)):
For any i,j, and k:
Hi h e (1 ) -premise
e confirms Hi (2) - premise
Tj I- Hi (3) - premise
e confirms Tj (4) - by CCC (see below)
231 Recall that, following Laudan and Leplin’s article, we assume in this subsection o f the chapter that 
empirical equivalence holds for any given theory. The contested point here is whether there are ways 
to choose between theories that we have already ascertained as empirically equivalent.
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Tj I- Hk (where k^i) (5) - premise 
Hk / e  (6) - premise
e confirms Hk (7) - by SCC (see below)232
Samir Okasha (1997) has correctly criticised this form of argument by saying that it 
relies on two principles that Hempel showed to be incompatible, namely the 
‘converse consequence condition’ (CCC) and the ‘special consequence condition’ 
(SCC). According to CCC, if some evidence confirms a statement S  it also confirms 
any statement S' that entails S. According to SCC, if  some evidence confirms a 
statement S, it also confirms any statement S' that S  entails. Hempel demonstrated 
that SCC and CCC can, when used together, lead to absurdity. The following 
argument is an example of how the principles can be used to derive confirmation for 
any theory:
Hi confirms Hj (a) - self-evident233
(Tj & Hi) I- Hj (b) - self-evident
Hi confirms Tj & Hi (c) - by CCC
(Tj & Hj) I- Tj (d) - self-evident
Hi confirms Tj (e) - by SCC
On the basis of CCC and SCC, this argument shows that anything can confirm 
anything, an obviously absurd result.
To Okasha’s critique I want to add that, even if employed on their own, the two 
principles can lead to incorrect inferences. It is well known that employing CCC on 
its own still allows us to derive that evidence which confirms a hypothesis will 
confirm any theory, no matter how ridiculous, that entails the hypothesis.234
232 N.B.: Lines 1-4 count as additional premises to the second argument.
233 This assumes that a statement can confirm itself.
234 This is a point I briefly raised in section three o f chapter three when I was tackling objection PS6. 
The result is also known as the ‘tacking paradox’.
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Similarly, employing SCC on its own allows us to derive that evidence which 
confirms a theory will confirm any hypothesis, no matter how ridiculous, that is 
entailed by the theory.
It is important to note that this does not mean that all inferences made on the basis of 
either or even both principles will be incorrect. But how would we set about showing 
which inferences are warranted and which are not? Laudan and Leplin offer no 
qualification on their use of CCC and SCC, assuming that the logical relations 
between theories and hypotheses are enough. As we have seen, this leads to the 
above absurdities. Contra Laudan and Leplin, warranted inferences seem to involve 
theories and hypotheses that are intimately, not just logically, related.
The sort of consideration referred to by the traditional scientific realist as indicating 
the intimacy of various parts of theories is unity. Together with simplicity, 
explanatory power, and comprehensiveness, they are frequently cited as the ultimate 
defence of realist claims (see, for example, Nelson (1996) and Psillos (1999)).235 
Possession of these virtues is viewed as extra-observational evidence that can 
overcome claims of empirical equivalence.236 More precisely, that Ti and T2 are 
empirically equivalent does not entail that the evidence equally confirms Ti and T2 . 
This is a trivial point once one accepts that the possession of the above virtues counts 
as (non-observational) evidence.237 In the Bayesian framework, for example, these 
theoretical virtues can be reflected in the choice of priors.238
Van Fraassen objects that the so-called ‘theoretical virtues’ are nothing but 
pragmatic features of theories (see, for example, his (1980: 87-89)) with no 
epistemic significance. In other words, he denies that these virtues have any
235 Some take these virtues to denote one and the same thing that is merely expressed in different 
ways.
236 It is worth noting that Laudan and Leplin try to defeat underdetermination without recourse to 
extra-observational considerations.
237 Another realist approach to theoretical virtues is to deny that they are evidential, but assert that 
they still have a role to play in the truth or approximate truth o f a theory. One can thus argue from the 
platform that they are ‘extra-evidential’ considerations pertinent to the truth content o f the theory.
O f course, being a Bayesian does not necessarily mean that one takes theoretical virtues as formal 
criteria for restricting one’s priors. Thus, in considering the role o f the notion o f simplicity in 
Bayesianism, Howson and Urbach (1996) state that “the addition o f any criterion [including 
simplicity] for determining prior distributions is unwarranted in a theory which purports to be a theory 
of consistent degrees o f belief, and nothing more” (418) [original emphasis].
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evidential status, i.e. that they can confirm or disconfirm a theory. They can, of 
course, be used as pragmatic criteria for acceptance of a theory, but their role is 
restricted to just that. The lack of consensus on how to understand theoretical virtues 
certainly makes things easier for Van Fraassen's view, since it motivates the 
suspicion that they might be conventional and/or pragmatic features of theory choice. 
Even more damaging is the insufficiency of evidence that nature is amenable to a 
unified, comprehensive, simple, and explanatorily powerful account. This view finds 
some proponents in the realist camp. Nancy Cartwright, for example, argues in 
favour of the disunity of science.239
There is thus a standoff over the epistemic significance of theoretical virtues. In the 
current context, this means that to the extent that theoretical virtues might be able to 
substantiate Laudan and Leplin’s claim, i.e. that a theory is supported by evidence 
that does not form part of its observational consequences, we must reserve our 
judgment.
Evidential Equivalence
I will not enter into the dispute over the epistemic import of theoretical virtues. 
Instead, I propose to look at some of the ramifications in case either side wins.
Suppose the anti-realist wins. In that case, we would say that a theory cannot be 
confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of theoretical virtues. Does that mean that 
only observational consequences are evidentially relevant to a theory? The answer to 
this question depends on whether the realist can find anything other than the 
aforementioned theoretical virtues that could seriously be considered as evidentially 
relevant to the confirmation of theories. It must nonetheless be noted that the current 
state-of-affairs does not provide much hope that other non-observational 
considerations may eventually succeed where theoretical virtues such as unity and 
simplicity have failed.
Suppose the realist wins the argument, thereby establishing that theoretical virtues 
are evidentially relevant. In that case, we would say that a theory can be confirmed
239 That does not mean that she rejects any kind of appeals to unification, let’s say within specific 
domains, but rather that she rejects overall claims o f the unification o f the science.
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or disconfirmed on a non-observational basis, effectively going beyond the epistemic 
commitments of constructive empiricism. This said, is the issue of 
underdetermination settled? The answer is ‘no’. Even if two empirically equivalent 
theories are evidentially inequivalent, there may still be theories that are evidentially 
equivalent to each! What needs to be established is whether or not there are 
evidentially equivalent rivals for any theory, i.e. whether the following sentence is 
true:
(EVE) VT 3T' [(T 'b-T ) & T ' is evidentially equivalent to T].
Even if empirical equivalence claims can be defeated by appeal to theoretical virtues, 
there remains the issue of evidential equivalence, or EVE for short. If EVE is false, 
there are at least some theories that the evidence can uniquely identify. If, however, 
EVE is true, then underdetermination remains rife, albeit in a restricted form that no 
longer supports constructive empiricism. The difference consists in the extent to 
which underdetermination can be mollified.
The suggestion that arises here is that realism does not need to defeat 
underdetermination altogether to be able to defeat constructive empiricism. To 
achieve the latter, it suffices to provide non-observational constraints to 
underdetermination. To achieve the former, the following sentence must be shown to 
be true:
(EVE2) 3T 3T' [(T 'h-T ) & T' is evidentially equivalent to T].
That is, if  we want to defeat underdetermination entirely, we need to show that no 
theory has evidentially equivalent rivals, i.e. all theories are uniquely identified by 
some set of (observational and non-observational) evidence.
EVE2 seems too strong a claim, since it requires all theories to lack evidentially 
equivalent rivals. Realists, it might be argued, can achieve their aim of vanquishing 
underdetermination with the weaker claim that all true theories lack evidentially
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equivalent rivals. That is, they can achieve their aim if they can show the following 
sentence to be true:
(EVE3) -• 3T 3T' [(T'l—T) & T ' is evidentially equivalent to T], where T is any true 
theory.240
Suppose EVE3 is true. What follows? Once scientific inquiry arrives at a true theory, 
this theory will have no evidentially equivalent rivals. Since EVE3 refers only to true 
theories, theories that do not possess this trait may well have evidentially equivalent 
rivals. To the extent that all of our current theories are at best approximately true, i.e. 
not true simpliciter, establishing EVE3 is of no immediate help to the issue of 
underdetermination. In other words, a realist must also require that approximately 
true theories lack evidentially equivalent rivals:
(EVE4) -■ 3T 3T' [(T'l-^T) & T' is evidentially equivalent to T], where T  is any 
approximately true theory.
The reference to the concept of approximate truth complicates the evaluation of 
EVE4’s truth conditions. Without a clear understanding of this slippery concept, 
EVE4 would be hard to establish. This adds complications to those already present 
due to the concept of evidential equivalence. For, even though we have been 
supposing that theoretical virtues have evidential status, there is still the issue of how 
to unpack the concept of evidential equivalence.
I hope to have offered a glimpse into some of the consequences for theory choice 
should theoretical virtues be more than just pragmatic considerations. One lesson to 
take away from this sub-section is that theory choice may well remain indeterminate 
even after a potential defeat of the constructive empiricist brand of 
underdetermination.
240 In a sense, EVE3 says something trivial. If T is true, then surely T f must be false since it 
contradicts T. Why then do we need to show that EVE3 is true? Presumably because it is possible for 
two or more theories to be evidentially equivalent and true with respect to all possible observations, 
yet still have inconsistent components.
195
4. Structural Realism and Underdetermination
The Inverse Relation o f Epistemic Commitments to Underdetermination 
To get a firmer grip on the general notion of underdetermination we need to 
circumscribe it. At one end, we have the most radical form of underdetermination. 
This arises if  no constraints can be given to the content of theories -  not even 
empirical constraints. In short, any theory is as good as any other. At the other end, 
we have a complete lack of underdetermination. This presumably arises if sufficient 
constraints can be given to uniquely determine a theory. In the middle lies a 
spectrum of different degrees of underdetermination, each arising on account of the 
strength of the different constraints that can be given. Whether or not a set of 
constraints mitigates underdetermination in an acceptable way depends on whether 
or not these constraints are warranted.
There is thus an inverse relation between constraints and underdetermination. The 
stronger the constraints the weaker the impact of underdetermination on theory 
choice. What kinds of constraints are we talking about? In the above subsection we 
talked about observational and non-observational constraints. Here we will look at 
constraints from a slightly different angle, namely from the perspective of the 
epistemic commitments of positions in the scientific realism debate. We will thus 
take a position’s epistemic commitments to act as the constraints it claims to place 
on underdetermination.
Reformulating the inverse relation in terms of epistemic commitments, we get: The 
stronger the epistemic commitments of a position in the scientific realism debate, the 
more rival theories (to any currently successful theory) can potentially be eliminated, 
and, consequently, the more constrained underdetermination becomes. I say 
‘potentially’ because, all things considered, whether rival theories can be eliminated 
depends on the available evidence. If the epistemic commitments of a position in the 
scientific realism debate are correct, then one would expect that the most successful 
theories would tell us something about the world in accordance with those 
commitments. For example, if structural realism says that we can only know the 
structure of the physical world, then our most successful theories will at best be able 
to tell us something about the structure of the physical world. Thus, if structural
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realism is correct, there are structural constraints that theories must satisfy. Any 
given theory of optics, for instance, will have to describe the structure of light in a 
way that more or less approximates the description given by Fresnel's equations.
The four positions considered in this dissertation, i.e. (non-structural) scientific 
realism, Ramsey-style structural realism, Russellian ESR, and constructive 
empiricism, can thus be ordered according to their epistemic commitments, and, 
consequently, according to their potential to eliminate rival theories.
Commitments Concrete
Observational
Structures
Ramsey
Sentences
Abstract
Structures
Concrete
Physical
Structures
Viewpoints
Constructive Empiricism •
Ramsey-style ESR • • o
Russellian ESR • • o
Scientific Realism • • •* •
•  indicates full specification.
o indicates specification up to isomorphism.
* this holds with certain qualifications; see discussion below.
The table provides a rough classification, for, inevitably, some degree of idealisation 
is involved. Recall that scientific realists think that we cannot really divide things 
into observables and unobservables. They allow talk of ‘unobservables’ but only as a 
fafon de parler, for they think that ‘unobservables’ are merely indirectly observable, 
i.e. observable with the help of instruments. The objects of observation, for scientific 
realists, are the objects inhabiting the physical world, i.e. electrons, bicycles, 
molecules, etc. By contrast, empiricists believe that the objects of observation are the 
phenomena, i.e. some sort of intermediaries between physical objects and 
perceptions. Van Fraassen, in particular, thinks that the line between observable and 
unobservable, though hazy, can still be drawn. Comparatively, the structural realists 
believe, like the scientific realists, that whether something is observed with unaided 
vision does not affect its status as an observable. Unlike scientific realists and more 
like constructive empiricists, they draw a line between observables and 
unobservables. Contrary to both scientific realists and constructive empiricists, the 
term ‘unobservable’ for structural realists encompasses all physical objects, whereas 
the term ‘observable’ has as its objects the perceptual contents of our heads. This is 
not to deny, of course, that these contents have causal origins in the external world.
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Despite these discrepancies, there is still enough common ground to uphold the 
above classification. Take sub-atomic particles for example. These are unobservable 
according to the constructive empiricist and the structural realist, but indirectly 
observable according to the scientific realist. They are unobservable to the 
constructive empiricist and the structural realist for different reasons. The 
constructive empiricist will say that they are simply beyond the scope of unaided 
vision. The structural realist will say that subatomic particles populate the external 
world and as such are unobservable. These differences notwithstanding, all parties 
agree that photographs of tracks in cloud chambers are observable. They also agree 
that the content of these photographs can be expressed via observation sentences. 
This includes any relations or empirical generalisations that might be inferable from 
the photographs. In other words, all parties undertake an epistemic commitment to 
concrete observational structures.
Without further ado, let us consider how different types of constraints are supposed 
to curtail underdetermination. The first line of defence against underdetermination is 
logical consistency and observational constraints -  the latter in the form of concrete 
observational structures. Innumerable theories can be weeded out as non-rivals 
solely on the basis of these two criteria. One need only consider that out of the set of 
all possible theories, empirically adequate and internally consistent theories form 
proper subsets.241 All abandoned theories together with any empirically equivalent 
rivals they might have fall under this category simply on account of their empirical 
failures 242 Moreover, we can quite easily contrive examples of ineligible rivals by 
making them entail observationally false consequences, or by making them 
internally inconsistent.
So even at the level of observational evidence, there are constraints that mitigate the 
absolute relativisation of theory choice. Naturally, logical consistency and 
observational constraints are not meant to distinguish between realist positions and 
constructive empiricism, as these are constraints that all parties in the debate take on 
board. Indeed, what we have just restricted is an extreme version of
241 Here the notion o f empirical adequacy is employed to mean ‘adequate with regard to available 
observations’, i.e. not in Van Fraassen’s sense o f ‘adequate with regard to all observations’.
242 Current theories also have their own share o f failures and thus must also be weeded out. O f course, 
this is not an argument to abandon current theories without first finding a better alternative.
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underdetermination that would probably be uncongenial even to social 
constructivists like Bruno Latour. What about the more familiar forms of 
underdetermination, like UTE-CE, that take observational evidence constraints for 
granted? Is there a way to mitigate these too?
ESR goes one step beyond constructive empiricism in its epistemic commitments. If 
ESR is correct, there will be structural constraints that theories need to satisfy. In 
other words, it has the potential to eliminate even more rival theories, i.e. it has the 
potential to mitigate UTE-CE. In addition to the consistency and observational 
constraints, ESR endorses the existence of, and epistemic accessibility to, structural 
constraints. It thereby purports to classify more theories as non-rivals on account of 
their failure to satisfy the structural constraints. Advocates of Ramsey-style 
structural realism take these structural constraints to be manifested in the Ramsey- 
sentence of a successful theory.243 Advocates of Russellian structural realism take 
these to be the abstract structures that can be inferred from concrete observational 
structures. In both cases, the concrete physical structures are specifiable only up to 
isomorphism.
Arguably, scientific realism takes epistemic commitments even further. In addition 
to the consistency, observational, and structural constraints, its advocates claim that 
there are constraints that allow the full specification of concrete physical structures. 
According to scientific realists, one or more true theories could one day reveal the 
physical world as it is to us, with all true observation sentences included. By 
contrast, the ideal case for structural realism would be an isomorphic description of 
the physical world, plus all true observation sentences. The ideal case for 
constructive empiricism is just the set of all true observation sentences.
A closer look at the relation between the epistemic commitments of scientific realism 
on the one hand and each of ESR’s two versions on the other can be instructive. The 
epistemic commitments of scientific realism are unequivocally stronger than those of 
the Ramsey-style ESR. Recall that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory T, i.e. R(T), is
243 O f course, if  Ramsey-style ESR collapses to some form o f empiricism, as some have argued, its 
structural constraints would not amount to anything beyond the observational level.
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logically weaker than T. Thus advocates of the truth/approximate truth of T  are 
necessarily advocates of the truth/approximate truth of R(T) but not vice-versa.
Things are not as clear when it comes to the Russellian version of ESR. Since there 
is nothing about scientific realism that requires adherence to the view that the 
structure of our perceptions reflects the structure of the external world, commitment 
to abstract structures seems out of place. Prima facie, then, the set of Russellian 
ESR-ist epistemic claims is not a proper subset of the set of scientific realist claims. 
If this is true, the two sets intersect only at the concrete observational structures. Can 
we still make sense of the view that the epistemic commitments of Russellian ESR 
are weaker than those of scientific realism?
In so far as scientific realists allow the full specification of concrete physical 
structures they commit themselves to abstract structures. After all, from the concrete 
physical structures one can deductively infer the corresponding abstract structures, 
i.e. the isomorphism classes whose members include the concrete physical structures 
in question. Of course, if they can fully specify concrete physical structures, 
scientific realists would probably have no need to infer the corresponding abstract 
structures. The point, however, is not whether scientific realists have a need to infer 
abstract structures, but rather whether commitment to concrete physical structures 
entails commitment to the corresponding abstract structures. I think this is clearly the 
case, since one can deductively infer the latter from the former and, as we all know, 
deduction is non-content increasing.
Still, there is a difference in the abstract structures of Russellian ESR and of 
scientific realism that cannot be ignored. The difference lies in the way each arrives 
at the abstract structures. According to Russellian ESR, we infer the abstract 
structures from the concrete observational structures. Against this, the above method 
of inferring abstract structures in accordance with scientific realism takes concrete 
physical structures as premises. In view of this difference, the particular abstract 
structures each position infers need not be the same. Even so, we can say that both 
positions make a general commitment to abstract structures. In this sense, the 
epistemic commitments of Russelian ESR are weaker than those of scientific 
realism.
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To avoid confusion, a proviso needs to be made at this point. My discussion of 
constructive empiricism, structural realism, and scientific realism was somewhat 
caricaturist. Nothing prevents particular versions of these viewpoints, whose 
epistemic commitments and potential effects on underdetermination vary 
significantly. Without radically changing the commitments of these viewpoints, 
however, any such manifestations will fall within certain limits. For example, on the 
strongest reading of scientific realism, perhaps one that incorporates belief in a final 
theory of everything, the constraints defeat underdetermination in its entirety. On a 
weak reading of epistemic structural realism, even the abstract structure of the 
unobservable world is underdetermined to some extent.
The upshot of this whole discussion is that differences between the epistemic 
commitments of the four positions reflect differences in how far each position 
promises to restrict underdetermination. It is reasonable to assume that as rational 
agents we want to maximise our rewards. For some, this would mean opting for a 
strong version of scientific realism, since it offers the highest rewards. Yet, there is a 
trade-off. High rewards are often tied to high risks. This also holds true here. We can 
think of the epistemic commitments as risks depending on the extent to which these 
are warranted by the available evidence and arguments in the scientific realism 
debate. The question to ask then is: How far should we take our epistemic 
commitments given the present state of evidence and arguments?
Epistemic Warrant'. Structural Realism vs. Rivals
In this subsection, I will argue that there is a good case for taking our epistemic 
commitments as far as ESR but not further. To this effect, I will utilize two groups 
of considerations that I label ‘historical’ and ‘other’ for the sake of expedience. I 
take these to be telling with respect to the present state of evidence and arguments in 
the scientific realism debate. The considerations are drawn from results reached in 
previous chapters. A number of arguments that up to now received scant attention 
will be developed further. This subsection hence doubles up as: i) a summary of the 
main reasons for accepting ESR, and ii) as an indirect answer to the question of 
underdetermination.
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- Historical Considerations
In so far as the history of science is concerned, scientific realism seems handicapped 
when compared to structural realism. Worrall’s revival of ESR rests precisely on the 
idea that it offers the only realist account of the history of science that can 
accommodate the pessimistic meta-induction argument. In the previous chapter I 
evaluated realist attempts to overcome the meta-induction argument and argued that 
these have so far been unsuccessful. By comparison, I offered several reasons why, 
at least in this department, structural realism fares better than scientific realism. 
Some of the reasons appeared in chapter three, as arguments against Psillos’ claims 
that certain non-structural components of Fresnel’s theory were preserved. As I 
argued there, the components in question are in fact structural, and, hence, encourage 
the correlation between preservation of structure and predictive success. More 
crucially, my own case study in chapter five revealed further preservation at the 
structural level. In particular, I showed that structures postulated during the caloric 
theory’s reign made their way to modem thermodynamics.
Since components are rarely preserved whole, I have also taken into consideration 
the correspondence principle. Many, if  not most, realists agree that the principle 
offers the best hope to resist anti-cumulativist arguments and to make sense of 
intertheoretic relations. This lends credence to structural realism for the principle 
operates solely at the level of mathematical structures. Although a comprehensive 
account of the correspondence principle has proved elusive, I offered one concrete 
version of the principle, what I called ‘NC’, arguing that it is corroborated by some 
well-known cases in the history of modem physics. I argued that NC is not trivially 
satisfiable and therefore cannot be easily dismissed.
Admittedly, more research needs to be carried out to establish whether the history of 
science corresponds to MSSS', i.e. that “Not all structures may survive, but most 
predictively successful elements that do survive, either intact or suitably modified 
(for, example, according to NC), are structural.” Even so, from the standpoint of the 
current state of research, the historical evidence seems to support ESR more strongly 
than it does scientific realism.
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A historical argument distinct from the above considerations, yet potent in its 
support of ESR, draws its force from the direction of scientific theorising. It is 
widely acknowledged that the trend in the history of science has been one of 
increasing mathematization. Explanations in pre-Galilean times were almost 
invariably devoid of mathematics. Though they were to a certain extent abstract, they 
would more readily rely on metaphors to explain their subject matter. Since Galileo 
and especially since Newton, there has been a transformation of scientific 
explanations, moving away from the narrative-based and ontologically profuse into 
the more abstract mathematical explanations. Andrew Warwick, in his study of the 
history of the pedagogy of physics, notes that the changing nature of the subject from 
the late 17th century onwards led to a change in the way in which it was taught and 
examined:
... the oral lectures, catechetical tutorial sessions, guided readings and Latin 
disputations, through which most university students were taught and examined, 
were ill suited to imparting the skills of advanced mixed-mathematics. Unlike the 
more elementary parts of Euclid’s geometry, in which the propositions and 
demonstrations were expressed in verbal form, the new analysis relied on the 
mastery and application of several new and highly specialised symbolic languages 
(2002: 29).
Nowadays, quantum mechanics is the prime example of a theory not at all amenable 
to the narrative-driven styles of explanation. As most of us would agree, quantum 
mechanics primarily provides predictions rather than intuitive explanations.244 Our 
understanding of it is almost entirely based on the abstract mathematical structures 
employed. It is interesting to note that one of the first things students of quantum 
mechanics are taught is to put aside their intuitions about how the world works, and 
concentrate on understanding the mathematics behind the theory. How else can they 
come to terms with such unintuitive features as wave-particle duality, non-locality, 
and the uncertainty relations? Indeed, unintuitive features like these can be found in 
other highly mathematised theories, and parts thereof. I could thus ask the same 
question about action at a distance, and a sui generis electromagnetic field.
244 Wesley Salmon makes a similar, but more restricted, point when he remarks: “Because these fine­
grained causal explanations are not possible, many philosophers, m yself included, have concluded 
that quantum mechanics does not provide explanations o f these correlations [i..e. correlations that 
exhibit non-locality]” (1998: 76).
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Turning away from the issue of increased mathematization, how does an anti-realist 
position like constructive empiricism account for the preservation found in the 
history of science? Van Fraassen, if you recall from chapter two, agrees with Worrall 
that there is a preservation of structure through theory change. Unlike Worrall, 
however, he argues that it is not the structure of the unobservable that gets preserved 
but the structure of the observable. I dubbed this ‘SRP4’ or ‘the empiricist 
structuralist challenge’. Can the challenge be met?
I believe that the Russellian version of ESR can meet this challenge. Assuming, like 
van Fraassen does, that we can only represent the phenomenal world is assuming that 
the world of phenomena has come unstuck from the physical world. How do the 
phenomena arise, if not for the underlying physical causes? Is it reasonable to 
assume that phenomena encode no information at all about the physical world?
Perhaps, it might be countered, the relation between the physical and the phenomenal 
worlds is not one of isomorphism. After all, one can accept that there is some 
relation between the two worlds without knowing what that relation amounts to. In 
other words, constructive empiricism is compatible with the view that the 
phenomenal and physical worlds are intimately related, but, owing to the lack of any 
evidence to the contrary, remains sceptical that the two worlds stand in a relation of 
isomorphism.
I can think of two reasons why this comeback is not compelling. First, the 
constructive empiricist is using double standards. He requires that the empirical 
substructures of theories are isomorphic to the structures in the phenomenal world 
but dismisses any such the relation between the phenomenal world and the physical 
world. Granted, the physical world seems more remote from our cognition than the 
world of phenomena. Does this licence scepticism for the one case but not for the 
other? The constructive empiricist needs a persuasive argument to show that this is 
so.
Second, there is an indirect way of testing the correspondence between the physical 
and the phenomenal world, namely through the correspondence between our actions 
in the physical world and our observations of their effects. Why should there be any
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such correspondence if there is no correspondence between the physical and the 
phenomenal worlds? The following example is instructive. When I see the cue ball 
lined up with the billiard ball I want to hit and the hole I want the ball to end up in, 
why is it that I know shooting straight will do the trick? It is because the two balls 
and the hole stand in a certain relation to each other, and if I do not guide my arms in 
conformity to this relation, I will not be able to shoot straight and experience that I 
shot straight. Likewise, if I do not want to pot the ball, one way to achieve this is by 
not shooting straight. In doing so, I can see the effect of my not shooting straight, i.e. 
I can see the ball bouncing off the sides of the billiard table.
Even though we only have direct access to our experience, all of us, realists and anti­
realists alike, assume that our bodies reside in the physical world. Our actions are 
causes in the physical world and they have effects that we can perceive. This simple 
idea provides a constant reminder of the correspondence between the physical and 
the phenomenal worlds.
- Other Considerations
Three of ESR’s most forceful arguments are the arguments from the:
(1) structural source of predictive power
(2) limits of mathematical description
(3) linguistic intransmissibility of anything but structure
I have more or less introduced all three arguments in preceding chapters. Here, I will 
restate the arguments and, where needed, present a more thorough treatment than 
that given earlier.
The first argument, i.e. the argument from the structural source ofpredictive power, 
has only been hinted at in previous chapters. In spite of this, it does not need much 
setting up. The argument rests to a great extent on the simple observation that out of 
all the features of theories, only the mathematical structures possess sharp predictive 
power. This is significant because the testing of theories primarily concerns 
measuring how accurately its predictions match the observable phenomena. In so far 
as the epistemic warrant of theories is largely decided under such testing,
205
mathematical structures win this contest hands down, for they alone have the ability 
to produce accurate predictions.
The critic may object, in the spirit of Duhem’s thesis, that although mathematical 
structures are necessary in the process of churning out predictions, they are not 
sufficient. Other non-structural components are involved, it may be argued, and they 
surely deserve some of the credit for the predictive success and hence a share of the 
epistemic warrant. Two things can be said in opposition to this objection. First, we 
must be wary of so-called ‘non-structural components’. As we have seen in section 
three of chapter three, Psillos’ examples of non-structural components turned out to 
be structural. The onus is on the scientific realist to find legitimate examples. As I 
argued in that section and elsewhere, the legitimacy of such examples depends on 
whether they possess independent confirmation. For, even if we find non-structural 
components being preserved through the history of science, as was the case with the 
hypothesis of the materiality of heat, we must ask whether these make a direct 
contribution to the predictive aspects of theories.
The requirement that a component be independently confirmed might prima facie 
sound at odds with Duhem’s thesis, which, after all, is holistic in its approach to 
confirmation. It should not, for by ‘independent confirmation’ I include those cases 
where background conditions and auxiliaries vary.245 The necessary ingredient in my 
construal of independent confirmation is that the component contributes to the 
calculations of values, which can then be checked against testing. Thus, my construal 
of the notion of independent confirmation does not exclude holistic confirmation.
This brings us to the second point, namely that Duhem’s lesson can be completely 
accommodated within the structural realist framework. By and large, terms in any 
given equation appear also in other equations. The term for specific heat at constant 
pressure cp that appears in three -  LI, L3, and L4 -  out of the five equations 
discussed in the previous chapter serves as a good example. When some terms in an 
equation require for the determination of their value the calculation of other terms, 
we either turn to equations where the latter terms appear and are given values, or to
245 My rough definition o f independent confirmation can be found in footnote 195. The variance I 
have in mind does not involve inconsistent auxiliaries.
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some experiment that evaluates such terms. The first disjunct, which is what 
concerns us here, illustrates how equations can act as auxiliaries to other equations. 
Another way to illustrate how the structural realist framework underwrites holistic 
confirmation is by noting the following two intuitive observations: 1) Equations, all 
of whose terms are determined and which agree on the value of any of their shared 
terms, get a holistic boost in confirmation. 2) Where disagreement crops up, we infer 
a la Duhem that at least one of the equations is at fault. Thus equations, or, more 
precisely, mathematical structures, have no problem playing the role of auxiliaries. 
The structural realist can thus give a holistic picture of confirmation solely in terms 
of structures.
The argument from  the limits o f mathematical description, which I presented at the 
end of the last subsection of chapter three, relies on the close link between structural 
realism and mathematics. As I have just pointed out, scientists increasingly rely on 
mathematics to describe the objects of scientific inquiry. Indeed, science employs 
mathematical objects as surrogates for its own objects. According to the orthodox 
view of mathematics, whatever can be described in the language of mathematics will 
be described only up to isomorphism. By transitivity, to the extent that scientific 
objects are describable only in mathematical terms, they will only be describable up 
to isomorphism.
Van Fraassen makes use of this argument to support constructive empiricism, 
claiming that phenomenal objects can only be described up to isomorphism. I see no 
good reason why the same argument cannot be utilised by the structural realist. The 
main difference between the two is that while the constructive empiricist takes 
phenomena to be the only legitimate objects of scientific enquiry, the structural 
realist extends this list to include physical objects. As I have argued above, the 
phenomenal world does not float about freely but is anchored in the physical world 
via causal chains. This should be seen as an argument for the legitimacy of the 
structural realist extension of the scientific enquiry’s list of objects to physical 
objects.
I briefly presented the argument from the linguistic intransmissibility o f anything but 
structure in section three of chapter two, when I pointed out its origins in Poincare,
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Russell, Quine, and Carnap. The argument is a more generalised form of the 
argument from the limits of mathematical description for it extends the structural 
limits of description to all languages, i.e. not just mathematical ones. The gist of the 
argument is as follows: Assuming that we only have direct access to our perceptual 
experience and that this is private, how do we communicate knowledge to others? 
Though language cannot transmit perceptual experience, it can transmit relations that 
hold between perceptions.246 Given that the relata cannot be transmitted, the relations 
transmitted can only be specified up to isomorphism. Thus, only (abstract) structure 
can be transmitted through language.
A concrete example will help make this point clear. Suppose two people, let us call 
them ‘A’ and ‘B’, are locked in separate rooms and A is presented with an object that 
she has to truthfully describe to B via a phone line. The catch is that A cannot 
mention the object by name or any synonyms it may have. What happens during the 
telephone conversation is pretty obvious. A tries to convey the object to B by giving 
certain characterisations of the object’s appearance and function. These 
characterisations are necessarily structural, for A cannot transmit perceptions of the 
object itself. That is, A can only transmit information about the relations the object 
and any of its parts appear to stand in. This typically involves information on its 
geometrical features, the shade of its colour in comparison to some other shade of 
colour A presumes B to be acquainted with, its function with regard to some other 
object, etc.
Now consider what happens when A shows B the object. In case B  did not know the 
object prior to the whole episode, she would gain new knowledge of it, i.e. 
knowledge in addition to the structural knowledge acquired during the telephone 
conversation. The new knowledge would come in the form of perceptions. In case 
she did know the object already, she would simply not gain any new knowledge, at 
least not in the sense of perceiving the object for the very first time. What other kind 
of knowledge does B have of the object in this latter scenario? It is the kind of 
knowledge she could transmit to A if the tables were turned, i.e. structural 
knowledge. Either way, the knowledge that A and B seem to have at their disposal is
246 For example, even though I cannot transmit my perceptual experience o f two shades o f green, I can 
transmit the relation that one is darker than the other.
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of two kinds: perceptions and relations between these. If we accept the 
correspondence story given above, this knowledge allows one to infer the abstract 
structure of the (physical) object in question. A and B  thus end up having a third kind 
of knowledge, one that concerns the physical world.
The following lengthy passage from Quine, which inspired my own example, 
explicates the structural character of the linguistic transmission of information:
Send a man into another room and have him come back and report on its contents.
He comes back and agitates the air for a while, and in consequence of this agitation 
we learn about objects in the other room which are very unlike any agitation of the 
air. Selected traits of objects in that room are coded in traits of this agitation in the 
air. The manner of the coding, called language, is complicated and far-fetched, but 
it works; and clearly it is purely structural, at least in the privative sense of 
depending on no qualitative resemblances between the objects and the agitation. 
Also the man’s internal state, neural or whatever, in which his knowledge of the 
objects in that room consists, presumably bears none but structural relations to those 
objects; structural in the privative sense of there being no qualitative resemblances 
between the objects and the man’s internal state, but only some sort of coding, and, 
of course, causation. And the same applies to our own knowledge of the objects, as 
gained from the man’s testimony (1968: 161).
In all stages of this process, the information is structural through and through. The 
private acquisition of knowledge of the objects is structural. The linguistic 
transmission of this knowledge is structural. The acquisition of knowledge by the 
testimony of others is structural. Even the sound waves produced in speech encode 
only structural information about the world.
Taking Stock
To the extent that historical and other considerations support ESR more strongly 
than any of its rivals, we can say that its epistemic commitments are more warranted. 
Given the inverse relation between epistemic commitments and underdetermination, 
it can be argued that we have at least some warrant to believe that the impact of 
underdetermination on theory choice can be restricted in accordance with the 
epistemic commitments of ESR. Of course, just because we have reason to believe 
that epistemic structural realism is correct, this does not mean that any given 
scientific theory will not be underdetermined with respect to structure. Whether a 
particular theory satisfies certain constraints is something that must be judged on an 
individual basis. Thus, it is only those theories for which we have evidence to
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believe that they have latched on to the structure of the world that will not be 
underdetermined with respect to structure.
It is not argued here that this indirect strategy to restrict the impact of 
underdetermination solves the problem. Rather, it is argued that there is some 
warrant for the view that we can appeal to structural constraints on matters of theory 
choice. Naturally, if the constructive empiricist version of the underdetermination 
thesis is indeed correct, then no realist epistemic commitments will be correct, and, 
correspondingly, the only constraints that theories will be able to satisfy will be 
observational. Having said that, it is not clear that the constructive empiricist version 
of the underdetermination thesis holds, for as I pointed out at the end of section two, 
the notion of a ‘genuine rival’ remains elusive for both parties in the debate. 
Although for each body of observational evidence there are infinitely many 
empirically equivalent theories that diverge on their theoretical claims, it is not clear 
how many of these, if  any, are genuine rivals to existing well-confirmed theories. 
Similarly with the idea of evidential equivalence, it is not clear whether any genuine 
competitor theories can be evidentially equivalent.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have addressed some central themes in the debate concerning 
arguments from the underdetermination of theories by evidence. The starting point 
was Laudan and Leplin’s influential article that criticises underdetermination 
arguments on two fronts.
First, they question the view that all theories have genuine empirically equivalent 
rivals. Yet, their main claim, i.e. no algorithms exist that can produce empirically 
equivalent rivals for any given theory, remains unsubstantiated. To this effect, I 
offered some concrete algorithms that seem to do the job. Even if no genuine 
algorithms can be constructed, I argued, it does not follow that some theories have 
no empirically equivalent rivals. The analogy from recursion theory suggests that 
such rivals may exist despite our inability to produce them algorithmically.
Second, they argue that, even when theories have such rivals, there are still ways to 
justifiably choose between them. In support of this argument, they offer two reasons:
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(a) that the observational consequences of a theory need not be evidential, and (b) 
that evidential considerations go beyond the observational consequences of a theory. 
I argued that even though (a) is correct, it fails to defeat claims of empirical 
equivalence, since all that it achieves is to trade one empirical equivalence class for 
another. Similarly, Leplin and Laudan’s appeal to the converse consequence 
condition and the special consequence condition in support of (b) fails to show that 
evidential considerations go beyond the observational consequences of a theory.
A more promising avenue, not entertained by Leplin and Laudan, towards the claim 
that the observational consequences of a theory form a proper subset of the evidence 
for or against it is the appeal to theoretical virtues such as unity, simplicity, and 
explanatory power. Suppose that it can be shown that these virtues have evidential 
status. Even then, if two theories are empirically equivalent it does not mean that 
they will be equally unified, simple, or explanatorily powerful. Unsurprisingly, 
whether theoretical virtues have such evidential status is a disputed matter. In 
particular, the anti-realist denies the epistemic significance of these virtues, 
emphasising instead their pragmatic character.
Avoiding a full-scale discussion of the evidential merits of theoretical virtues, I 
concentrated instead on the possible ramifications of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. What I 
discovered is that even if the underdetermination that comes with empirical 
equivalence claims is defeated by appeal to theoretical virtues, another type of 
equivalence claims remains. Evidential equivalence is the idea that there is at least 
one evidentially equivalent rival theory for any given theory. If EVE is true then the 
realist must come to terms with the idea that theory choice will never be completely 
resolved, not even in the ideal limit. Indeed, to defeat underdetermination altogether, 
the realist must sustain a thesis that, is logically stronger than the negation of EVE. 
To this effect, I offered several stronger alternatives to the negation of EVE, i.e. 
EVE2-4, pointing out some of the difficulties involved in trying to come up with the 
right formulation.
A suggestion that emerged from the discussion on evidential equivalence was that 
there is an inverse relation between epistemic commitments and underdetermination. 
The greater the epistemic commitments of a position in the scientific realism debate,
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the more rival theories it can potentially eliminate, and, consequently, the more 
underdetermination can be constrained. In this sense, one can order constructive 
empiricism, structural realism, and scientific realism on the basis of the increasing 
constraints they impose on underdetermination. At the end of the day, of course, 
what matters is the extent to which the epistemic commitments of a viewpoint are 
justified.
Summarising the results offered in this dissertation, I argued that there are good 
grounds to choose ESR, and in particular the Russellian variety, over its rivals. To be 
more precise, I offered two kinds of considerations that seem to give structural 
realism the edge: (i) historical, and (ii) other.
With respect to historical considerations, I reasoned that structural realism provides a 
better account of scientific theory change than that offered by the scientific realist. 
This is evident in the structural continuity we witness in the history of science. 
Contra van Fraassen’s claim that the continuity of structure takes place only at the 
level of phenomena, I argued that it is unreasonable to assume that the structure of 
the phenomena encodes no information about the structure of the physical world. In 
particular, I argued that the structural correspondence between our actions in the 
physical world and their observable effects indicates a correspondence between the 
physical and the phenomenal worlds.
With respect to other considerations, I utilised three arguments that go the longest 
way in support of structural realism: 1) The argument from the structural source of 
predictive power rested on the idea that only mathematical structures possess the 
sharp predictive power necessary to test the epistemic warrant of theories, and thus 
only they should take the credit. 2) The argument from the limits of mathematical 
description relied on the fact that scientists employ mathematical objects as 
surrogates for the objects of physics. Since the latter can only be described up to 
isomorphism, the former presumably inherit that trait. 3) The argument from the 
linguistic intransmissibility of non-structure made use of the fact that linguistic 
communication cannot transmit perceptions but only structure.
212
Provided that the historical and other considerations support ESR more strongly than 
any of its rivals, as I believe to have made a case for here, there are reasons to 
believe that underdetermination can be reduced in accordance with its epistemic 
commitments. At any rate, there seems to be no convincing reason to think that the 
constructive empiricist version of the underdetermination thesis holds, and, hence, 
no convincing reason that ESR is false.
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7
SOME PROMISING AVENUES FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH
1. Introduction
Over the last six chapters I have sought to evaluate the plausibility of the structural 
realist answer to the epistemological question set out at the beginning: ‘What kind of 
knowledge, if any, does science reveal of the physical world?’ I began my evaluation 
with an analysis of the debate and an outline of the main challenges facing scientific 
realism. I then proceeded, in chapter two, to a historico-analytical account of 
structural realism in its various guises. Concentrating on the epistemic variety, I 
distinguished between two prominent versions, Ramsey-style and Russellian ESR. I 
completed that chapter by identifying the main challenges to ESR. The next four 
chapters were then spent addressing these challenges, namely those unique to ESR 
and those affecting realist positions more generally. Some were answered to my, and 
I hope the reader’s, satisfaction. Others were left only partly answered, hopefully 
laying the groundwork for further research on this topic. Others still were explicitly 
bracketed from the onset.
In this short chapter, I will outline some promising avenues for future research on 
ESR. The plan is to divide the workload into two manageable sections. First, I will 
consider certain avenues of research arising from challenges that were taken up in 
chapters three to six. Second, I will briefly consider ways to develop answers to the 
challenges logged in the first chapter but not addressed.
2. Outstanding Issues
From Within
Psillos’ remonstration of ESR, as it is reflected in his seven objections listed in 
chapters two and three, has been shown to be largely unfounded. Having said that, at 
least one issue in chapter three demands further attention. Russell’s principle that 
relations between percepts have the same mathematical properties as relations
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between their non-perceptual causes, needs to be placed on a firmer footing. You 
may recall, from section four of chapter three, that Russell’s own justification of the 
principle was muddled and inadequate. I tried to rectify this by offering some 
reasons why we should accept MR, both in the aforementioned section as well as in 
section four of chapter six.
Specifically, in chapter three I argued that it is a general commitment of 
epistemological realism that there be some sort of correspondence between the 
mental or the linguistic on the one hand and the physical on the other. Since 
correspondence is not very informative unless it preserves (the mathematical 
properties of) relations, MR has at least some prima facie plausibility. The trouble is 
that this correspondence, even if relation-preserving, seems to be merely postulated 
to exist between the two realms. If we only have direct epistemic access to the 
perceptual realm, how exactly can we verify the sort of relations it bears to the 
physical realm?
I made an effort to redress this issue in section four of chapter six. There I argued 
that the isomorphic correspondence between the perceptual and physical world can 
be tested in an indirect way. Instrumental to this task is the more familiar 
correspondence between actions and their observable effects. Since actions are 
nothing but causes in the physical world, the correspondence between actions (or 
indeed inactions) and their observable effects is a special instance of the 
correspondence between causes in the physical world and their observable effects.247 
Although the link between the two correspondences is intuitive, more needs to be 
said about the isomorphic nature of the correspondence between actions and their 
observable effects. To this end, one would do well to draw upon the wealth of 
empirical and theoretical results from the fields of psychology of perception, 
neuroscience, cognitive science, AI, etc. A project along these lines would throw 
more light on the trilateral relation between actions, mind, and world.
The discussion of the Newman objection in chapter four raised a couple of issues 
that I want to pursue further here. One such issue concerns the call made by Worrall
247 There seems to be no good reason to expect that our actions are different from other causes in the 
physical world, at least not in a way that is relevant to the current context.
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and Zahar, as well as by Ladyman and French though for different reasons, for a new 
relation-based semantics. According to standard semantics, the interpreted terms of 
first-order sentences uniquely pick out individuals. ESR advocates cannot accept 
this, for they hold that we cannot uniquely pick out individuals. One way out for the 
epistemic structural realist is to resort to notions that work without contravening 
standard semantics. Notions like abstract structure. Another way out, the one 
advocated by Worrall and Zahar, is to replace standard semantics with a semantics 
that takes relations, instead of relata, as primitive. The challenge then for those 
sympathetic to this proposal is to come up with an independent justification why we 
should opt for such a radical approach, as opposed to sticking with the more familiar 
notion of isomorphism. More importantly, the challenge is to deliver a relation-based 
semantics that is as efficacious and successful as standard semantics. The advent of 
such semantics would not only solve ESR’s conceptual difficulties, that some take it 
to have, but also potentially revolutionise philosophy.
One of the dissertation’s most promising suggestions concerns the relationship 
between Quine’s ideas and structural realism. As we saw in chapter four, Quine 
advocated a form of structuralism that he thought to be intimately related to the 
theses of underdetermination and of indeterminacy of reference. I drew parallels 
between these ideas and structural realism. One implicit parallel takes 
(in)determinacy of reference to be circumscribed in accordance with the limits of 
knowledge. From the structural realist perspective, this amounts to the idea that 
reference can be fixed only up to isomorphism. When I said that objects cannot be 
uniquely identified but only up to isomorphism, it was implied that referents are so 
identified too. Given the widespread concern realists have about issues of reference, 
a systematic study of these issues from a structural realist perspective should 
certainly be high on a list o f priorities for future research.
Chapter five addressed the general challenge that realism needs to give a plausible 
explanation of the upheavals in the historical record of science. In particular, it 
requires that at least some components of theories, other than observational 
consequences, survive scientific revolutions, and, furthermore, that only those that 
survive are responsible for the success of a given theory. Structural realism, as we 
have seen, tries to answer this challenge in terms of the continuity of structure. This
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chapter also confronts the more specific challenge that there is insufficient historical 
evidence for structural continuity through theory change. In reply to this latter 
challenge, I concluded, following Worrall’s suggestion, that appeal must be made to 
the correspondence principle.
Alas, no all-embracing account of the correspondence principle has yet been 
formulated. Many people in the debate now believe such an account is unlikely to be 
found. A plurality of correspondence relations is the order of the day. To this end, I 
offered ‘NC-correspondence’, as one such correspondence relation, according to 
which a structure L ' becomes isomorphic to, or approximates, a predecessor L when 
a parameter in L ' is neutralised. I also refined the challenge, stating that the ESR-ist 
must develop and defend a list of correspondence relations that substantiate the view 
that not all structures may survive, but most predictively successful elements that do 
survive, either intact or suitably modified (for, example, according to NC), are 
structural. A list of this kind would mean that more historical cases can be subsumed 
under a structural realist explanation, and would, therefore, count more decisively in 
its favour.
In chapter six, I looked at one of the most intractable problems in the scientific 
realism debate, the underdetermination problem. Formulated in terms of a challenge 
to the realist, RP1 demands that we are able to choose between empirically 
equivalent theories. In evaluating the most prominent attempt to overcome RP1 in 
recent years, that of Laudan and Leplin, I considered equivalence types other than 
empirical equivalence. I pointed out that even if R P l’s demands could be met, that 
would not necessarily vanquish underdetermination, for other types of equivalences 
still lurk in the background. Evidential equivalence, for example, is the idea that 
there is at least one evidentially equivalent rival theory for any given theory, where 
how well a theory stands up to the evidence is not taken to be merely a question of 
entailing true observational sentences but also involves, roughly speaking, the way 
the theory entails these sentences -  an issue that brings in the ‘theoretical virtues’.
Even though it does not mean complete victory against underdetermination, having 
the ability to overcome empirical equivalence would be tantamount to constructive 
empiricism’s defeat. The fact that theoretical virtues can act as a lever against the
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deadlock of empirical equivalence was briefly mentioned in section three of the same 
chapter. A lot of research is currently being carried out to show why theoretical
* 4 0  j
virtues should be evidentially relevant in matters of theory choice. The challenge 
for the structural realist is to show why they should be evidentially relevant only to 
structures. In other words, assuming that theoretical virtues carry evidential weight 
in matters of theory choice, why should they favour structural realism over 
traditional scientific realism?
From Without
Some topics deep at the heart of the scientific realism debate have had very little or 
no exposure in this dissertation. This is true of two of realism’s central obstacles, 
briefly mentioned in the first chapter and explicitly bracketed thereafter. To remind 
the reader these are:
(RP3) It must be shown, or at least it is preferable to show, why the success of 
science needs explaining and, furthermore, why scientific realism provides a better 
explanation than any alternative position.
(RP4) The notions of approximate truth, truthlikeness and verisimilitude need to be 
given rigorous characterisations. If no adequate formal treatments can be given, as 
indeed conceded by some realists, more robust informal accounts as well as the 
reasons why such accounts would work need to be clearly explained.
A lot can be said about the relation of either to ESR. Suitably adapted, the second 
part of RP3 takes the form ‘Why does structural realism provide a better explanation 
than any alternative position?’ To the extent that the success of science needs 
explaining -  an assumption that thereby answers the first part of RP3 positively -  
structural realism has a pretty strong case. I see no good reason why the same 
arguments I utilised in the last subsection of section four in chapter six to support 
ESR cannot also be used here. For example, given that we take historical 
preservation to be a rough indicator of a theory’s success and that the kind of
248 Elliot Sober, for example, has been spearheading a very influential programme in the philosophy 
o f science that takes the Akaike theorem, named after the statistician who invented it, to be giving us 
a good estimate o f a theory’s simplicity based on the way it deals with the evidence.
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preservation we witness is essentially structural, structural realism can be said to 
offer a better historical explanation of the success o f science. Similarly, the argument 
from the structural source of predictive power can be utilised to explain the 
predictive success of science on the basis of the view that mathematical structures 
have latched on to the structure of the world.
An issue related to RP3 is inference to the best explanation. This notion has a lot of 
currency in the practice of science, where inferences are seldom straightforwardly 
deductive or inductive. Some form of IBE thus seems indispensable. I am inclined to 
think that IBE can be structuralised as some sort of inference to the best causal 
structure. That is, the best explanation for a given set of data would have to give a 
causal account o f the underlying structure. In a sense, I have been making tacit use 
of IBE all through the dissertation. When I claimed in section three of chapter two 
that ‘observational data falls into certain patterns allowing us to discover/postulate 
relations between observables’ what I had in mind was something along these lines. 
The test for the structural realist is to conceive of a version of IBE that delegates the 
explanatory power of theories to structures and nothing but structures.
As a final point, I suspect that a characterisation of the notions of approximate truth, 
truthlikeness, and verisimilitude finds more fertile ground in structural realism than 
in any other type of realism. For one thing, the position’s focus on the mathematical 
notion of abstract structure makes it easier to provide a formal treatment to measures 
of truth. Yet, even if the venture of formalisation fails to take off, the fact that the 
seat of predictive power seems to reside in structures cannot but bolster the belief 
that informal accounts of the notions of approximate truth, truthlikeness, and 
verisimilitude will also adopt the structural point of view. I have already talked 
loosely of structures approximating other structures in my discussion of NC- 
correspondence. I can only hope that a methodical enquiry into the link between 
approximate truth, truthlikeness and verisimilitude on the one hand, and structural 
realism on the other, will eventually bear fruit.
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3. Conclusion
In light of the above assessment, I want to identify four topics that appear to me the 
most alluring as avenues for future research. Each of these is accompanied by a few 
sample questions that I hope will whet the reader’s appetite.
(1) Theory of Reference: Does structural realism dictate any particular theory of 
reference? If reference can only be fixed up to isomorphism, what does this 
entail for the conditions of successful reference?
(2) The Correspondence Principle: If there is no all-embracing correspondence 
principle, what are the conditions of adequacy for each individual type of 
correspondence? How can we justify the claim that correspondence relations 
are neither trivially satisfiable nor socially constructed? Are all types of 
correspondence supportive of epistemic structural realism?
(3) Inference to the Best Explanation: Can a structural version of IBE be offered? 
Something in the ballpark of inference to the best structural explanation, for 
instance. If so, would this structural version of IBE perform without loss of 
vital inferential powers to the practice of science?
(4) Approximate Truth: Can we get a handle on the distance between theory and 
truth solely in virtue of structures? How are we to understand claims about 
one structure approximating another?
I trust that research into these four topics will provide ample data to peruse, in 
addition to the data provided in this dissertation, thereby facilitating a more informed 
judgment about the merits and shortcomings of epistemic structural realism. If I may 
be forgiven for the potential irreverence to the ghost of William of Occam, I will 
finish with an apt adjustment of his dictum that is in line with structural realism:
Do not multiply entities beyond the limits of structural isomorphism!
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